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This thesis offers qualitative evidence for why post-colonial citizenship in Algeria retains its 
legal-constitutional, nationalistic, and societal norms and values when it comes to meeting the 
needs of the Syrian displaced community in Algeria. The history of resistance to colonial 
governance has meant a constant reinvention of the State’s norms of exclusion and inclusion. 
Using Foucault’s analysis of biopolitical governmentality, this thesis shows how the Algerian 
state’s response, especially after the migrant emergency in Europe in 2015, has circumscribed 
the bounds of Algerianness in order to preserve the norms of citizenship from challenge. Unlike 
the European ideal of cosmopolitan citizenship in the context of a global refugee crisis, 
Algerian state norms and values have been shaped by three rationalities that have paradoxical 
outcomes. These rationalities are: hospitality, which is governed by rationalities of faith (Islam) 
and Pan-Arabism / Arabness; the state’s political concern with territorial security that are 
governed by rationalities of nationalism and security; and the state’s capacity to cope with the 
phenomenon of mass human movement in the 21st century (humanitarian support). Algeria’s 
strategies manifest a power game between nationalism and security within the state’s 
conceptions of Algerian citizenship and its openness towards non-citizens. This qualitative 
investigation uses sociological analysis to argue that the flow of Syrian refugees is managed 
according to these three rationalities of nationalism, security, pan-Arabism / Arabness and 
Islamic values. 
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1.1.‘A Piece of 1962 that Settles in the Present’  
 
After more than fifty-eight years of independence and over 170 years after the death of the 
most influential figures of the Algerian local resistance against brutal French colonisation, 
Algeria announced that it will formally and officially recover from France the body parts 
(skulls and remains) of twenty-four Algerian fighters and martyrs. The body parts belong to 
Cherif Boubaghla and Sheikh Ahmed Bouziane and their brothers that led the Zaatcha [oasis] 
anti-colonial uprising in 1849 among whom there was an Egyptian national who was in Algeria 
during his assassination by the French coloniser (Abdallah, 2020). This event reminds me of 
Boumedienne’s era when the body of Algeria’s well-known leader of anti-colonial resistance 
in the 19th century, El Amir Abdu El-Kader el Jazaei’ri, was returned from Damascus, Syria to 
Algeria and buried in Martyrs’ cemetery “El Alia cemetery” in 1966. El Amir Abdu El-Kader 
el Jazaei’ri was exiled by the French colonial regime in 1855 to Damascus, where he continued 
to live until his death. After Algeria’s independence and in an emotional ceremony like his 
allies that were recovered from France in 2020, Abdu El-Kader’s body was returned by the 
Syrian government in 1966 and welcomed by Algerians.  
 
The Algerian fighters were completely dehumanised to the point that they were not given their 
proper names; instead, they were numbered. The skulls of twenty-four Algerian fighters had 
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been kept in the storage area at the “Musée de l’Homme” in France for decades after their death 
(Vives & Global Information Network, 2020). On the 3rd of July 2020 and after years of 
negotiations with the French government and political and bureaucratic obstacles, remains of 
the Algerian fighters were welcomed with an exceptional celebration ceremony led by 
Algeria’s president, Abdelmadjid Tebboun, and national army forces. Despite the world 
pandemic situation and nationwide lockdown, Algerian people travelled from all over the 
country to salute their national martyrs and, in tears, pray for their souls. The remains of these 
national heroes of national anti-colonial resistance remained displayed for the public at “Palais 
de Culture” in Algiers until their final burial on the 5th of July 2020, Algeria’s national 
Independence Day (Doudou, 2020). On the day of their arrival, the Algerian army chief, Said 
Chengriha delivered a speech saying: 
 
‘The valiant resistance fighters who refused the colonization of their country by imperial France were displayed 
immorally for decades, like vulgar objects of antiquity, without respect for their dignity, their memory. That is the 
monstrous face of colonization … Algeria is now living a special day today’ (CGTN Africa, 2020). 
 
The army chief of Algeria, Said Chengriha, started his speech by denouncing as criminal acts 
the actions of the French regime towards Algerian heroes of the Algerian anti-colonial 
resistance and finalised his speech by appreciating the moment of recovery of the remains of 
the Algerian anti-colonial fighters. Like Said Chengriha, Algeria’s president Abdelmadjid 
Tebboun, in tears, argued:  
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‘They [fighters] have been deprived of their natural and human right to be buried for more than 170 years. Led by 
Cherif Boubaghla and Sheikh Ahmed Bouziane, the leader of the Zaatcha [oasis] uprising and their brothers, the 
remains include a skull of a young man who was younger than 18 years old’ (Abdallah, 2020). 
Malika Rahal, a historian referred to this historical moment as ‘a piece of 1962 that settles …in 
2020’ (“Algeria to recover…”, 2020). This event has delivered important messages regarding 
the nature of Algerianness as a political and a normative force, biopolitical and historical entity. 
The political significance of this event can be seen as a strong rejection of all kinds of 
colonisation and dehumanisation and constitutes an implicit confession by the French Republic 
of its crimes against Algerians during colonisation. The message of this event is that 
Algerianness still holds its normative force and the past remains a relatively safe repository of 
moral inspiration to base the nation’s dominant values. From a perspective of Foucault’s 
terminology of biopolitics, a political rationality which takes the administration of life and 
populations as its subject- the speeches of the Algerian state president and the army chief stated 
above remain a clear demonstration of a biopolitical state practice that cares for the well-being 
of the population. This biopolitical state practice also offers biopolitical rights to Algerian 
martyrs to be buried, with dignity, in their country for which they sacrificed their lives. The 
historical significance of this event shows that the Algerian state, to date, did not safely archive 
its colonial past with the French state. 
 
The fact of chasing the French government for years to return the body parts of the Algerian 
anti-colonial fighters shows that Algeria’s past still colonises the present. Algerianness 
represents an image about the presence of the past in the present. The latter is the starting point 
of my thesis. This thesis explores the nature and conceptualisation of Algerianness and 
Algerian national identity and how it treats non-citizens including Syrians as displaced people. 
Historically Algerianness was too diffuse for a diverse nation to cohere around in resisting 
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French colonisation; these only came to be defined according to prominent nationalists such 
as: El Amir Abdu el-Kader el Jazaei’ri, Abd El-Hamid Ibn Badiss, and Messali Hadj, as the 
French Republic’s assimilationist agenda of violent pacification in its North African colony 
began to fail. Given its colonial history and post-colonial present, this research reveals that 
Algerianness constitutes a contested field of collective identity where normative, nationalistic, 
biopolitical and political forces are mobilised by social actors. However, the question that arises 
in this thesis in relation to the discussion around human migration is: how do these forces / 
powers of Algerianness treat non-citizens that wish to belong in the age of mass migration in 
the 21st century? More specifically, how does this power game produce Syrians within Algeria?  
How does the conflict of powers construct Syrians as subjects that may boost the well-being of 
the Algerian population?    
 
The nature of post-colonial Algerianness has been continuously questioned. For instance, 
during popular marches that took place in early 2019, Algerians critically questioned the old 
design of Algerianness including its welfare system (social rights), political and civil rights of 
citizenship. Societal and cultural aspects were based on the normative force of Algerianness 
that unifies all Algerians, and on nationalistic values that should appreciate the revolutionary 
war of 1st of November 1954 and the efforts of the Algerian martyrs and war fighters (el 
Moudjahidin) in attaining independence. In several European countries such as in the UK, 
Sweden, Greece, France, Hungary, citizens supported political and nationalistic parties with 
xenophobic, cultural racism and exclusionary attitudes to migrants that are considered as the 
‘other’ or the ‘outsider’ who menace the collective representation of a national identity (Mafu, 
2019, p. 03). In the western scenario, national collective identities have been constantly 
exclusive; in Germany, for example, and as a reaction to Merkel’s immigration policies, 
Islamophobic, xenophobic and anti-migrant demonstrations took place in the German city of 
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Chemnitz in August 2018, leaving eighteen people injured (“Thousands protest…”, 2018; 
“Eighteen injured…”, 2018). However, interestingly, in Algeria the marches of February 22nd, 
2019 did not act as a platform for xenophobia to grow against asylum seekers, refugees, and 
immigrants as a major factor in rising unemployment in Algeria. Algerians, instead, criticised 
the social policy and its failure to achieve justice between different social classes in Algeria. 
The primary objective of this study is to offer a sociological understanding of how the Algerian 
state has been managing the flow of Syrian displaced people to the country since the start of 
the Syrian civil war in 2011. It is worth stating that the Algerian scene is very different from 
that in the Western context. While many Western countries have legislated official refugee 
schemes through which states can study, approve or maybe decline the applications of asylum 
seekers, Algeria’s immigration system still lacks this option and did not legislate an official 
law which could have organised the flow of war refugees to the country. Because there is no 
asylum official mechanism, by law, Syrians in Algeria are not legally recognised as asylum 
seekers or refugees, but they are recognised as either economic immigrants (long-residence 
permit holders) or as visitors / tourists (short-residence permit holders). Having said this, 
Algeria, compared to many of the Western countries, is still in its infancy when it comes to its 
experience in managing war refugees / displaced people. The main reason is that since the black 
decade in the 1990s, Algeria has had a reputation of being a dangerous place and an unsafe 
destination for either tourists or immigrants compared to neighbouring countries such as 
Tunisia and Morocco. From my experience, when I was applying for my ethical application in 
2018, I was obliged to do a risk assessment as a part of the ethical procedures at Portsmouth 
University. The overall risk of Algeria determined by the Drum Cussac Global Risk Monitor 
has been moderate to high at 3.75 (Drum Cussac.net). Although the terrorist attack of 
September 11th, 2001 in the USA proved that all countries, without exceptions, are in a constant 
risk of facing international terrorism, a phenomenon which is not unique only to specific 
 19 
countries, global reports and Western media still portray Algeria as an unsafe country. The 
latter is probably why Algeria has not had any previous experience with a significant flow of 
displaced people fleeing war before the arrival of Syrians in 2011. Apart from refugees of 
Western Sahara in the Southern region of Algeria, Tindouf, Syrians represent a significant 
fraction of displaced people in urban places in Algeria.  
After the civil conflict in Syria in 2011, approximately fifty thousand Syrians decided to reside 
in Algeria. Because the distance to drive from Syria to Algeria is more than 10-hours long and 
a flight ticket that would cost more than 500 Euros per person, most Syrian families that entered 
Algeria originally belong to upper middle class or bourgeois classes in Syria. These Syrians 
have chosen to reside in Algeria and resume their lives in an Arab country that would 
unconditionally welcome them without a visa. Many Syrian males are businessmen who hold 
higher education qualifications and could easily resume their businesses and lives in Algiers, 
however this does not deny that there were vulnerable groups of Syrians that extremely needed 
financial support and shelter. Vulnerable Syrian people have been hosted in guest centres such 
as Sidi Feradj guest centre in Algiers. Research fieldwork revealed that most my Syrian 
participants that reside in Algiers were able to afford private accommodation and, for them, 
social integration was smooth because they did not face any socio-economic obstacles. Fateh, 
(39) a shop owner in Baba Hassan, clarified that, for him, most Syrians that came to Algeria 
were not in need for financial or humanitarian support. He stated  
‘… Syrians that were financially stable came to Algeria and easily started a new life; others that were in need for 
financial support did not even think about coming to Algeria. Instead, they have chosen to go to more neighbouring 
countries such as Iraq, Jordon, and Lebanon …’ [… Souriyin li houn b Jazaei’ir mo’adamhom mayssourin lhal… 
ya’ani el chakhss souri li ando mochkila maliya fi souriya, ma fakar fi el jazaeir mn assassha, raho lal Irak, el 
ordon w lobnan ama li ahwalo moyassara maliyan, fa howa karar yji la jazaeir w ma yentzro ay mossaadat …]. 
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For these reasons, the present thesis does not focus on post-traumatic stress experiences that 
Syrians have faced after they reached Algeria. In this thesis, I will rather focus on the state’s 
strategies of rehabilitation and integration of the Syrian community in the capital, Algiers, and 
how these state strategies resulted in a feeling of marginality and uncertainty among Syrians in 
terms of their legal status in the country. From a perspective of biopolitical governmentality, 
the present study provides an explanation of how the state strategies and discourses manifest 
the politics of care and exclusion. Although the state’s strategies provided Syrians with access 
to welfare services, I argue that they have been designed to primarily care for the local 
population by preserving and boosting its homogenous national identity and normative feature 
of Algerian citizenship. By doing this, the present thesis will provide a new understanding of 
power within the Algerian context. Unlike Western studies that constructed a very narrow view 
of power in Algeria that is often referred to as a tool of authoritarianism and repression, the 
present thesis adopts a Foucauldian thinking of power in order to shed light on more positive 
types of power that regulate, administer, normalise and boost the well-being of the population. 
The present thesis will also critically reflect on the application of different types of power in 
real life situations. My research data revealed that Algerianness and Algerian citizenship are, 
now, adopting new evolving modalities in the age of mass migration namely: hospitality, 
security and humanitarianism. The three state strategies and discourses of hospitality, security, 
being the raison d’état, and commitment to the provision of humanitarian support, were 
governed by rationalities of Algerian nationalism and were, in turn, interpreted in the following 
state technologies of biopolitical governmentality such as: closing borders, imposing visa on 
Syrians in 2015 prior to their arrival, restricting access to employment and health insurance 
and informally and exceptionally not allowing the legalisation of mixed marriages between 
Algerians and Syrians.  
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These state rationalities are not randomly designed but they are historically related to the 
colonial past and post-colonial present of Algeria and are even designed in relation to the 
contemporary challenges of international terrorism in order to meet the state objectives. I argue 
that the biogovernmental norms of security and securitised humanitarianism can be seen as a 
reaction to the current challenges that Algeria has faced in the light of instability in the Sahel 
region due to the interventions of foreign military troops such as the presence of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) at its land borders with Libya (Lenarz, 2012) and the 
French troops in Northern Mali. These regional uprisings inevitably affected both the Algerian 
society and the political scene in Algeria (Northey 2019, p. 04). Unconsciously, by securitising 
the country, it is as if the Algerian government is trying to protect the country and prevent any 
possible threats from the so called “Arab spring” or the scenario of the French naval forces 
invading the country, as happened in 1827 which was followed by France colonising Algeria 
for 132 years.  
 
The biogovernmental norms of territorial security and humanitarianism contradict with the 
ethos of Islamic hospitality that the Prophet Mohamed appealed to by unconditionally hosting 
both believers and non-believers. They also contradict with the values of unconditional 
hospitality of El Amir Abdu el-Kader el Jazaei’ri when he hosted Christians in his palace in 
Damascus, Syria, because their lives were threatened during the sectarian riot in Syria and 
Lebanon in the 19th century (Wien, 2017). On the other hand, the state’s rationality behind 
conditional biogovernmental norms of hospitality is again due to challenging threats that the 
state faces due to instability in its neighbouring countries namely Libya and Mali and the 
presence of terrorist groups at its borders. The state’s securitisation of humanitarianism started 
since the black decade in the 1990s and continues to grow especially after the French 
government swapped 100 jihadists who were imprisoned in France for French hostages who 
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were detained in Mali (“Mali hostages…”, 2020). This act can be seen as a form of biopolitical 
racism from France towards Africans, whose lives, according to the French regime, are 
“unvaluable”, because the fact of releasing more than 100 Jihadists in Mali continues to feed 
into the circle of international terrorism in the Sahel region rather than combatting and 
preventing it.  
Implicitly, the state’s discourses of hospitality and security and their rationalities can be 
understood from a perspective of biopolitical governmentalities that aim at preserving the 
national identity of the Algerian population and enhancing its homogeneous features that do 
not necessarily match globalisation and multiculturalism. The integration of asylum seekers in 
the state capital, Algiers, is administered through the provision of social welfare, in healthcare, 
education, housing and employment. In terms of a biopolitical strategy, this project shows that 
the pastoral responsibility for war refugees, however, is implemented according to strict limits 
and conditions; the legal status of these men, women and children does not give them the right 
to attain Algerian citizenship. In this research, I will identify the key social factors among state 
and non-state actors in civil society that may or may not preclude Syrian displaced people from 
the Algerian national community. 
 
This research is a qualitative study that investigates how legal and normative forces of Algerian 
citizenship and Algerianness are constituted of competing governmental discourses and state 
biopolitical strategies in the age of migration and during the flow of Syrian displaced people 
into Algeria in the 21st century. Using Foucauldian notions of biopolitics and governmental 
discourse, analysis is carried out at three main levels. The first level investigates the state’s 
rationalities that lie behind the state’s discourses / strategies of hospitality, security, and 
humanitarianism. By doing this, this level of analysis also looks at how the state has embodied 
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its rationalities since 2011 using different technologies of care and control. The second level 
of analysis investigates the state’s modes of subjectivation and the production of the subject. 
Drawing on power-knowledge relations, the second level of analysis will depict the conflicting 
discourses over the production of Syrian displaced people as “guests”, “potential threat to 
national security” and “brothers and sisters” and the meaning of circulated knowledge at 
different times. Within a state’s biogovernmental framework, the third and last level of analysis 
will focus on how the state’s welfare rationalities and technologies have been designed to 
achieve biopolitical aims of care for the Algerian population and of both care and exclusion for 
the Syrian population in Algeria. 
Semi-structured interviews were carried out with research participants from both Syrian and 
Algerian cohorts in the capital Algiers, regardless of their gender, sexual orientation, religion 
profession or their ethnic background. The Syrian cohort involved Syrian displaced people who 
moved to Algeria after the Syrian civil war in 2011. The Algerian cohort, on the other hand, 
involved Algerian state officials, staff members that deliver social welfare services to Syrians 
in healthcare, education, housing and employment and key members of charity organisations. 
The latter are not non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in the sense that they are 
independent from the state and are committed to support refugees only, but they are charity 
organisations that have adopted religion (Islam) as their main rational. They adopted Islamic 
values and ethics of supporting and looking after people in need as their main task. ‘Charity 
organisations such as: Jame’eyat Hiraae (organisation of Hiraae), Jame’eyat Akhawat el khayr 
(Organisation of Sisters’ Good Deeds) and Jame’eyat el Irchad wa el Islah (Organisation of 
Guidance and Reform) are designed to provide support to everyone in need in Algeria including 
Algerians and Syrians … these organisations are very active in the capital, Algiers, and have 
their branches even outside the city … they are approved by the state … they receive financial 
support from both the state and independent donors including Algerian businessmen, 
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entrepreneurs and the like’, Fatima, (39), an Algerian businesswoman, a key member and 
representative of charity organisations, added. The choice of participants from the Algerian 
cohort such as healthcare providers revealed how the state sets up strategies and how they were 
implemented according to different state rationalities.  
 
1.2. Introduction and Background of the Study 
 
Within the context of globalisation, topics of immigration, forced migration, and human 
mobility, in general, have been the timeliest research topics in the twenty-first century. These 
have always intertwined with concepts of citizenship, cosmopolitanism, nationalism, 
biopolitics and governmentality studies. Researchers across a variety of empirical research 
disciplines in social sciences such as sociology, politics, and geography have worked on issues 
of migration. From the perspective of the social sciences and immigration studies, for instance, 
human mobility simply means to move from place A to place B to seek better living conditions. 
Individuals can either move from rural to urban spheres or from one city to another within the 
same country (at the national level/ internal migration) in a context of urbanization or across 
countries (at the international level) within a context of external migration. People migrate for 
many different reasons: economic, political, environmental, and social; these are known as 
push-pull factors (De Hass, 2008). The displacement of people and international migration 
(voluntary or forced) challenges the validity and the sovereignty of a nation-state, its national 
security, borders’ control, inclusiveness, and allegiance to the nation state. 
The international law of migration precisely distinguishes between migrants and forced 
migrants (refugees). The first group of people voluntarily leave their home country to seek a 
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better life, better job opportunities and better life choices; the latter group involves people who 
leave their home country under unsafe conditions to seek security and peace (Armstrong, 2012, 
p. 223). The United Nation’s charter of Human Rights was established in 1948 following mass 
migrations due to the World Wars that began in Europe. Article 13 in the UN charter of Human 
Rights declares that ‘everyone is entitled to free movement and residence within the borders of 
each state; everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his 
country’ (United Nations, 2015, p. 28). However, the displacement of people and international 
migration (voluntary or forced) can be challenging to the sovereignty of a nation-state, its 
national security, loyalty and allegiance to the nation state, borders’ control.  
  
In this thesis, I will focus on international migration and more specifically on forced migration 
of Syrians that fled their home country due to war and instability since 2011 and decided to 
live in Algeria and more specifically in the capital, Algiers. Research data of the present thesis 
reveals that at a societal level, most Syrian participants did not face social exclusion or 
obstacles that would hinder their social integration or their integration into healthcare, 
education, and housing. However, they experienced major problems in terms of legal 
recognition and access to employment. Wafae (27), was working in a nursery school in Syria 
but could not resume her work in Algeria because of her legal status. By law, her short-
residence permit does not allow her to work in state organisations in Algeria although she has 
been living in the country since 2016. Wafae narrated her experience:  
 
‘…In terms of employment, for instance, I tried to apply for a job in in a nursery school, but I could not be 
successful in my application because I do not have a long-residence permit or a working permit…’ [min nahiyat 
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choghl ana matalan roht michan adaris bi madrassa lhadana lhokoumiya bas makdert, makablouni la ano ma andi 
la ikama da’ima, la rokhssat choghl la bitakat tachghil…]. 
 
Not only in the case of Syrian females, Ayman (40), previously a journalist in Syria, replied to 
my question about his view of Syrians’ integration at both a societal level and a legal level: 
 
‘… the Algerian society is very kind and welcoming … it is a society that is highly influenced by faith: Islam, …. 
We do not have problems with the people … but our concerns are at a legal level … we do not have long-residence 
permits that would allow us to register our business on our names without the need for a long-residence holder or 
an Algerian citizen as a co-owner …’ [cha’eb el djazaei’ir cha’eb tayib w cha’eb motaatir b din el islami ktir ma 
adna ay machakil ma’ou, bas adna mochkila ma’a el awrak .. ma adna ikamat la nkder nftah machari’e aw mahalat 
b asmaena el khassa bi doun chakhs ando ikama da’ima aw jinssiya jazaei’iriya] 
 
Similarly, one of the strongest motives that encouraged Anas (39) and Mohamed (32) and their 
small families to quit UAE and Egypt, respectively, where they had legal status, and reside in 
Algeria was the level of hospitality and openness that their friends experienced among 
Algerians. However, the state’s approach of hospitality and unconditional welcoming does not 
guarantee full and unconditional access of social welfare services.  
 
As stated above, I will investigate the state’s technologies and rationalities of power that have 
governed the Syrian displaced community in Algeria through discourses of hospitality which, 
at state and societal level, is shaped by faith (Islam) and a newly resurgent pan-Arabism. The 
state’s approach of hospitality can be seen as a socio-political strategy to strengthen 
Algerianness in the collective imagination by advocating shared values of brotherhood with 
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the rest of the Arab world. Hospitality (diyafa) in Algeria is also religion-driven and it 
represents a crucial element in Algerian Islamic ethics and traditions. Its position in Islamic 
theology is manifested in the Prophet Mohamed’s saying, ‘there is no good in the one who is 
not hospitable’ (in Siddiqui, 2016). In addition to hospitality, the state’s geopolitical concerns 
over social unity and national territorial security have treated the Algerian national community, 
Algerianness, as its referent object that needs protection from a constant threat of international 
terrorism. However, this securitisation has resulted in a feeling of marginality among Syrian 
respondents. Wael (37), a van-driver, who was an electrician in Aleppo, Syria, before he 
entered Algeria in 2014, relates to marginality: 
 
‘… we are in a prison, a big prison. We have freedom inside, but once we leave Algeria, we cannot come back to 
it. [nahna n’ich b sijn; sijn kbir ma fina ntla’e meno’. [Netnakal dakhil el jazaei’ir bi kol horiya ma fi mchakil bas 
mata ma tla’ena menha mafina narja’e] (My translation from dialectal Arabic to English).  
 
In addition to the main conflicting discourses and state strategies of hospitality and security, 
there is a historical obligation for the state to provide humanitarian support and to the Syrian 
community. Humanitarian aid can be seen as an extension of values of Arabo-Islamic 
hospitality that is driven by historical ties between Algerians and Syrians that started since 
1855 when El Amir Abdu El-Kader el Jazaei’ri was exiled in Damascus and this event has 
marked a strong kinship between both nations ever since. Most my participants such as: Fatima 
(39) a businesswoman and a representative of charity organisations from the Algerian cohort, 
and others from the Syrian cohort such as: Lara (45, a dressmaker), Nirmin (49, a housewife), 
Bachir (25, a business owner), Moataz (23, a shopkeeper), Amin (28, a shopkeeper), Amar (35, 
a shop owner), and Riyadh (37, a builder) shared the same view and expressed an emotional 
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charge of brotherhood in the name of kinship and historical ties between the Algerian and 
Syrian nations that started since the exile of El Amir Abdu El-Kader el Jazaei’ri in Syria.   
 
Despite all restrictions, Algerian authorities including the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the 
Algerian Red Crescent continue to collaborate with UNHCR branches in Algeria to provide 
support for displaced people and their families. The International Organization for Migrants 
(IOM) has collaborated with the Algerian Ministry of Health to seek better healthcare, 
treatment, and support services to both migrants and harragas. Harraga, ‘the path burners’, is 
a term of North African colloquial Arabic used to describe North African migrants that attempt 
to cross frontiers illegally and reach Europe (Sansal, 2014, p. 37). The Migration Policy Centre 
in the EU region (2013, p. 10) declares: 
 
‘Algeria has initiated ambitious reforms in its migration policy. The main objective of the new Algerian migration 
policy is to control irregular migration. This choice can be explained by a number of converging factors: increased 
EU engagement with Algeria on irregular migration; the proliferation of smuggling networks involved in cross-
border crime; increase in regional terrorist activity; regional upheavals and consequent increases in population 
movements; and by the indignation of the public confronted by the drama of the harragas… In addition to border 
controls, the Algerian government has also been involved in dealing with humanitarian crises on its borders, such 
as the displacement of people from Libya and Tunisia after the Arab Spring and the Malian refugee crisis that 
started in 2012, and has provided humanitarian aid, among other services, in such circumstances. It is also working 
with the UNHCR to address refugee issues within Algeria’s borders’. 
 
Due to constant threats from terrorist groups, smugglers, and drug traffickers, Algeria’s 
approach to managing the movement of irregular migrants is a matter of effective border 
controls. At the same time, the Algerian state is still committed to providing humanitarian aid 
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to potentially displaced people coming from Mali, Libya and Tunisia. The state’s paradoxical 
strategies and discourses of hospitality, security and humanitarian support emerged as 
substitutes to an official legal mechanism of refugees in the country which would have 
managed the flow of Syrians and granted them rights, if it had been present in Algerian law. 
Although there is no legal forum for Syrians to claim their rights, my empirical investigation 
reveals that the Algerian social welfare system offered Syrians full and unconditional access to 
healthcare, education, housing, but only conditional and limited access to employment. One 
would ask: why would the state grant Syrians free unconditional access to healthcare, 
education, and housing, yet limit access to employment? 
Using Foucault’s concept of governmentality by which ‘a population’s conduct is directed, 
managed and controlled’ (Bulley, 2014, p. 02) and focussing on the idea of biopolitics, I argue 
that the state strategies of hospitality, security and humanitarian support are primarily 
biopolitical. This means that the practices adopted by the state to manage the flow of Syrians 
in Algeria, are primarily designed to govern the Algerian local population and enhance its 
prosperity and well-being. This is achieved by monitoring its level of openness towards 
foreigners by deciding who deserves entry and who does not, based on their capacities, abilities 
and skills to improve the well-being of the local population. This proves why the state 
facilitated the access of most Syrian businessmen to employment and granted them long-
residence permits while it restricted and limited access of Syrians that belong to a lower and 
working classes. Hatem (42) a Syrian businessman in Baba Hassan explained:  
 
‘… I am not going to lie to you, I am a businessman and I have my own business, I have health insurance, I have 
a legal status which is my long-residence permit .. I do not have a problem, but short-residence permit holders and 
undocumented people cannot start their own businesses or apply for trade registers on their own names…’ [choufi 
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ma rah akdeb aliki, ana andi amali khas fini w andi ikama w andi daman ijitimae’I yaani mafi mochkil bas fi nas 
ma andon ikamat maykdro ystakhrjo sijil tijari khas fihoun]. 
 
This, in turn, demonstrates that the state in Algeria still holds power over the design of 
Algerianness as a normative and societal force, as a nation’s collective identity, and as a 
biopolitical entity. This socio-political scene also reflects the problematisation and 
conceptualisation of Algerian citizenship that has been governed by its colonial and post-
colonial normative forces. My research data also uncovered that the normative force of 
Algerian citizenship remains highly dependent on nationalist discourses that have designed 
Algerianness as a religio-culturally and racially homogeneous phenomenon. 
 
1.3. Research Aims and Research Questions 
 
Given the lack of academic and general research that sheds light on Syrian displaced people in 
Algeria and the complexity and ambiguity around their situation in Algeria, and the absence of 
a national refugee / asylum mechanism in Algeria, this research aims at answering the 
following research questions: 
 
a. What are the dominant state discourses in Algeria in relation to refugeeness? What 
are the state rationalities behind adopting these discourses? How do they function 
and what are their technologies? 
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b. Within a framework of biopolitical governmentality: how are these state technologies 
designed to care or control both the local and the displaced community, Algerians 
and Syrians respectively?  
c. As far as the production of knowledge and modes of subjectivation are concerned: 
What is the status of Syrians in Algeria?  
 
• What rights and responsibilities do they have and what are the legal and 
societal challenges that Syrians are facing within the Algerian setting?  
• How do Syrians in Algeria position themselves within Algeria -both 
discursively and practically?  
• How do these ways of positioning themselves respond to/ match/ challenge the 
ways in which the Algerian state produces Syrians (guests/ potential threat to 
national security/ brothers and sisters)? 
 
Question (a) aims at identifying the main discourses that dominate the state’s politics of 
refugeeness and their technologies that were adopted in order to manage the flow of Syrians to 
the country. Identifying the state’s technologies and the main discourses is crucial in this 
research because the state has not yet adopted a national refugee mechanism, which is supposed 
to explain how the state should respond to displaced people, how it works to integrate them 
into the Algerian context and how power shapes the self of the displaced community. The 
investigation of state’s technologies is still possible and can be done through observing the 
state practices and its response to the influx of Syrians since 2011. State technologies have their 
underlying rationalities. In order to answer question (a), chapters 3 and 4 provide a critical 
analysis to colonial and post-colonial Algerian history which is crucial in understanding the 
nature of Algerian citizenship as both a political, normative, and a biopolitical entity.  
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Question (b) provides an understanding of how the Algerian state perceives Syrian displaced 
people differently at different times and under different circumstances. The Power-Knowledge 
relation is ‘productive’ of subjects who are positioned as having different characteristics and 
capacities for action (Li 2005, Ong 2003 in Judge, 2010, p. 06). Power-Knowledge relations 
are important in critical analysis of how the state discourses address the Syrian displaced 
community. This will give an insight about how Algeria produces Syrian displaced people at 
different times as “guests / brothers in faith” or as “potential threats” and will reveal the state 
dominant discourse. As such, this will show more about their rights (including citizenship 
rights: legal, civil and political) and responsibilities towards both the state and the local 
population.  
 
Question (c) This question is linked to question (b) as it identifies the struggles that Syrians 
faced in Algeria. Research revealed that not all Syrians have lived the same experience in terms 
of the state rationalities of welfare. In fact, their life experiences differ according to their legal 
status and the rights they enjoy accordingly. This shows that having legal documentation is a 
crucial part for Syrians to feel socially and legally integrated. As a result, this has resulted in 
producing different discourses of the self and modes of subjectivation among the Syrian 
community itself: some prefer to call themselves refugees or asylum seekers because they are 
registered with the UNHCR office in Algiers and feel protected by a world organisation; others 
would prefer to be called brothers and guests in Algeria because they are treated as a part of 
the Islamic Ummah / the Arab community and have received unlimited access to citizenship 
rights (employment, healthcare, education and housing) including long-term residence permits 
that are valid for two years and can be renewed. Another group of Syrians have stayed at the 
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edge of the previous categorisations: they are perceived as potential threats whose residence 
permit should be renewed every 45 days and enjoy limited rights of employment but free access 
to accommodation, healthcare, and education. Throughout this thesis I will use the term 
“displaced people” to cover all categories in the Syrian community including, undocumented 
migrants, refugees, asylum seekers.  
 
1.4. Research Objectives  
 
The main objective of the present research is to analyse and investigate the problematic 
conceptualisation of Algerianness that has demonstrated itself in citizenship and nationality 
laws. Algerianness and its norms of inclusion and exclusion can be legally and normatively 
observed through the state practices and strategies adopted to manage the flow of Syrian 
displaced people after the Syrian civil war in 2011. In the absence of a jurisdiction over the 
refugeehood in Algeria, the level of integration of asylum seekers and refugees can still be 
observed and investigated through the state practices and strategies of officialising the status 
of war refugees either by offering long-residence permits or citizenship status by naturalisation 
and, therefore, extending their rights to attain social equality and achieve social justice. In post-
colonial contexts, decisions around subjects of migration are still influenced by the colonial 
past (Phil Hubbard, 2004 in Judge, 2010) and Algeria is no exception. Within the Algerian 
context and due to a complex history of re-shaping and re-designing Algerianness during and 
after the French colonisation, today’s policies and state response to the phenomenon of 
migration reflect a complex struggle of powers at both national and international level. At a 
national level, we can observe the struggle between values of nationalism, Arabness / pan-
Arabism and Islam, hospitality; the international level, on the other hand, manifests the struggle 
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of national security within the age of mass migration and globalisation. By investigating the 
struggle of power, this research will demonstrate how different institutional discourses of 
power are responsible for creating Algerianness and monitoring the openness of Algerian 
citizenship and to what extent they manage the diversity of the local population through 
including / excluding Syrians.   
 
1.5. Structure of the Thesis  
 
The following chapter (chapter 2) will discuss the theoretical foundation namely Foucault’s 
conceptualisations of governmentality and biopolitics. In terms of power-knowledge relations, 
this chapter will illustrate the intimate relation between knowledge, power, and the subject. 
Chapter 2 also provides a new perspective of looking at Algerian citizenship and Algerianness 
as biogovernmental state’s rationalities in the age of mass migration and international 
terrorism. As far as the originality and uniqueness of the present thesis, this chapter represents 
the gap in the existing literature, contribution of the thesis into fields of Algerian citizenship, 
Algerian identity, and refugee studies in Algeria and the social value of this thesis.       
 
Chapter 3 reviews literature about the struggle of historical, social and political power that has 
played a determining role in shaping cultural and political nationalism during the French 
colonial occupation from 1832 to 1962. This chapter will investigate the nature and scope of 
French colonial discourse in Algeria through ‘analyzing the political activity and organization 
that developed its own forms of knowledge as a part of its activities of domination and 
exploitation’ (Young, 2001, p. 408).  French colonial governmentality adopted discriminatory 
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citizenship laws and education curricula as its technologies that embodied different discourses 
and rationalities of the French civilizing mission as a “will to improve”. These practices 
produced Algerian Muslims as a backward and uncivilized indigenous population in need of 
reform from French citizens. One cannot speak of Algerian governmentality during the 
colonization of Algeria because France annexed Algeria to its territory and imposed all 
administrative and governmental laws and left Algeria without an administration and without 
a government after independence.   
Chapter 4 will continue to explore the Algerian past and will focus on the state processes of 
Algerianisation of the newly independent nation by re-establishing connections with the Arab 
world and fostering national pride through the project of Arabization and pan-Arabism. The 
latter along with Islam have contributed in setting boundaries of post-colonial Algerian 
citizenship which has continually been reinvented by the Algerian state’s norms of inclusion 
and exclusion of the other through laws of citizenship. Additionally, this chapter will explore 
how post-colonial citizenship has been designed as a biopolitical project which produced 
Algerian citizens as Muslims and Arabs and managed the wealth of the independent state and 
fostered the well-being of Algerians by granting them free unconditional access to welfare 
services.  
 
In chapter 5 (Methodology chapter), I will explain how the fieldwork for this research was 
carried out and how the process of data gathering was conducted. I will also provide the 
research design including research population, profile of participants, data collection, and data 
analysis. My research design offers an image of data analysis using Foucauldian Discourse 
Analysis in terms of biopolitical governmentality which identifies three levels of analysis. The 
first level of analysis investigates the state technologies that were adopted since 2011 until the 
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present (2021) to manage the influx of Syrians to the country in the absence of a national 
official refugee / asylum mechanism in Algerian law. From a perspective of Foucault’s 
governmentality, the analysis of the state’s technologies will explain the strategies behind these 
technologies and the state’s rationalities. The second level of analysis will examine power-
knowledge production and modes of subjectivity of Syrian displaced people in Algeria and the 
paradox of knowledge production around Syrians and their status: “guest” in contrast to “a 
potential source of threat”. This analysis will identify dominant discourses of power. The third 
level of analysis will discuss state welfare rationalities, “État-providence,” and how the welfare 
system offers different rights to different categories of Syrians according to their capacity to 
enhance the well-being of national citizens. By doing this, this level of analysis will highlight 
the state biopolitical practices of care and control. The methodological chapter will also discuss 
ethical obstacles and limitations that I have faced during the processes of data collection and 
the recruitment of participants. It will also shed light on the value of the research vis-à-vis the 
positionality of the researcher as both an insider, being an Algerian citizen, and outsider from 
the perspective of being non-Syrian.  
 
Chapter 6 is an analysis chapter which sheds light on how the principles and values of Islam 
and pan Arabism that were fundamental in the process of Algerianising the independent nation 
of post-colonial Algeria have been governing the relationship between Algerians and Syrians. 
A group of Syrian displaced people were trapped between the Algerian-Moroccan land borders 
in April 2017 and were denied entry to both countries. In June 2017, Algeria granted them 
access and the head of the Algerian Red Crescent declares that these “suffering bodies”, 
Syrians, are “worthy guests” and “not refugees” in Algeria that has always hosted them as their 
second country. The incorporation of humanitarian support and hospitality discourses and 
strategies, in Algeria, has promised a high level of dignity at a societal level and a positive 
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public opinion to the Syrian displaced community. Acts of hospitality and the state’s 
commitment to provide humanitarian support contributed in facilitating legal procedures and 
responsibilities that Syrians are expected to perform in Algeria such as the renewal of their 
legal documents at the Foreigners’ Office (Maktab El Adjanib), respecting the Algerian 
national law such as road traffic codes, employment laws and the like. This chapter will also 
focus on how the Algerian state unconditionally welcomed and offered social rights such as 
healthcare, education and housing to Syrians as a symbol of brotherhood that can be traced 
back to historical ties which started during the exile of El Amir Abdu El-Kader el Jazaei’ri in 
Damascus, Syria in 1855. This chapter will, therefore, discuss if Algerian hospitality towards 
Syrians is a moral duty or a gift relationship.  However, from a biopolitical perspective, this 
chapter explains how the strategy and state discourse of hospitality has been designed as a 
biopolitical project of protecting, preserving, and controlling the diversity of the local 
population. This discourse has produced Syrian displaced people as “guest” yet precludes them 
from: health insurance, though healthcare is free, right to mixed marriages between Algerians 
and Syrians, and right to naturalisation and attaining Algerian citizenship after a legal period 
of residency in Algeria. As such, the state discourse of hospitality is a good example of a 
practice of both care, inclusion and exclusion.  
 
Chapter 7 is the second analysis chapter of this thesis which will focus on Algeria’s geo-
political concern of potential threats of national security in the time of international terrorism 
and international human migration. Algeria’s constant threat of international terrorism that may 
come from unstable countries such as Libya and Mali, and the exploitation of displaced people 
by terrorist groups at the borders, have led the Algerian state to close borders and impose a visa 
prior to arrival in January 2015 for all Syrians wishing to reside in Algeria. Security as a 
biopolitical state strategy has been designed as a care policy for the security of the Algerian 
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local population through excluding displaced people that have been categorized as “potential 
threats” to the well-being of the Algerian population. This securitisation of migrancy also re-
shaped the state’s discourse of hospitality as a biopolitical strategy that restricted access to 
employment imposed limitations in terms of mixed marriages. Looking at these practices from 
the lens of biopolitical governmentality, the restricting of access to employment and denying 
mixed marriages between Syrians and Algerians, illustrates the state’s efforts to manage the 
diversity of Algerianness and preclude non-citizens from Algerian citizenship. The state 
discourse of security has produced the Syrian displaced community as “a potential source of 
threat”. These biopolitical practices protect the homogeneity of the Algerian national 
community. The state’s biopolitical practices are responsible for defining the status of Syrians 
within Algeria and illustrates the state’s capacity to include “valuable, loyal, worthy” and 
exclude “invaluable, suspicious / dangerous, unworthy” lives of refugees. 
 
Chapter 8 will conclude the thesis by summarizing the answers to the research questions, 
drawing attention to the sociological development of Algerianness as a cultural and societal 
entity and Algerian citizenship as a political entity into a biopolitical practice adopted by the 
state. This chapter will also sum up how strategies of hospitality, security and humanitarian 
support   have treated Syrians and managed their flow to the advantage of the well-being of the 
Algerian local population. It will also site the main ideas discussed in this thesis and suggest 










The introductory chapter provided an overview and background of the present study by 
focussing on how the state’s rationalities of citizenship and Algerianness as both nationalistic 
and normative forces have governed the norms of inclusion and exclusion of non-citizens. In 
addition to the state’s nationalistic norms, moral values of Islam and Pan-Arabism, and the 
state’s concerns around territorial security, became main rationalities of biogovernmental 
practices of hospitality, securitisation, and humanitarianism in the age of mass migration in 
the 21st century. The current chapter will provide a theoretical conceptualisation of Foucault’s 
understanding of power, governmentality and biopolitics and how they construct the subject. 
These theoretical concepts are widely used in the western context, but this chapter will 
demonstrate and justify how they are both implicitly and explicitly embedded within a non-





Chapter Two: Theoretical Foundation: Biopolitical 
Governmentality, Citizenship and Displacement 
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2.1. Algeria’s Biopolitical Governmentality: Algerianness and Algerian 
Citizenship as Political Objects which Substitute a National Asylum / 
Refugee Law in the Country 
 
2.1.1. Power, Knowledge, and the Subject 
 
According to Foucault’s thinking, there is an intimate relation between knowledge and power. 
They are inseparable and they are linked to the subject. In power-knowledge relations, if power 
is a way of influencing a system of thought, then it produces a specific knowledge about the 
subject and shapes their thoughts in a particular way. For instance, at schools, although power 
is invisible in modern societies, one can still observe it through the scientific knowledge that 
is disseminated as fact and in the thoughts that pupils construct about themselves in relation to 
these facts. This will produce pupils as both subjects and objects of power. In this case, pupils’ 
thoughts and feelings are not free because they are still controlled by a certain type of power. 
This scene of power-knowledge relation creates a state of ‘subjectivation’, as Foucault would 
call it, which allows to construct and control the subject (Foucault, 1990b, p. 28). Different 
mechanisms of power produce different knowledge and the more knowledge we gain about the 
subject, the more power we can practice over them.  
 
According to Foucault (2005), knowledge is not objective and universal, it is rather linked to 
history. In his book, The Order of Things (2005), Foucault argues that different historical 
epochs in western Europe, for instance, such as the Renaissance, Classical and Modern ages 
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would produce different scientific knowledge and systems of thoughts which are governed by 
different ‘epistemes’ (Foucault, 2005, p. xxiv). In his book, The Archaeology of Knowledge 
(1972), Foucault defines the episteme as ‘something like a slice of history common to all 
branches of knowledge, which imposes on each one the same norms and postulates, a general 
stage of reason, a certain structure of thought that the men of a particular period cannot escape’ 
(Foucault, 1972, p. 191). The episteme is not knowledge (connaissance) (Foucault, 1972, p. 
192, italics in original), it is rather a set of implicit and unconscious rules that ‘govern what 
constitutes legitimate forms of knowledge for a particular cultural period’ (O’Leary & Chia, 
n.d, p. 04). Every epoch has its corresponding episteme that governs techniques, values and 
how a society thinks (Foucault in O’Leary & Chia, nd). In his view of episteme, archaeology 
and knowledge, Foucault sees knowledge as a historical product that is governed by 
unconscious epistemes that influence how people of a certain society think and how their 
thinking, values, and logic changes throughout time in Europe (Foucault, 1972).  
 
In order to identify epistemes and in terms of power-knowledge relations, Foucault (1972 / 
1980) shifted from archaeology to genealogy using Nietzsche’s term. He argued that new 
scientific knowledge is directly related to a change in power relations. For example, in 
biomedicine, it is those in power that determine if the person is ill and needs further therapeutic 
treatments or not. In genealogy, Foucault investigates how history has affected the way we 
think, the way we punish, the way we educate and the like. Genealogy is how history has shaped 
the present. For instance, a shift from a visible and repressive type of power to a less visible 
but normalising and regulating type of power illustrates how disciplinary power and biopower 
have shaped the modern subject, social, political, and economic regulations and the like 
(Foucault, 1972 / 1980). Foucault’s power-knowledge genealogy answers questions like: ‘who 
has power? How is it exercised? What are its effects?’ (Shiner, 1982, p. 390). 
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In Foucault’s books History of Sexuality (1990), Archaeology of Knowledge (1972), Discipline 
and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (1977), his new thinking about power allows us to 
understand that power circulates everywhere even in places where we do not expect it to be 
such as at schools, universities, and even science and knowledge. Power is not always violent 
and ‘repressive’, but it can be ‘normalizing’ and ‘productive’ (Foucault in lilja & Vinthagen, 
2014, p. 109). Foucault’s insight of power shows how power has been changing throughout 
time and it involves three different modes: sovereign power, disciplinary power and biopower 
(Foucault in lilja & Vinthagen, 2014, pp. 107 & 108). These modes of powers are inevitable, 
and they may all co-exist and overlap in the same social setting.  
 
Traditionally, sovereign power had always been perceived as ‘a mechanism of deduction’ and 
as an exercise of power carried out by the sovereign over his subjects and had been understood 
as ‘the right to decide life and death’ (Foucault, 1990a, pp. 135, 136). For instance, in 
Foucault’s work about the history of sexuality (1990a), the father of the Roman family has the 
right to either ‘dispose’ or give life to his children or slaves (Foucault, 1990a, p. 135). This was 
an ‘archaic model’ of top-down power which was a matter of ‘subjugation and seizure’ 
(Foucault in Apatinga, 2017, p. 38). Sovereign power is repressive, and it is about punishment 
and violence through which power can be visible such as: the state’s army, police, law / 
juridical power and its penal styles (Foucault, 1977). On the other hand, in disciplinary power, 
which is more normalising, the display and exercise of power is more important than physical 
violence. Disciplinary power is also the surveillance of society using rules and procedures that 
regulate and discipline individuals and shape their behaviours (Foucault in lilja & Vinthagen, 
2014, emphasis added) in different settings such as in schools, hospitals and the like. Having 
said that, disciplinary power is invisible because it is exercised through disciplinary means 
through institutions such as schools and prisons, but the objects / subjects on which power is 
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exercised are visible (Foucault, 1977). Undoubtedly, from a Foucauldian perspective, power is 
not understood as ‘a group of institutions and mechanisms that ensure the subservience of the 
citizens of a given state’ or a mode of subjugation which, in contrast to violence, has the form 
of the rule’ (Foucault, 1990a, p. 92). Instead, Foucault (1990a, p. 138) affirmed that power has 
shifted from ‘the right to take life or let death to the power to foster life or disallow it to the 
point of death’. He believed an analysis, in terms of power, should cover ‘force relations’, ‘their 
aims and objectives’ in a particular society (1990a, pp. 92, 95).  
The production of subjects differs in each type of power. In sovereign power, the body is the 
major target of punishment and violence. Besides, only the sovereign has the right to ‘seize’ 
and end life (Hobbes in Taylor, 2011, p. 43). For example, under sovereign power, the criminal 
will be punished if they commit a crime and is likely to be condemned to death (Taylor, 2011). 
Disciplinary power, on the other hand, can be seen as a system of knowledge that shapes the 
individual as both an object of power ‘to be known in relation to others who can be known’ 
and a deviant subject that can be normalised and regulated with different instruments of power 
(Johnston, Foucault in lilja & Vinthagen, 2014, p. 109). In disciplinary power, a criminal is 
less likely to face death, but their behaviour will be watched and normalised in ‘the prison’ or 
‘psychiatric’ clinic for therapeutic treatments (Taylor, 2011, p. 44). In this regard, Foucault 
used Bentham’s 18th century idea of ‘the panopticon’ to demonstrate how disciplinary power 
and its technologies can be exercised through techniques of regulation and surveillance in order 
to impact the human behaviour (Foucault, 1977, p. 201, emphasis added). The panopticon is a 
form of a prison in a circular shape with cells and a central observation tower in the middle of 
it. Prisoners are inside the cells but cannot see what is inside the tower. The theory is that 
individuals inside the cells are more likely to be normalised and disciplined if they believe they 
are being watched (Foucault, 1977, p. 201 & 202). Whether or not ‘the inmate’ is being 
constantly observed, the presence of the tower in the centre of the panopticon is enough to 
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impact their behaviour and make them regulate their conduct. By doing this, the individual 
becomes ‘a part of the disciplinary system’ (Sheridan, 2016, p. 02). This act of surveillance is 
a central point in Foucault’s understanding of power in modern societies. This act of control 
and governance of the people is what Foucault referred to as ‘self-governance’, ‘self-
regulation’, and ‘conduct of conduct’ (Foucault in Dean, 2010, pp. 17-19). However, this type 
of power contradicts with principles of liberalism and has negative implications on individuals 
because it creates a monitored society of people that think and act the same way which opposes 
individual liberties and original ideas (Foucault, 1982). Additionally, in this context, people 
are not directly confronted with power or liberty (Foucault, 1982), but they are still a part of 
the power system. In its relation to knowledge, disciplinary power limits the knowledge 
everybody will construct about themselves. Within the context of a normalising power, the 
modern penal system was described by Foucault as a ‘subtle, calculated technology of 
subjection’ (Foucault in Heilker, 1994, p. 11).        
 
Power can be positive in being no longer ‘deductive’ in the West, for instance, and in the way 
it is used to ‘incite, reinforce, control, monitors, optimize and organize the forces under it’ 
(Foucault, 1990a, p.136). This has later been referred to as biopower (Foucault, 1990a). In 
summary, ‘biopolitics marks the modern move from the sovereign power over death, to the 
sovereign power over life, which is bio-power’ (Muller, 2004, p. 52). Biopower is another 
mode of Foucault’s insight on power. In modern societies, biopower is moved from violently 
practicing power to psychologically enforcing it via the state’s techniques and technologies. 
Biopower ‘exposes the structures, relations, and practices by which political subjects are 
constituted and deployed, along with the forces that have shaped and continue to shape 
modernity’ (Cisney and Morar, 2016, p. 01). As an element in the development of capitalism, 
biopower refers to the subjugation of bodies and the control of population through various wide 
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disciplines such as education, public health, housing, training, migration and the like (Foucault, 
1990a, pp. 140, 143). Biopower covers two main ‘poles’ namely: ‘anatomo-politics of the 
human body’ and ‘biopolitics of the population’ (Foucault, 1990a, p. 139). The first focusses 
on ‘the body as a machine’ which means that disciplinary power assures ‘its disciplining, the 
optimization of its capabilities, the extortion of its force, the parallel increase of its usefulness 
and its docility, and its integration into system of efficient and economic controls’ (Foucault, 
1990a, p. 139). In fact, biopower is another form of regulatory power that can still use ‘the 
same tactics employed in disciplinary power’ (Taylor, 2011, p. 44). However, unlike 
disciplinary power that focusses on the individual as a subject / object, biopower’s focus shifts 
to the entire population as its object (Taylor, 2011, p. 44). Another difference between 
disciplinary power and biopower is that disciplinary power functions through institutions, but 
biopower functions at a state level although still ‘involved in many institutions’ (Taylor, 2011, 
p. 45). For example: in the hospital, the disciplinary type of power would focus on deviant 
individual bodies and regulate them to fit into the norms (Taylor, 2011). In biopower and 
biopolitics, the state is concerned with administering the biological processes of the whole 
population such as: ‘birthrate, level of health, longevity, and public health life expectancy’ 
(Foucault, 1990a, p. 139; Taylor, 2011, p. 45).  
 
Biopolitics and governmentality or ‘the analytics of government’ as Dean (2010, p. 27) would 
call it, are linked in the way that both frameworks of analysis focus on the exercise and practice 
of power on the life of the population as its object through a number of disciplines including, 
for instance, ‘economic, social, psychological or biological, and ‘patterns of migration, 
housing’ (Dean, 2010, pp. 27 & 117 &119). Foucault’s insight on governmentality involves 
government’s rationalities and technologies as core elements in discursive analysis of research 
data. Governmentality also gives an understanding of ‘how the government forms its 
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objectives’ (Foucault, 2007, pp. 1-3 in Välikangas and Seeck, 2011, p. 10). The term 
governmentality was first coined by Michel Foucault in his observations about aspects of 
security, territory and population during his lectures at Collège de France between 1977 and 
1978. The term governmentality can be divided into two main terms ‘govern’ and ‘mentality’, 
therefore, the term refers to the mentality of governance (Dean, 2011 cited in Ettlinger, 2011, 
p. 538). The use of governmentality to explain relationships of power between stakeholders or 
political actors aims at investigating how both ‘truths’ is produced and how things are governed 
(Dean, 2010, p. 27; Rajas, 2014, p. 10). Foucault (2007, p. 116) argued that ‘the study of 
governmentality should tackle the state and population’. In order to understand how 
governmentality studies conceptualise government, the government becomes a matter of 
promoting ‘welfare or the common good of a population and the economy’ (Rajas, 2014, p. 
12). This is connected to the notion of biopolitics and biopower (Rajas, 2014, p. 12) where the 
biological existence of the human body is politicized. Biopolitics represents a critical element 
in governmentality: ‘the relation between security, territory and population’ (Muller, 2004, p. 
52).  
 
2.1.2. Why Biopolitical Governmentality in the Algerian Context? 
 
Foucault’s conceptualisation of governmentality and biopolitics have been widely used in the 
fields of International Relations and immigration in modern states and more specifically within 
the European context. Walters highlights aspects that can be analysed within the intersection 
of Foucault’s concept of governmentality in migration studies: 
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‘Governmentality themes and concepts are being extended to the analysis of ever more aspects of ‘new migration 
worlds’ (Guiraudon/Joppke 2001). To mention just a few there is the role which technological practices, experts 
and industries are playing in the production of borders and the management of mobility (Jeandesboz 2011; Bigo 
2002; 2008; Salter 2007); the use of cultural policy as a tool of minority representation and memorialization (van 
Baar 2011); the way in which love and marriage become instrumentalities in calculations about the validity of a 
migrant’s status (D’Aoust 2013); the bureaucratic regime that produces illegality as an uncertain object and status 
(Inda 2006); recent changes in the accommodation and detention of asylum-seekers (Gill 2009; Darling 2011); 
and the counter-conducts and counter-cartographies by which migration regimes are contested on a molecular 
scale (Tazzioli 2014) (in Walters, 2015, p. 02)’. 
 
In its relation to immigration studies, adopting an analysis of framework of governmentality in 
immigration studies will provide and understanding of the effects of immigration policies and 
how immigrants are being perceived. More importantly, governmentality studies provide an 
understanding for why immigration policies are problematised and more politicised (Rajas, 
2014).  
 
Foucault’s new understanding of power originated from a European context and was widely 
applied in modern states in Western Europe. However, a little attention has been paid to non-
European contexts such as the Algerian context. In a modern nation like Algeria, Foucault’s 
concepts of biopolitics, governmentality, power-knowledge relations and modes of 
subjectivation can still be investigated in relation to immigration and refugee studies. Very few 
studies have discussed governmentality in relation to the Algerian context such as Smail’s 
research (2018) that investigates how discourses of language and citizenship are intertwined in 
Algeria. His study reveals that ‘nationalist and neoliberal discourses and ideologies have 
always been competing within Algeria’s linguistic scene in order to invoke different 
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configurations of belonging to and exclusion from the Algerian national community’ (Smail, 
2018, p. 53). I believe the struggle of these discourses and many others still govern the legal 
and normative forces of Algerian citizenship when it comes to how the state deals with the 
status of the Syrian displaced community in Algeria.  
The state can protect the biological existence and the emotional well-being of its local citizens 
through biopolitical immigration and anti-migration policies (Apatinga, 2017, p. 38; Mavelli, 
2017, p. 809). ‘The main idea of biopolitics is … to legitimize … homogeneous society by 
claiming its natural character and historical evolution’ (Kristensen, 2013, p.09). My research 
will also demonstrate how aspects of biopolitics exist within state strategies and practices of 
explicitly managing the flow of refugees in order to implicitly improve the well-being of the 
population, ensure its security within the age of mass migration, and protect the homogenous 
feature of Algerianness by limiting Syrians’ chances to obtain Algerian citizenship. Indeed, the 
notion of biopolitical governmentality will uncover the state rationalities behind the strategies 
/ discourses of hospitality, security and humanitarian aid adopted by the state to manage mass 
migration in the 21st century. This research will also illustrate the embodiment of these 
rationalities through technologies. The following chart best illustrates how research data 
displays Algeria’s biopolitical governmentality including main discourses, rationalities and 
technologies adopted to govern the Syrian displaced community in Algeria and manage their 




Chart 1: Algeria’s biopolitical governmentality in the age of mass migration (idea 
inspired from Rajas, 2014, p. 26) 
 
In order to best read and understand the chart above, I need to clarify the terms discourse, 
rationalities and technologies. Within the investigation of the ‘problematics of government’, 
the Foucauldian term of governmentality ‘draws attention to a way of thinking and acting 
embodied in all those attempts to know and govern the wealth, health and happiness of 
populations’ (Rose & Miller, 2010, p. 272). This means that in order to investigate a context in 
terms of governmentality studies and problematics of government, techniques and their 
rationalities should be analysed. In their understanding of technologies and their rationalities, 
Rose and Miller (2010, p. 273) argue that rationalities refer to ‘the discursive field within which 
the exercise of power is conceptualised, the moral justifications for particular ways of 
exercising power by diverse authorities, notions of the appropriate forms, objects and limits of 
politics, and conceptions of the proper distribution of such tasks among secular, spiritual, 
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military and familial sectors’. Technologies, on the other hand, ‘the complex of mundane 
programmes, calculations, techniques, apparatuses, documents and procedures through which 
authorities seek to embody and give effect to governmental ambitions’ (Rose & Miller, 2010, 
p. 273). This means that every state discourse is driven by state rationalities. The embodiment 
of the latter can be realised through the state technologies. Having said this, the above chart 
demonstrates how discourses of hospitality, security and humanitarianism are directed by the 
state’s biopolitical rationalities of national territorial security, nationalism, Algerian 
citizenship, and Algerianness. The state’s rationalities, in turn, govern the state’s decisions 
about the inclusion and exclusion of Syrian displaced people. These discourses, political 
programmes and their rationalities operate through technologies of closing borders, visa 
restrictions, banning mixed marriages between Algerians and Syrians, bureaucratic procedures, 
guest centres, offering full and limited access to welfare services. 
 
2.1.3. Why Biopolitics, Algerianness and Algerian Citizenship?  
 
If biopolitics shows the state’s capacity to include and exclude refugees, then the dynamics of 
inclusion and exclusion are informed by biological and emotional well-being of the host 
community (Mavelli, 2017). Additionally, if the role of biopolitics is inventing citizenship in 
order to better manage the population (Rygiel cited in Nyyssonen, 2018), then the biopolitical 
regimen can also be informed by the national identity of the host community and the nation’s 
collective identity and its conflicting discourses. In its relation to refugeeness, biopolitics 
politicises both the life of refugees and the state strategies adopted to manage them (Muller, 
2004). We can see how through Foucault’s terminology ‘The biopolitics of otherness’, the 
immigrant body has become a source of inspiration for immigration policies (Fassin, 2001, p. 
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04, italics in original text). Within the Algerian context, biopolitical governmentality is 
informed by conflicting discourses of normative, nationalistic, and legal forces of Algerianness 
and their rationalities. It precludes ordinary Syrian displaced people from attaining citizenship 
by granting them conditional and limited access to social welfare. Businessmen and Syrians 
whose ancestors relate to the family of El Amir Abdu El-Kader el Jazaei’ri either by blood or 
marriage were either naturalised or received official status (long-residence permits) which 
allowed them to receive unconditional access to welfare services and freedom of movement. 
Kamal (35) a shop owner in Kouba, mentioned that well-known families like ‘El Jazaei’ri, El 
Jazaei’rli, Aal Jazaei’ri, El Amayri, El Kadiri’, in Syria, were lucky in both receiving high 
responsibility jobs in Syria after the death of their grandfather, El Amir Abdu El-Kader, and in 
enjoying their legitimate right of naturalisation and receiving Algerian citizenship by descent. 
Their children and spouses received Algerian citizenship as well. All they needed was an 
official document that proves they belong to the family of El-Amir Abdu El-Kader el Jazaei’ri. 
From a biopolitical perspective, these Syrians of Algerian origins and Syrian businessmen have 
been granted official status and unconditional access to social rights due to their relation to one 
of Algeria’s most influential anti-colonial fighters and leader and because they were skilful 
enough to contribute into the country’s economy. However, biopolitical governmentality of the 
local population (Algerian society) excluded Syrians that did not belong to the stated categories 
of businessmen and kinship group. State biogovernmental rationalities and technologies 
restricted their mobility, and freedom of movement outside Algeria and their access to social 
rights. Instead, as a gesture of solidarity between Arabs and Muslims, these Syrians are 
categorised as “guests” with no official status but short-residence permits that should be 
renewed every 45 days.  
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In order to understand how Algerianness has been shaped as a biopolitical force that cares for 
the well-being of the Algerian population by including “valuable” lives and excluding 
“unworthy” lives during the age of mass migration and human movement, it is essential to 
review the complex historiography of Algerianness, the post-colonial design of Algerian 
citizenship and the conflicting discourses that often overlap and conflict in state decisions and 
rationalities. Reviewing Algerian history will, therefore, offer an overview about how 
Algerianness has been shaped and constructed during the colonial and post-colonial eras and 
how this design may or may not have changed during the age of mass-migration, globalisation 
and international terrorism and its capacity to accept and include the “other”: in this case, the 
Syrian displaced community. I argue that the Algerian colonial past and post-colonial present 
is both consciously and implicitly embedded in Algeria’s biopolitical governmentality of 
refugees.  
 
In colonial Algeria, as a part of its civilising mission that can be seen as a “will to improve”, 
the French colonial governmentality created two main groups: people with rights (Europeans 
and Jews in Algeria) and colonial subjects that are deprived of rights (Algerian Muslims). The 
governmentality of citizenship during the French colonisation in Algeria used religion, 
language and ethnicity as political objects and instruments of inclusion and exclusion. In order 
to biopolitically care for the French community in Algeria and improving its emotional and 
physical well-being, French citizenship was granted to Jews, people of European origins and 
to Algerians that would accept European values and renounce their Muslim personal status. 
Under Senatus-consulte (1865) a French citizen in colonial Algeria would have the right to 
social welfare compared to somebody who refused to quit their Muslim personal status for 
French citizenship. As a reaction to these programmes of the French “will to improve”, 
nationalist and liberal movements started in Algeria with the most influential figures namely, 
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El Amir Abdu el-Kader el Jazaei’ri, Abd El-Hamid Ibn Badiss, and Messali Hadj. In anti-
colonial movements of liberation and resistance in colonial Algeria, nationalist (cultural and 
religious) and political discourses contributed in the preservation of Algerianness as a 
normative force that rejects all forms of French imperialist values and promoted the 
construction of Algerian citizenship as a socio-political entity after independence. After 
independence, Algerian citizenship was designed as a reaction to French policy, namely, the 
obliteration of Islam and Arabic. Before removing conditions of discrimination based on 
religion and gender in 1970, post-colonial citizenship in 1963 was granted only to those whose 
father and grandfather held a Muslim personal status. During Bouteflika’s era, Algerian 
citizens did not take part in re-shaping and re-defining the norms and values of Algerianness 
in post-1962 Algeria as the case of officialising the status of Tamazight without a national poll 
that would represent the opinion of most Algerians and whether they agree or disagree. The 
state has always held power to define Algerianness and its boundaries and it is a state’s decision 
to include or exclude non-citizens wishing to belong. For these reasons, one cannot dissociate 
the present from its colonial past and post-colonial present. The Algerian response to the 
challenge of mass migration in the 21st century, like much else in public life, also typifies this.   
 
2.1.4. Why Syrians in Algeria?  
 
The field of migration and refugeehood is not widely researched in Algeria and very few 
research papers have shed light on this phenomenon. Mohamed Saïb Musette, a migrant 
himself who has been naturalised for his loyalty to the Algerian state, is a key contributor in 
the wider field of migration studies in Algeria. He argues that Algeria has always received 
economic migrants and humanitarian migrants and claims that around ‘40 nationalities are 
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present in Tamanrasset’ in the southern part of Algeria (Musette, 2014, p. 47). About the whole 
migratory situation in the country, Musette confirms that although the Algerian state has 
adopted securitised strategies to control its large borders and organise the flow of displaced 
people to the country, it has been flexible in terms the provision of basic rights to displaced 
communities (Musette, 2014, pp. 47 & 48).  
 
The Migration Policy Centre in the EU (2013) declares that the history of migration from and 
to Algeria was mainly related to its relation to France. By the start of the 21st century, Algeria 
has been receiving a considerable flow of migrants. For instance, Chinese workers entered 
Algeria as economic migrants, while people from Western Sahara (since 1975), Palestine, Mali, 
Niger, Yemen, and Syria entered Algeria as forced migrants that fled their countries due to 
foreign occupation, political instability or civil wars. The latter group took refuge in Algeria to 
seek humanitarian protection and security. A Significant number of displaced people belong to 
the Sahrawi community. The table below shows the number of Sahrawi refugees in Algeria 
during the first decade of the 21st century as provided by the United Nations High 
Commissioner for refugees (Qasmiyeh, 2011, p. 12) 
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
155,430 155,430 155,430 146,925 170,000 90,000 90,000 90,000 90,000 90,000 90,000 
 
Table 1: The number of refugees in Algeria between 2000 to 2010 
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As table (1) above illustrates, the number of forced migrants coming from Western Sahara to 
Algeria decreased remarkably between 2000- 2010. In 2005, the number of immigrants flowing 
to Algeria fell from more than 155,000 to less than 90,000. This may be because forced 
migrants consider Algeria as a transit point to find their way to Europe or may be because 
Algeria did not grant them legal status (refugee status) through which they could have claimed 
their rights. By the end of December 2017, the UNHCR reported that the number of Sahrawi 
displaced people exceeded ‘175.000’ (UNHCR, 2018, p. 04). This number represents Sahrawi 
people residing in five main refugee camps in Tindouf namely: Awserd, Boujdour, Dakhla, 
Laayoune, and Smara camp (UNHCR, 2018, p. 04). UNHCR reports show that the Sahrawi in-
camp population was given administration over the territory of these camps. Each camp 
resembles to a small wilaya (province) with its own administration, healthcare clinics, and 
education settings run by refugee volunteers (World Food Program, 2019, p. 06, italics in 
original). While most Sahrawi refugees are grouped in camps, my fieldwork revealed that most 
Syrians in Algiers have chosen to rent private properties with their own money rather than 
staying in guest centres. Similar to the situation of my Syrian participants, the Algerian welfare 
system grants Sahrawi war refugees free unconditional access to social rights such as: 
healthcare and education, but access to formal and legal labour market remains restricted and 
not guaranteed (WFP, 2019, p. 06). In relation to Foucault’s governmentality, the questions 
that arise at this stage and will be answered in the analysis chapter (chapter 7) are: why does 
legal access to formal employment remain restricted by the state? Is it deliberate? What might 
be the state’s rationalities behind these state’s technologies and what they might tell us about 
the biogovernmental strategy of governing displaced communities in Algeria?  
 
Since 2011 and until the present (2021), the Arab world has known wide waves of social and 
political changes which led to violent civil struggles and revolutions which came to be known 
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as the Arab Spring. The revolutionary struggles and violent civil protests led to the overthrow 
of Ben Ali in Tunisia (in 2011); Ali Abdullah Salah in Yemen (in 2011); Hosni Mubarak in 
Egypt (in 2011) and Muammar Gaddafi in Libya (in 2011). In Syria, Bashar Al-Assad still 
struggles for his government and regime since 2011. The Syrian civil war is believed to be one 
of the deadliest civil wars in the 21st century.  By 2012, the movement’s space and dimensions 
grew and turned into a real crisis for the Syrian people. Syrians started a large movement 
externally and reached surrounding countries (Lebanon, Jordan), Europe and the Greater 
Maghreb countries. According to UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), 
since the time Syrian crisis started its sixth year, approximately 13.5 million people urgently 
needed their lives to be saved. Additionally, more than 6.5 million people were internally 
displaced within Syria with 5.9 million people that still struggle with difficult conditions of 
survival since the start of civil unrest (UNHCR, 2016). However, others chose to flee their 
country; the UNHCR estimates about 5 million people have sought refuge in other countries 
including the Arab and the European world (UNHCR, 2016). 
 
Algeria is one of the host countries that has opened its doors and welcomed Syrians to live 
within its territory. Algerian authorities and national press still dispute the exact number of 
Syrians that fled to Algeria since 2011. The associate protection officer in UNHCR’s office in 
Algiers, Aline Fautsch (A, Fautsch, personal communication, April 25, 2017), argues that in 
2017 around 40,000 Syrians have been registered at their office in Algiers. In 2019, the number 
of Syrian displaced people in Algeria reached 50,000 (UNHCR, 2019). Although Algeria is a 
party to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 protocol as well as the 1969 OAU 
Convention (UNHCR Global Appeal, 2010-2011, p. 08), it has not yet adopted a national 
asylum law that should have defined the status of refugees living within its territory and their 
distribution within the Algerian territory (UNHCR, 2019). Having said this, UNHCR (UNHCR 
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Global Appeal, 2013, p. 128) has identified experts since 2012 to collaborate with the Algerian 
government in drafting and adopting a national asylum / refugee system that is consistent with 
international standards. The UNHCR also shoulders the responsibility to register asylum claims 
of Syrians, but it is not responsible for determining the status of refugees in Algeria. The 
UNHCR provides humanitarian aid and protection against illegal deportation. A national 
refugee mechanism in the country will, therefore, determine the legal status of Syrians in 
Algeria and their rights.  
 
In my answer to why the present thesis focusses on the Syrian displaced community is to 
investigate what Musette considers as contradictory and complex. He states that the majority 
of foreign communities in Algeria enjoy legal status including political refugees because states 
where they come from are either in conflict, or groups are in conflict on their territory and they 
are supported by the UN (in Benfodil, 2017, 02). This means that these people’s legal status is 
well defined, and they have international protection and receive international donations. 
Besides, Palestinians in Algeria enjoy a special protection which is not necessarily under the 
UN protection (Musette in Benfodil, 2017, p. 02). However, he claims that the case of Syrians 
is, indeed, vague and complicated. In this respect, Musette added (in Benfodil, 2017, p. 02) :  
‘Maintenant, si on regarde les nouvelles vagues de personnes qui arrivent et qui réclament le statut de réfugié, de 
quelle manière va-t-on s’y prendre ? La donne se complique davantage avec les Syriens. L’Algérie a pris une 
position vis-à-vis de ce problème en disant que c’est une solution politique qui réglera le conflit en Syrie, et que 
les opérations militaires ne peuvent qu’aggraver la situation. Est-ce que l’Algérie peut leur octroyer le statut de 
réfugiés ?’             
‘Now if we look at the waves of people arriving and claiming refugee status, how are we going to do it? The 
situation becomes complex with Syrians. Algeria has taken a stand that the Syrian situation is political and should 
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be resolved with a political solution and not military operations that will only worsen the situation. Can Algeria 
grant these Syrians refugee status?’  (my translation from French into English). 
 
Having said that, the present thesis starts from the question of Musette and uses Foucault’s 
biopolitical governmentality to argue that Syrians are trapped ‘at the edges of citizenship’ 
which made them both insiders and outsiders within Algeria (Hepworth, 2015, p. 09). This is 
manifested in different modes of labelling Syrians as ‘guest’, ‘brothers and sisters’ and 
‘potential danger of national security’. These state’s labels are not innocent, but they are 
themselves paradoxical state’s strategies of camouflage for a gap in the Algerian law which 
could have governed Syrian displaced people in the country and identified their legal status 
vis-à-vis citizens (Algerians) and vis-à-vis other displaced communities in Algeria. These 
labels are also strategies of care and exclusion according to the state’s biopolitical rationalities 
and practices that produced different modalities of citizenship in the Age of mass migration in 
Algeria.  
Communities of different nationalities sought refuge in Algeria for several reasons. While for 
instance, Sahrawi and Palestinians fled their home countries due to occupation from foreign 
forces namely: Moroccan military and Israel, Syrians did not flee for the same reasons because 
their home country was not occupied by foreign forces but witnessed a civil war as a 
continuation of a wave of the so called Arab Spring which ended up with foreign interventions 
in the country. Although Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh provided significant research about the 
Sahrawi community in Algeria, I believe secondary literature about displaced people in Algeria 
still lacks a socio-political approach that looks at how, in the absence of a refugee law, the 
Algerian state has been managing the flow of war refugees. By doing this, one is not only 
journalistically reporting data, but they are critically questioning the state’s strategies, their 
technologies, and their impact on the life experiences of displaced communities. For these 
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reasons, the present thesis has adopted a Foucauldian theoretical foundation to look at the 
state’s governmentality of refugees and depict the rationalities behind choosing paradoxical 
strategies in dealing with the Syrian displaced community. 
Due to the unresolved situation in their home country and the delay of decolonisation process, 
the displaced community from Western Sahara that sought refuge in Algeria remain dependent 
on the state’s assistance that is delivered by the Algerian Red Crescent, and on international 
assistance and financial support from the UNHCR and NGOs. This has designed them as 
typical war refugees that are most vulnerable and in need for humanitarian support within their 
host state, however this was not widely reported by most participants of the Syrian cohort I 
interviewed. Most of them did not primarily express the need for humanitarian support, but 
most importantly they criticised the state’s approaches that positioned them at the edges of 
Algerian citizenship. They demonstrated a high level of self-awareness around the identity 
crisis they developed, which was caused by their unknown legal status. Although the decision 
to grant Algerian citizenship to non-citizens is a state’s decision, these Syrians rejected the fact 
that the Algerian state adopted exceptional restrictions which have precluded them from 
obtaining well-defined legal status either by naturalisation (after 7 years of continuous 
residence in Algeria) or by long-residence permits that are renewed every 2 years, travel 
documents and the freedom of mobility outside Algeria. Besides, while the state adopts one 
main technology of hosting the Sahrawi displaced community in five refugee camps in 
Tindouf, ‘Syrians were hosted in guest centres and not refugee camps’, Asma, an Algerian state 
official at the Foreigner Office in central Algiers clarified. Refusal to label Syrians as legitimate 
refugees tells a lot about how the state define them and what type of knowledge the state 
disseminates around these people. For these reasons, conducting a research with the Syrian 
community provides an interesting socio-political scene where the state has adopted 
exceptional strategies to manage the flow of Syrians according to different state rationalities 
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that cared and excluded them at the same time. The questions that could be asked here are: why 
does the state adopt a different strategy and technology to host displaced Syrian people? What 
might be the state’s rationality behind this policy? What might be the privilege that the Syrian 
community enjoy in Algeria? And what can this tell us about the exercise of power and the 
knowledge produced around people of the Syrian community? In terms of power-knowledge 
relations, how does the state’s strategies and technologies construct Syrians as governed 
subjects within the Algerian context, and how do these strategies define and shape the way 
Syrians construct knowledge about themselves? If these subjects are governed according to a 
specific power, then what could be their position within the Algerian context? What would the 
state’s technologies and strategies say about the nature of Algerian citizenship and its norms 
of inclusion and exclusion in relation to citizenship rights?  
 
The Algerian context is totally different from the western context when it comes to dealing 
with refugeeness and displacement of people in a number of points including colonial and post-
colonial history that affects the present state decisions, state rationalities of liberalism and neo-
liberalism, state technologies, state strategies and discourses around refugees. Because there is 
no national asylum / refugee law that would have been used to analyse the situation in Algeria, 
I will investigate biopolitical governmentalities through a set of relations between subjects, 
practices, rationalities and discourses of the Algerian state in dealing with the flow of Syrians 
and their life experiences. The official journal of the Algerian Republic states the following 
article regarding refugees’ entry to Algeria and classifies them as foreigners: 
Chapitre II  Art.7- Sous réserve des accords internationaux ratifiés par l’état algérien, relatifs aux réfugiés et aux 
apatrides, tout étranger arrivant sur le territoire algérien est tenu de se présenter aux autorités compétentes, 
chargées du contrôle aux postes frontières, muni d'un passeport délivré par l'Etat dont il est ressortissant, ou de 
tout autre document en cours de validité reconnu par l'Etat algérien comme titre de voyage en cours de validité et 
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assorti, le cas échéant, du visa exigible délivré par les autorités compétentes et d'un carnet de santé conformément 
à la règlementation sanitaire international (Loi n° 08-11 du 25 juin 2008. - Relative aux conditions d'entrée, de 
séjour et de circulation des étrangers en Algérie - JO N° 36 du 02 Juillet 2008. Pp. 4-10). 
 
Chapter II Art. 7. Subject to international agreements ratified by the Algerian state, relating to refugees and 
Stateless persons, all foreigners arriving in Algerian territory shall be required to submit to the competent 
authorities, control posts at frontier posts, equipped with a Passport issued by the State of which they are national, 
or any other document in the process of validity recognized by the Algerian state as a valid travel document and 
with, where applicable, the visa required to be issued by competent authorities and a health booklet in accordance 
with international health regulations (My translation from French to English). 
 
Principally, Article 7 in chapter II states refugees’ compliance as they enter the Algerian 
territory, however their status and their rights are not detailed. Due to the gap in Algeria’s 
national law (UNHCR, 2019), Algeria adopted different strategies to welcome and manage 
Syrians in the country. As a result of this, their status remains subject to controversial debate 
among Syrians and Algerian state officials. A very important question that should be raised at 
this point, is: what is the status of Syrians in Algerian law? Lister used the terminology of 
exclusions from ‘without’ to describe immigration policies i.e., immigration policies are 
measurements of excluding foreigners from national membership (Basok & Ilcan, 2013, 
p.126). Indeed, immigration policies tend to exclude the other from the us: the ‘other’ being 
the non-citizen and the ‘us’ being the national citizens (Anderson, 2013). The exclusionary 
immigration mechanism may be based on class, gender, and/or ethnic group. 
 
By definition, asylum seekers and refugees are unable to return to their home countries as long 
as they are not safe and secure enough for them to return to and live in. When they arrive at 
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their host states, they need to establish a good rapport not only with the state but with the local 
community as well. Syrians living in Algeria are not recognized as citizens of the Algerian 
state; therefore, their rights are limited, and they are expected to have certain responsibilities 
towards the state and the Algerian local community. For instance, as non-legally recognized 
citizens, they do not participate in the political life of the Algerian state such as voting or taking 
part in elections. The question that should be asked is: what is the status of Syrians in Algeria 
and what rights and duties do they have accordingly? 
 
Unlike the Sahrawi displaced people that are given more attention at both national and 
international levels compared to other displaced communities, this research has chosen the 
Syrian displaced community that has been living in the capital Algiers, since 2011 as its target 
research population and a main source of data whose presence and influence within the 
Algerian context had been simplified, if not marginalised. A significant number of Syrians who 
have been living and working in Algiers reside and work in different provinces such as Baba 
Hassan, Dali Ibrahim, Bir Khadem, Kouba, Bab El Zouar, Staouali, and Sidi Yahia. Another 
reason of choosing the Syrian community is although their significant number in Algeria (more 
than 50,000), they have been given less attention among social researchers and experts who are 
interested in immigration and refugee studies. The level of attention given to Syrians in Algeria 
is subject to different explanations: it is either because they have been successfully integrated 
within the Algerian local community to the point that they may not have faced any major 
challenges, social exclusion or racism or because there may be controversial practices and 
strategies adopted by the state in the absence of a national asylum / refugee mechanism in the 
country that does not allow Syrians to claim their rights in Algeria. Another reason can be 
deduced from the viewpoint of my Algerian participant at the level of the Foreigners’ Office 
(Maktab El Adjanib) in central Algiers, Asma (50) who was previously a lawyer, who argued 
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that the Algerian state has deliberately protected Syrians from being exploited or involved in 
any hidden foreign political agendas. However, I believe that the Syrian community will 
significantly enrich the field of migration and refugee studies in Algeria especially because my 
fieldwork revealed that the state’s biogovernmental strategies of managing the flow of Syrian 
displaced people consciously and unconsciously led to an identity crisis among them. 
 
2.2. Research Significance, Gap, and Contribution of the Thesis to 
Knowledge 
 
Before stating the contribution of my research, it is important to draw your attention on the 
quote with which I opened my thesis. The quote is by Tahar Djaout, an Algerian writer who 
was assassinated during the Algerian civil war in 1990s. He said: ‘it is a tough job being 
Algerian’ (Tahar Djaout * (quoted in Šukys, 2007: 14) in Benrabah, 2013, p. vi); my experience 
taught me that it is even harder being an Algerian social researcher who is conducting 
sociological research in Algeria. The main reason why I mentioned this was due to the 
obstacles I faced during my fieldwork and the difficulties I experienced due to the unfamiliarity 
of sociological research works that involve the local society in Algeria. Additionally, my data 
collection journey was not easy because of the difficulties I encountered to gain the trust of the 
Algerian cohort despite the fact of being Algerian myself (see chapter 5 for further details). My 
data collection journey taught me that the Algerian context as a space for sociological research 
is a securitised space that is heavily impacted by bureaucratic obstacles. Interviewing Algerian 
state officials gave me the impression that even the data around displaced people and the state’s 
security measures are highly securitised. By contrast, my experience with the Syrian cohort in 
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Algeria did not reveal that the Syrian community is securitised or highly censored by the state. 
Even my Syrian participants that held expired Syrian passports and stopped renewing their 
Algerian residence permits experienced liberty of speech, thoughts and freedom of movement 
within the Algerian territory. This group of Syrians could still access employment, though 
illegal and restricted. Additionally, and most importantly, the quote reflects my literature 
review journey that was widely impacted by the lack of resources especially those written by 
Algerians. Having said that, many of literature review works I used were written by European 
and American scholars. Very few were written by Algerian sociologists that lived in Algeria 
whose writings reflect the history of Algeria without being driven by linguistic or political 
agendas.      
 
The present thesis contributes to the evolution of an Algerian sociology as a broad field by 
specifically providing a qualitative evidence about the experience of a partially integrated 
minority within the Algerian context. Faradji (2015) argues that there is still a lack of social 
research projects that involve civil society and political power together to analyse a social 
phenomenon.  Research in the social sciences is always dependent on and monitored by the 
Algerian state itself. He further stated that: 
‘The State defines not only research subjects according to their expectations and interests of time, usually from a 
utilitarian perspective, but also closely monitoring production areas: universities, institutes, research centres ... in 
addition, the dissemination of knowledge, because the books and are edited by domestic companies under the 
direction of policy makers, is closely monitored.’ (Faradji, 2015, p. 355). 
 
As far as this study is concerned, it gains a considerable significance as it investigates and sheds 
light on a neglected sociological aspect of Algerian contemporary studies, which is the field of 
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immigration and refugeehood, rather than just journalistically reporting the phenomena and 
reacting to events (Gouldner, 1973). By pursuing the problem, exploring and recording life-
experiences and the inner nature of people and societies (D'Alton, 1971), this research provides 
an understanding of the situation of Syrian displaced people in Algeria and how the state has 
been managing their flow since their arrival to the country in 2011. This study is also an 
opportunity for future research to emerge in the field of refugeeness and migration about 
unfamiliar groups and diverse moralities (Gouldner, 1973).  
 
Examining the voice of Syrians will offer what is missing in sociological research in Algeria, 
as Faradji (2015) argues. Syrians’ voices will bridge the gap between theoretical language, 
social reality and the state power that monitors the relation between state practices and their 
implications in real-life situations. The significance of citizenship as a constitutional / social 
process is used to figure out the types of relationships that exist between the Syrian displaced 
community and both the state and people in Algeria. It will also reflect on challenges of social 
inclusion or exclusion that Syrians have faced as non-citizens in Algeria. The responses of 
Syrian displaced people, their reactions and experiences offer an interpretation of the factors 
that lead to either inclusion or exclusion of foreigners from the Algerian community.  
 
2.2.1. Contribution to the Algerian Contemporary Studies 
 
The subjects of Algerian nationalism and Algerian national identity have always been 
interesting to numerous Francophone, Arabophone, and Anglophone authors such as Benjamin 
Stora, Hugh Roberts, Jonathan Hill, Mouloud Mammeri, Ahmed Ben Noàman, Assia Djebbar, 
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Farhat Abbas, Malika Rahal, James McDougall and many others. The majority of Algerian 
studies have adopted political, cultural-historical orientations or literature-based approaches. 
Specialists in literature, history, anthropology as well as nationalist ideologues have discussed 
the presence of Algerianness (Algérianité) in Algerian literary texts and Algerian nationalism 
that evolved during the twentieth century. Specialists also focus on the notion of Algerian 
identity that was built as a reaction to the French orientalist policy and the French civilising 
mission (mission civilisatrice) which tended to obliterate all constituents of Algerianness such 
as the Arabic language and Islam.  
In her work about the culture of being Algerian entitled ‘The nation's ‘unknowing other’: three 
intellectuals and the culture(s) of being Algerian, or the impossibility of subaltern studies in 
Algeria’ published in 2003, Fanny Colonna claims that as descriptions by state makers of 
nationhood, the state’s description of Algerianness is imaginary, however, Mostefa Lacheraf, 
Mouloud Mammeri, and Abu’l Qasim Sa’adallah have attempted to explain Algerianness 
differently by reflecting on ‘the questions of nation, society, history and culture’ (Colonna, 
2003, p. 158). Mostefa Lacheraf, for example, a diplomat and constitutional theorist of the 
Algerian regime, interpreted Algerianness as a cultural entity from a social and a historical 
perspective. Colonna (2003, p. 159) argues that Lacheraf’s works entitled L'Algérie, nation et 
société  and Des Noms et des Lieux: Mémoires d'une Algérie oubliée  written in 1965 and 1998, 
respectively, reflect his experience as a socially and historically situated person and not merely 
as a political voice’ (Colonna, 2003, p. 159, emphasis in original text). Another important 
literary text by Lacheraf is Les Temps Modernes which, to Colonna, represents 
‘… a model of penetrative understanding on localised Algerian societies and their capacity for self-direction’, 
their consciousness of ends and means; on 'spoken languages which are more than dialects', on the 'disconcerting 
totality of individual cases' which constitutes village culture; and on this very culture, which, under colonialism, 
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'retrenches and which only, henceforward, religious tradition, itself vulnerable, appears to defend'- all this speaks 
all too eloquently to researchers who have gone to study these societies at first hand (Colonna, 2003, p. 159)’. 
According to Colonna, the full human reference for Algerian historicity is only possible in the 
defensive mode, i.e. only religion offers the people a recuperative mode of existence under 
colonialism. What Lacheraf did, was a study of his own society at first by focussing on his 
languages, different local dialects, culture, religion, historical places and reflecting on his own 
experiences without socially studying how the state imagination of Algerianness is designed 
and manifested in Algerian society.  
 
Mouloud Mammeri, an Algerian novelist and a linguist from Kabylia region (Djurjura), 
focusses on the ‘Berber question’ by reflecting on his cultural heritage: the Tamazight dialect 
and grammar in his novels and linguistic works (Colonna, 2003, p. 161). In his works, 
Mammeri aims to show that ‘the assumptions about Berbérité as an archaic, immobile, self-
reproducing peasant culture should disappear’ (Colonna, 2003, p. 161). Instead, he always 
believed that Berbérité is a cultural heritage of the Algerian national identity. Mammeri’s 
lecture in Tamazight language entitled: Poèmes kabyles anciens was banned in March 1980 in 
Tizi Ouzou in Kabylia region in Algeria (Maas, 2014, p. 149, italics in original text). His 
lectures were claimed to be ‘threatening to the public order’ (Maas, 2014, p. 149) and the event 
of his ban marked the start of a Berber spring in Algeria. The Berber spring in Algeria was a 
reaction to the policy of Arabisation and was a strong political and civil claim that the essence 
of Algerianness is Berbérité or at least should be Arabité and Berbérité. Maas confirms that the 
Berber spring was ‘a redefinition of Berber self-identification in relation to the Algerian state 
(2014, p. 149)’. Following the Berber spring, the Tamazight language gained its national status 
within the Algerian context in 2002. This decision of approving Tamazight language as a 
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national language signifies the approval of Berbérité as a component of Algerianness along 
with Arabité.  
 
Abu’l Qasim Sa’adallah, on the other hand, is an Algerian official salafi historian influenced 
by a Badissian thinking and his reformist organisation, the Association des Ulama Musulmans 
Algériens: AUMA (Algerian Muslim Scholars Association).  He published a number of articles 
in several volumes in the Algerian official press such as ‘Cultural History of Algeria’ (Ta’rikh 
al-Jaza’ir al-thaqafi) in 1970, in which he discusses the cultural patrimony of Algeria: the Arab 
and Islamic heritage. Abu’l Qasim Sa’adallah criticised the viewpoints of Mostefa Lacheraf 
and Mouloud Mammeri because to him, Algeria is an Arab and a Muslim nation. His 
appreciation of Arabic language and Islamic heritage is clear in his critique of Lacheraf and 
Mammeri and his accusation to both of being westernised in the following quote: 
 
‘As for those Algerians who received a uniquely French education [and no doubt he means precisely our two other 
authors], they separated themselves, or almost, from their roots and their origins, losing all contact with Arabic 
documents and manuscripts, and even with their genealogical tables, all of them established in Arabic throughout 
the different periods of the country’s history. Such kinds of Algerians were therefore in no sense fit to write the 
cultural history of their country (Colonna, 2003, p. 165, italics in original text)’. 
 
The literary works of Mostefa Lacheraf, Mouloud Mammeri and Abu’l Qasim Sa’adallah 
represent a strong political and cross-cultural conflict. In his critique of Lacheraf and Mammeri, 
Sa’adallah stated that Islam and Arabic are religious and cultural identities for every Algerian. 
Sa’adallah’s work can still be classified as anti-colonial literature of nationalism and it can still 
be considered a reaction to colonial violence that was practiced over Algerians and particularly 
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Muslims and Arabs through France’s citizenship laws in Algeria. In this respect, Frantz Fanon 
(1965, p. 67 in Young, 2001, p. 302) describes the importance of violence in movements of 
freedom especially in Algeria by claiming that ‘the colonized man finds his freedom in and 
through violence’. However, in Mammeri’s works, the feeling of subjection to violence 
continues even after Algeria’s independence. His appreciation of the Berber identity is a strong 
reaction to the policy of Arabisation which shaped the politics of Algerianness in Islam and 
Arabité only. Cultural and ethnic solidarity among Berbers saved the socio-cultural crisis in 
Algeria and has today resulted in recognising Berbérité as an element equal in status to Arabité 
in the national identity of Algeria.   
 
The politics of Algerianness still lie between the axis of tradition and modernity. The traditional 
side signifies the anti-colonial attitude of nationalism and the modern side is the post-colonial 
feature of Algerianness which is still not decolonised from its past. The works of the three 
writers: Mostefa Lacheraf, Mouloud Mammeri and Abu’l Qasim Sa’adallah, show how the 
absence of a sociological aspect in their literary works signifies a partial decolonisation of the 
self. In this regard, Colonna (2003, pp. 158 &168) argues that it is still difficult to answer the 
question: ‘what is being Algerian?’ ‘from inside Algeria’ although the legitimacy of literary 
works published by Mostefa Lacheraf, Mouloud Mammeri and Abu’l Qasim Sa’adallah is 
undeniable. The three authors’ works can still be criticised for being subjective in interpreting 
cultural history and the cultural patrimony of Algerianness (Algérianité) because each one of 
them interpreted the meaning of Algerianness as a personal experience according to their 
personal racial / ethnic, cultural, linguistic, political and ideological orientations.  
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Despite an extensive survey of views about the meaning of Algerianness, Rahal (2012) still 
claims that there is a limited access to modern Algerian national history. The contemporary 
socio-cultural fragmentation of Algérianité remains unresolved. Few researchers in post-
colonial studies have attempted a systematic analysis of contemporary Algeria by examining 
the structural impact of socio-cultural ideas but no work has studied Algerianness as a 
normative and a political entity and its capacity to include or exclude foreigners through the 
lens of outsiders and through the perception of non-citizens, who live in Algeria. An 
explanation of boundaries of Algerianness is overdue. In the present thesis, I am offering a 
sociological interpretation to the meaning of Algerianness based on social and constitutional 
challenges of inclusion / exclusion that the Syrian displaced community has faced in Algeria. 
 
2.2.2. Contribution to Refugee Studies and Citizenship Studies  
 
The present research provides an insight into the study of refugeehood, in general, and more 
specifically into refugeehood within the Algerian context which is marginalised in academic 
research and mainly in the field of social sciences. The extremely limited number of published 
research, if none that have dealt with Syrian refugees in Algeria, proves that the aspect of 
human migration in Algeria is undiscovered by both Algerian and foreign researchers. 
Additionally, this shows that their impact on society, politics, and economy is underestimated. 
This research will, therefore, contribute to the field of refugee studies by shedding light on the 
experience of Syrians in Algeria who found themselves at the intersection of paradoxical state 
strategies and discourses: hospitality, security, and humanitarian support. Discourses of 
liberalism or neo-liberalism govern state policy in Europe, America, Australia, and other white 
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majority nations. These discourses did not appear in the Algerian context. However, Algeria’s 
strongest relation to its past and its heroic war of liberation continues to dominate public debate.   
 
The conceptualisation of Algerian citizenship is different from the Western model of 
citizenship. Unlike the Western model of citizenship that, until very recently, has adopted 
values of cosmopolitanism, the Algerian modal is nationalistic, if not patriotic, and is still 
dependent on Algeria’s colonial past. The state official at the level of Foreigners’ Office 
(Maktab El Adjanib), Asma, expressed a normative but ambiguous requirement of patriotic 
sentiment for Algerian citizenship holders. She stated that an ideal Algerian citizen should 
always be ready to fight for the state’s security against external threats as their ancestors (el 
Moudjahidin) did during the French occupation in Algeria and the Algerian revolutionary war 
[… el jazaei’ri lazem ykoun dayman msta’ad ano yafdi blado b roho mitl ma amlo jdoudna el 
mudjahidin ayam el isti’emar el Faranci w tawra el jazaei’riya…]. This dimension of Algerian 
citizenship fits in what Carens calls a psychological dimension of citizenship in which the 
feeling of belonging ‘is connected through one’s sense of emotional attachment, identification 
and loyalty’ (Carens, 2000 in Weil, 2011, p. 616). For instance, on August 25th, 2020 and by 
presidential decree, the Algerian state decided to grant Pierre Audin the Algerian citizenship 
(Le Journal officiel de la République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, 2020, p. 22). 
Pierre Audin is the son of Maurice Audin, a teacher of mathematics at the University of Algiers 
and a French activist who was a victim of a state crime committed by the French colonial 
regime. Maurice was tortured and murdered by French soldiers at the age of 25 in 1957 in 
Algeria just because he fought for justice and independence from colonial rule. Until now, his 
dead body is never found (“My father was tortured…”, 2018). To pay tribute and express 
gratitude for Maurice Audin after Algeria’s independence, “La Place Maurice Audin” in central 
of Algiers is a place that holds his name as an honour to his soul after his death for Algeria. 
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Additionally, Algeria’s gesture of granting citizenship to Maurice’s son, Pierre, signifies that 
Algerian citizenship is often considered as a privilege, as opposed to a right, granted to those 
who showed support and loyalty to Algeria in the revolutionary war against France. Granting 
Algerian citizenship to Pierre Audin also reveals that the nature of Algerian citizenship is not 
about just being an Arab or a Muslim, it is rather about loyalty and sacrifices for Algeria as a 
nation. Thus, non-Muslims and non-Arabs can still enjoy citizenship, as in the case of Audin’s 
son. 
Having argued that Algeria’s citizenship is seen as a privilege, Algeria’s conceptualisation of 
citizenship gives limited chances for non-citizens to acquire it. This makes Algerian citizenship 
different in nature from projects of cosmopolitan European citizenship (moral or political) that 
emerged around the 2000s as a ‘post-nationalist’ tradition of ‘global distributive justice’ in the 
age of globalisation (Kamminga, 2017, p. 01). The cosmopolitan model of citizenship does not 
necessarily fit into the Algerian context. Cosmopolitan Europe advocates ‘developing 
international law, advocating democracy and human rights, providing global financial aid and 
humanitarian assistance, and boosting global climate policy’ (Kamminga, 2017, p. 01). When 
it comes to issues related to citizenship and refugees, cosmopolitan egalitarianism theorists 
adopt the idea of open borders and non-exclusion to outsiders since they believe in equality, 
dignity, sharing interests and benefits within a moral framework between citizens and non-
citizens despite the considerable inequalities at the economic, political, social or 
environmental levels. This underpins the free movement of people and ideas within the context 
of globalisation. Because the concept of egalitarian rights makes the individual belong not only 
to their local communities but to the world / global community, egalitarian theorists claim that 
people should learn to co-exist peacefully in the world. A cosmopolitan perspective rejects the 
politics of the nation-state system and argues that borders are unjust, arbitrary and artificial. 
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This leads to the conclusion that all citizens are citizens within the world and within their 
national communities (Held, 2010).  
From a minimalist lens, the conception of human rights and global justice is more problematic 
during the age of globalization in the contemporary world than ever before. Global justice is 
when people get enough, not the minimum, and come to lead their life in dignity. If people 
share the same resources even if they are enjoying a decent minimum, the minimalist approach 
tells us that this is not enough, and it is unjust. The minimalist approach is all about securing 
at least the basic rights and standards of living for everyone within individual societies and 
states and not within the global community (Armstrong, 2012, p. 37). In terms of citizenship 
rights, minimalist proponents suggest that citizens should enjoy equal national citizenship 
within their nation-states but does not necessarily guarantee that they would enjoy global 
citizenship equally (Armstrong, 2012). 
 
Brown (in Kamminga, 2017, p. 02) criticises the cosmopolitan project of the EU: both morally 
or politically, the project is still ‘inconsistent with application of the freedoms of cosmopolitan 
right and the laws of hospitality to non-EU citizens and its outward human rights policies [are] 
distorted by dubious economic behaviour’. Moral cosmopolitanism entails strong 
commitments to egalitarian principles at the level of the world’s community such as justice, 
openness, and the recognition of others’ cultural identities (Nussambaum, 1996 in Kamminga, 
2017). Nagel (2015, p. 119 in Kamminga, 2017, p. 04) states that political cosmopolitanism, 
on the other hand, accounts for the fact that ‘the demands of justice derive from an equal 
concern or a duty of fairness that we owe in principle to all our fellow human beings, and the 
institutions to which standards of justice can be applied are instruments for the fulfillment of 
that duty’. 
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Cosmopolitanism often conflicts with the phenomenon of statelessness. People who are 
stateless belong to no state in terms of legal formal relations with a nation-state, they have no 
documentation of their legality as recognised citizens of a particular state, and they have no 
civic or political engagement and identification. In her book, Abrahamian (2015, p. 16) shows 
different cases of stateless people, known as ‘bidoon’, and how their status had been dealt with 
as a matter of business and trade. For instance, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), decided to 
buy bidoon people Comorian citizenship and passports. However, problems that arise in the 
light of this practice: why did not the UAE grant bidoon people Emirati citizenship instead of 
buying them Comorian citizenship? More importantly, how can the bidoon accept citizenship 
of a state that they do not know, do not belong to and have no relation with? What about the 
sense of belonging, loyalty to nation- state and nationalism? Abrahamian shows how all these 
points melted in the global trade of citizenship (2015). I believe that the idea of 
cosmopolitanism along with globalisation are theoretically acceptable in the sense that 
individuals represent the core unit of moral concerns rather than states and they are subject to 
international law. However, these utopian ideas are impossible because citizens are directly 
governed by nation-states and they have to comply with the national law in their day-to-day 
practice rather than referring to international law. 
 
Unlike supporters of cosmopolitanism, I agree with Kamminga (2017, pp 01, 02) that the 
project of making the EU a cosmopolitan order and polity in the age of globalisation is no more 
than a utopian and an idealist idea which is not likely to be realised due to different reasons 
and the subject of hospitality of non-EU citizens should be discussed among EU members. The 
main reason is that the conceptualisation of cosmopolitan Europe is limited to the EU region 
and to EU citizens. The main goal of the EU is ‘global peace and security of Europeans in a 
broad sense, rather than global distributive justice’ as a conventional cosmopolitan concept 
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(Kamminga, 2017, p. 02). From an insider point of view, for the EU citizen, ‘Europe is 
perceived as a protector of human rights’; however, from a perspective of an outsider, of a non-
EU citizen such as an African citizen, Europe is seen as a ‘fortress’ (Schlenker 2013, pp. 30, 
34–35; Baban 2013, pp. 227, 231 in Kamminga, 2017, p. 07). In fact, the EU principles of 
cosmopolitan democracy and distributive justice are declining, and the EU is dominated by 
resurgent nationalism. Based on the reaction of EU state elites to the phenomenon of human 
movement and the flow of non-EU refugees, one can arguably characterise even the minimalist 
accommodation of asylum as essentially unjust, exclusive, and still limited to people within 
the EU territorial space. This is the case especially after European states decided to ‘strengthen 
their immigration policies and tighten borders towards people coming from 3rd world countries’ 
(Kamminga, 2017, pp. 07).  
 
This study unveils how Algerian citizenship and immigration policies have adopted 
nationalism and security as state rationalities to protect the Algerian national community when 
adopting a formal policy / strategy of accepting and integrating displaced Syrians since 2011. 
When civil conflict first ignited in Syria, Algeria adopted a welcoming approach of hospitality 
that granted access to Syrians unconditionally and without a visa prior to arrival. In the power-
knowledge relation, the production of the refugee body is subject to different binary images.  
For example, the Algerian hospitality approach produced Syrians as “guests”. Although the 
“guest” status is not official, it offered eligibility to unconditional social rights. By the start of 
2015, however, Algeria changed its approach and closed its borders due to a constant threat of 
terrorist groups from neighbouring countries such as Mali and Libya. The Algerian minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Sabri Bougadoum, has recently stated that Algeria’s national security is a part 
of Libya’s national security and the national unity of its neighbouring countries (Rédaction AE, 
2020). Incidents such as the terrorist attack in Ain Amenas gas plant in Teguentourine in south-
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eastern part of Algeria in 2013 and the discovery of a spying network led by undocumented 
migrants in Ghardaia province in 2017 have contributed to the Algerian state’s adoption of 
restrictive regulations when it comes to granting access to displaced people. As such, Syrians 
became subject to investigation before gaining their entry visa.  
 
2.3. Social Value of the Thesis  
 
This research does not offer a model of a national mechanism of asylum / refugees for Algeria, 
instead, it bridges the gap between the state’s intentions and practices in an attempt to explore 
the societal situation of Syrian displaced people in Algeria. Benrabah (2013, p. xiii) claimed 
that Algerians developed chauvinism and xenophobia towards others because of the socio-
political ideologies that tended to create a homogeneous society through the process of 
Arabisation of the state which lately gave birth to Islamic fundamentalism and the Black decade 
(civil war in 1990s).  However, Ayman, a Syrian who has been living in Algeria since 2011, 
states that the majority of Syrian displaced people did not experience any acts of discrimination, 
social exclusion or any behaviour that would threaten their human dignity and security at a 
societal level. As an activist and a previous journalist who took part in the civil and political 
opposition against the Syrian regime in 2011, Ayman believed that people in Algeria have more 
freedom of speech compared to people in Syria. Therefore, the present research can be 
considered as a research that documents Syrians’ voices about the legal challenges, they have 












‘Orientalism is never far from what Denys Hay has called the idea of Europe, a collective 
notion identifying ‘us’ Europeans as against all ‘those’ non-Europeans, and indeed it can be 
argued that the major component in European culture is precisely what made that culture 
hegemonic both in and outside Europe: the idea of European identity as a superior one in 
comparison with all the non-European people and culture’ (Said, 1985, p. 07).  
 
‘France made little efforts to convert Muslims of Algeria to Christianity, but she did try to 
replace their language by her own, and she did so hastily and without bestowing to real 
citizenship in exchange’ (Amin Maalouf, 2003: 133 in Benrabah, 2013, p. 21) 
 
‘Algeria our country, Islam is our religion, Arabic our language’ (Abd-el Hamid Ibn Badiss in 
Vince, 2015, p. 44) 
Chapter Three: French Colonial Discourse in Algeria: Historical, Social 






Algerianness (Algérianité) has been a special subject of investigation in Third World studies 
of nationalism, as Frantz Fanon’s call for decolonisation of Africa in the twentieth century 
shows. During the colonial era (1830-1962), Algerianness, as a normative force was formed as 
a reaction to the French orientalist policy (cultural, religious, linguistic, educational, legal and 
administrative) that reflected the Republic’s ideal of enacting the French civilising mission (la 
mission civilisatrice). According to French orientalist thinking, the recognisably modern form 
of the civilising mission was to be implemented for a backward people through education, 
efficient administration, and citizenship laws. The slogan of the French mission was “Algérie 
française” (French Algeria). These initiatives can be related to the “will to improve”. I have 
to say that one cannot speak about Algerian governmentality during the French colonial period 
because colonial Algeria, unlike Morocco and Tunisia during colonisation, was annexed to 
France and therefore left without a choice to elect its proper government or set up its 
administration. However, we can talk about acts of resistance against French colonial 
governmentality in terms of movements of nationalism (political, cultural and armed). This 
means the French presence in Algeria was a brutal colonisation, while Tunisia and Morocco 
were considered as ‘protectorates’ of the French regime (Cogneau, Dupraz, Mesplé-Somps, 
2019, p. 04).  
 
In the world of development, the ‘will to improve’ is when a group of people are in charge of 
the development of another group in terms of their welfare, social, economic and political 
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policies and relations (Li, 2007, p. 04). Li referred to this group as ‘trustees’ that can be 
planners, administrators, state officials, politicians (Li, 2007, p.04). Undoubtedly, this can be 
observed in colonial times when French authorities intervened in the life of the colonised, 
native population, and produced all kinds of control, discipline and even contradictions (Li, 
2007). Within the Algerian context, French colonial policies cared for Europeans and Jews in 
Algeria and favoured their wellbeing over Muslims that were completely marginalised. Li 
(2007, p. 07) argues that in order to operationalise the ‘will to improve’, the first procedure that 
is involved is what Foucault called in his concept of governmentality, ‘problematization’, 
which is to identify a problem to be solved. The second stage which she (Li, 2007, p. 07) called 
‘rendering technical’ involves designing a technical matrix in which that problem can be 
observed and identified. The third stage involves designing a plan in order to solve the 
identified problem in the interests of the wellbeing of the population (Li, 2007). These 
programs cannot be vague, but they must be translated into programmes that can be 
implemented in aspects of life. The French civilising mission in Algeria can also be referred to 
as a form of disciplinary power that was exercised through militaries, educational systems, 
administrative, legal and civil laws, prisons and the like. This demonstrates the relation 
between power and knowledge by which the French regime created manipulated Algerian 
subjects / objects. The reason why I used both subjects and objects in describing Algerians in 
the French colonial policy is because, first, the colonial power had to study the Algerian society 
as its object to know more about it by sending sociologists and anthropologists to the country. 
After fulfilling the task of defining the object, the French regime had to design a disciplinary 
system under which the Algerian society can be subjected, manipulated and controlled. The 
educational system or French schools as means of disciplinary power, for instance, 
disseminated their knowledge that Algeria is a French territory and Algerians should be 
westernised by all means. As such, the French colonial practices manifested themselves in: 
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banning Arabic language at schools, religious schools and administrations, suppressing the 
practice of Islam by punishing religious leaders, and finally turning indigenous Arab and 
Muslim people into French subjects in contrast to the Algerian Jewish community that gained 
legal recognition as citizens through naturalisation. The outcome of French colonial 
governmentality created unsettled indigenous people and resulted in religious fears and ethnic 
struggles that still exist in post-colonial present times. My research data reveals that Algerian 
citizenship and nationality and the state practices in dealing with non-citizens in the 21st century 
are still shaped by the Algerian colonial past. Having said this, the present chapter provides a 
critical account for how Algerianness was culturally and politically re-formed during the 
colonial period and describes how Algerianness was shaped as a reaction to the French scheme 
of colonial power by focussing on the contribution of three main figures that have a formative 
place in national consciousness: El Amir Abdu El-Kader el Jazaei’ri, Messali Hadj and Abd 
El-Hamid Ibn Badiss. Resisting the discipline of French regime, these men’s efforts provided 
a defining background for political, cultural and religious ideologies that have since defined 
the boundaries of Algerianness when it comes to religion, language and Arab ethnicity.  
 
A simple way of defining nationalism would be the possession of any sentiments of loyalty to 
a particular nation (Kaplan & Herb, 2008). However, a more concrete definition in the interests 
of analysis is that nationalism can be defined as a set of doctrines, ideas and sentiments which 
could be oriented either by economic, political or socio-cultural principles (Breuilly, 1993, p. 
ix; Hill, 2009; Özkırımlı, 2010).  Breuilly argues that ‘one nationalist doctrine may assert that 
the nation is a matter of active, subjective commitment while another may insist that the nation 
is a racial or linguistic or religious community constituted independently of the opinions of its 
members (Breuilly in Balakrishnan 1996, p. 148-149)’. Whilst nationalism is arbitrary and 
natural, it should not be taken for granted. Instead, modern nations and nationalism are the 
 81 
products of modern processes such as capitalism, industrialization, urbanization, secularism, 
and the emergence of the modern bureaucratic states (Özkırımlı, 2010, p. 72).  
 
Algeria’s modern nation has been continually built as a reaction to French colonialism since 
the 19th century. The “fly-whisk incident” has been considered a turning point in the history of 
Algeria; this episode formed the pretext for occupation lasting a hundred and thirty-two years. 
Its history can be traced back to the time when the French Consul Pierre Deval met Dey Hussein 
in Algiers in April 1827 (Toperich, Boukaila, Roberts, 2019). After Dey Hussein sent an 
invoice to King Charles X to negotiate the situation in which France was deep in debt to 
Algeria, to the tune of fourteen million francs (Shillington, 2005), the French Consul refused 
to discuss the matter. According to a popular myth, Dey Hussein lost his temper and struck the 
French Consul with a fly-whisk (Tarvin, 2009; Hashmi, 2012). After this diplomatic incident, 
the French naval force responded by blockading the port of Sidi Fredj in Algiers for three years. 
By June 1830, the French troops started expanding from the coast to the southern areas that 
marked the start of a brutal colonisation to Algeria. 
 
Algerian people have always had a sense of belonging to a nation, but it came late (Heggoy, 
1968) because the notion of modern nationalism moved beyond culture and language and 
adopted a political ideology as its primary engine especially after the two World Wars. 
Algerians waited until political nationalistic movements started in the 20th century. The 
Algerian modern nation, as with many other nationalisms, emerged due to the efforts of elites 
that shaped the boundaries of Algerianness. Heggoy (1968) claims that the idea of an Algerian 
nation with united inhabitants did not exist before the French conquest; during Ottoman rule, 
Algerian society was a traditional Muslim society of Arab and Berber tribes that were respected 
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and ‘governed by Muslim rulers’ (Ladjal & Bensaid, 2014, p. 567). Unlike the Ottoman era, 
during the French occupation, Algerian dwellers emigrated to Tunisia and other Muslim lands 
because to an Algerian, being governed by a non-Muslim ruler is an aberration from the ideals 
of the faith (Heggoy, 1968).  
Generally, the Ottomans’ approach of influencing and challenging local cultural, political and 
societal certainties of Algerians were based on ‘containment and domestication, flattery and 
appreciation of elites and scholars’ (Ladjal & Bensaid, 2014, pp. 567-568). This approach also 
assisted Ottomans in gaining a ‘good relationship with cultured Algerians and elites’ (Ladjal 
& Bensaid, 2014, p. 567). However, during the era of French occupation, people’s local 
cultural, religious and political spheres were approached with brutality, exclusion, ban of 
religious schools and the weakening of their legitimacy, the deprivation of rights, and the 
oppression and exile of Algerian scholars and elites. Having said this, it can be argued that the 
collective national identity, Algerianness, was primarily governed by Islam as its legitimating 
narrative. As long as Islam was respected and its status within the state and society was 
protected, Algerianness was preserved. This is how Algerianness was kept homogeneous and 
how social and religious bounds were not broken. Indeed, ‘the initiative of respecting religious 
authority and legality provided the Ottomans with a strong foothold in Algeria’ and made them 
achieve their ‘interests in the region’ (Ladjal & Bensaid, 2014, p. 567). 
 
After the French invasion, native Algerians started sporadic native uprisings and local 
resistance since the 19th century which did not provide a recognisably political form of 
nationalism to popular discontent with the French political and administrative rule; instead, it 
encouraged future intellectuals towards resistance and opposition to French colonisation. El 
Amir Abdu El-Kader el Jazaei’ri had a prominent role in shaping the religious content of 
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Algerian nationalism and he acted as a source of inspiration for nationalists that would come 
afterwards. To him, Jihad or the holy war was neither a matter of making Christians convert 
into Islam nor harming them; it was rather a mission of defending Islam and Muslims, Algeria 
and Algerians against the outsiders: the French (Marston, 2013).  
To Abdu El-Kader, a good governance, is after all, subject to God’s words as shown in his holy 
books namely: ‘Torah, the Psalms, the Gospels and the Koran’ and as shown in Sunna which 
is the Prophet’s Mohammed’s sayings (Kiser, n.d, p. 01). To Abdu El-Kader, the art of 
governance should cover three main areas: the first can be described as self-governance or self-
mastery that encompasses intellectuality, good morality, and respect. The second form covers 
governing his community while the third form of governance aims at creating a caliphate by 
federating independent-minded tribes under law (Kiser, n.d, pp. 4-5). Abdu El-Kader 
established the cultural attributes which would act as a social power for modern nationalists. 
Naima Mouhleb argues that two main elements: Islam and Arabic, played a significant role in 
unifying Algerians in the age of the French occupation 
 
‘Algeria had no royal family or previous ruler to rally around during the colonial occupation. A unifying element 
was found in the religion and language that denied Algerians a place in French Algeria, namely Islam and Arabic’ 
(Mouhleb, 2005, p.87 in Benrabah 2013, p. 21). 
 
For Paulin Djiteé ‘nowhere else in Africa has the language issue been as central in the fight 
against colonialism as Algeria’ (Djiteé in Benrabah 2013, p. 21). Language and religion were 
the two most vital of human cultural forms to foster solidarity against an alienating colonial 
policy. They were also essential markers of nationhood and the main patterns of national 
identity during the nationalists’ movements in the era of global rights in the twentieth century. 
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For instance, doctrines of assimilation and association in political, economic and judicial 
structures and institutions, the policy of Frenchification and the mission to evangelise and 
promote civilisation indirectly influenced both Abd El-Hamid Ibn Badiss to establish the 
Algerian Muslim Ulama’s- -scholars- association (AUMA Association des Ulama Musulmans 
Algériens) in 1931 and Messali Hadj to be the first to claim total cultural, political and 
administrative independence. During French colonisation, politicisation was limited to a 
minority of the middle-class Muslims who supported assimilation and equality with French 
citizens (Barclay, Ann Chopin & Evans, 2018). By 1946, French Algeria witnessed Muslim 
political movements that not only demanded equal rights but also called for total independence 
from French cultural influence (Barclay et al, 2018).  
 
Uprisings were motivated by the idea of a modern nation-state bound by its united geographical 
territory (Heggoy, 1968, p. 128). Indeed, modern Algerian nationalism already had the 
linguistic, cultural, and religious resource to lead anti-colonial movements. Therefore, 
reformers, such as Messali Hadj, needed to adopt ideological and political doctrines in order to 
establish a strong background for Algerian modern nationalism to emerge and stand against 
French policy. Hadj and Ibn Badiss strongly advocated ideas of liberalism and national 
independence and resisted the ideas of imperialism and assimilation. Within the Algerian 
context and as a resistance for the French colonial power, solidarity, desire and the will to fight 
for liberty against the French remained the main aspects of cultural scholars, namely, Ibn 
Badiss and nationalist leaders. During his nationalist revival, Ibn Badiss focused on Arab 
Islamic culture as a symbol of solidarity and unity between Algerian Muslims. Right from the 
start of their occupation, the French colonisers imposed their western, oriental and imperialist 
culture on Algerians. Therefore, as a reaction to the French projects, the AUMA organization 
played the role of raising people’s awareness to Islamic culture. Abd- El Hamid Ibn Badiss’s 
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stand remained clear; he disagreed with Algerian assimilationists such as Farhat Abbas and 
argued instead:  
 
‘We have examined the past and the present and have found that the Algerian nation has taken shape and exists. 
This nation has its history marked by deeds of the highest order. It possesses its culture, its traditions, and its 
characteristics, good and bad, so as do all the nations of the earth. We maintain further that this Algerian nation 
is not France, cannot be France, and does not wish to be France’ (Clark, 1960, p. 17). 
 
At the end of the Second World War, a massive wave of nationalist movements spread in the 
world and in Algeria. This took place in different regions in Algeria; Sétif, Kharata and Guelma 
by Algerian Muslims claiming their freedom and social justice as they were promised by the 
French. A display of the Algerian flag on May 8th, 1945 led to a massacre of around 40 and 45 
thousand victims according to PPA (Algerian People's Party) statistics and the consulate of the 
USA in Algiers (Golsan, 2000). The French army and police turned the peaceful nationalist 
march into a bloody tragedy. The Algerian people recognised that independence would not be 
granted by peaceful actions; they started forming an army which would ignite the independence 
war (Behr, 1961).  
 
Abbas had an assimilationist orientation when it came to integrating Algeria and Algerians into 
the French state and European values with equality and cultural pluralism, justice and respect 
to different races and religions. He drafted the Democratic Union of the Algerian Manifesto 
U.D.M.A (Union Démocratique du Manifeste Algérien) in 1946 which represented a turning 
point in his political life. The programme of the Algerian manifesto focussed on the fulfilment 
of political equality as a sovereign nation and self-governance, the right of Algerians to elect 
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their representatives in the national assembly which was monopolized by the French only. The 
manifesto established a federated republic of Algeria, provided Algerians received Algerian 
citizenship and Algerians in France receive French citizenship (Abun-Nasr, 1987). Abbas 
recognised that assimilation was no longer a viable proposition because, to the French policy, 
Algerians that wished to belong needed to forsake their Algerianness and accept Frenchness as 
their identity. Abbas’s new-formed political party strongly supported the foundation of an 
independent Algerian state.  Abbas’s stand with the Muslims that took part in the Second World 
War marked the first stirrings of his nationalist sentiment and made him one of the prominent 
nationalists in Algeria:  
 
‘Algerians agree to take part in a war for the people’s liberation, provided this be carried out without racial or 
religious discrimination; provided that- despite past sacrifices and past promises- they should not be deprived of 
their freedom and essential liberties; and provided a congress of elected representatives of all Moslem 
organisations be convened to draft a political, economic and social statute’ (cited in Behr 1961, p. 50). 
 
The Algerian resistance to French colonial power was also supported by a taking up of arms. 
In 1947, a group of young nationalists formed the O.S (Organisation Spéciale) in order to 
prepare a strong army that could take part in the war of independence. The main figures of the 
organization were Ahmed Ben Bella, Ait Ahmed Hocine, Mohamed Boudiaf, Lakhdar Ben 
Tobbal and Abd El-Hafidh Boussouf. Although the O.S was smashed by France, underground 
preparations still took place. In 1954, the FLN (National Liberation Front; in French: Front de 
Libération Nationale) was formed with its national army (National Liberation Army). The 
FLN’s main objectives were inspired by previous political and social/cultural nationalists. It 
called for the restoration of the sovereign, democratic, and social Algerian state, within the 
framework of Islamic principles (Behr, 1961). 
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Despite a poorly equipped army, the FLN started the war on November 1st, 1954 by launching 
several attacks in more than twenty regions in Algeria. In an attempt to make the Arab world 
and the whole world know about the Algerian war of independence and to tighten the 
diplomatic relations with other nations, the Algerian provisional government was founded in 
Cairo in 1958 headed by Farhat Abbas. In a two-year period, most of the Arab world and 
nations from Asia (Vietnam, Northern Korea, China, and Indonesia) recognised the legitimacy 
and the existence of an Algerian nation-state. On the other hand, on October 17th, 1961, 
Algerian immigrant workers in Paris and its surroundings prepared carefully for a peaceful 
protest against racist practices, segregation and the restriction of political freedom by De 
Gaulle’s government. The FLN designed nationalistic slogans supporting national 
independence: “Algeria is Algerian”, “independence to Algeria” to be held during 
demonstrations that took place on the 17th of October. The demonstration of Algerian 
immigrants in France, unfortunately, had a tragic ending. In order to paralyze the Algerian 
movement, the French police headed by Maurice Papon as a prefect reacted brutally. The night 
of October the 17th ended up with a large number of individuals from the Algerian community 
killed, beaten and dumped into the Seine River (House & MacMaster, 2006). Therefore, 
October 17th, 1961 massacres remain a black spot in the history of France. During that time, 
the FLN obtained support from international opinion and De Gaulle was compelled to sign the 
Evian Accords in March 18th, 1962. The main negotiators in this treaty were the provisional 
government and the FLN and the French Republic.  The formal agreement established a cease 
fire in Algeria, prisoners of war were released, and the French granted the Algerian nation its 
independence and sovereignty on July 5th, 1962 (House & MacMaster, 2006). The number of 




3.1. Practices of the French Colonial Power against Islam and Arabic 
Language through Education and Citizenship Laws 
 
3.1.1. Enforcing Assimilation through a National Educational System   
 
The French strategy of colonisation adopted a policy of racial and geographical expansion. The 
orientalist project during the nineteenth century was a dream of conquest into the interior by a 
superior administrative power (Said, 1985). Leory-Beaulieu argues that the power of 
colonisation lies in the invasion of space and the reproduction of people in order to blur their 
language, customs, ideas, and laws (in Said, 1985). Indeed, Cressaty and Senator Paul Doumer 
argued ‘if France was to continue to prevent ‘le retour de l’Islam’, it had better take hold of the 
Orient’ (in Said, 1985, p. 225).   The Napoleonic plan for Egypt demonstrated a double feature: 
He [Edward Said] tells us how a team of scientists, geographers, historians, and archaeologists compiled, 
catalogued, and made available a knowledge that was deemed essential for invading and placing Egypt under the 
imperial gaze. This operation was generally civilizing at ‘home’ and ‘orientalising’ in the colony’ (Marrouchi, 
2012, p. 94). 
 
The Napoleonic technique of colonisation used classical historical texts as knowledge that was 
spread by cultural practices of French scientists in order to control the colonised population 
with military troops. The Napoleonic strategy in Algeria was to expand an assertive civilising 
mission in geographical space, race, culture, policy and language. Urging the profit motive, the 
French strategy aimed at weakening the indigenous economy of Algeria and to engage in a 
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defensive war against Arab and Muslim identity. French colonisers believed that mixed 
marriages between French and Algerians would easily make indigenous Algerians convert to 
Christianity (Chabou, 1969 in Laaredj-Campbell, 2016). In 1848, around 3389 Jews and 
Christians immigrated to the country to join around three million indigenous Algerian Muslims 
with French military advances. This early wave of colonisation was characterised by the arrival 
of both military officers and civilian administrators (Lorcin, 1995, p. 1).  
 
It is very important to shed light on the intellectual situation in Algeria before the French 
colonisation and the impact of the French governmentality and its strategy at the level of 
education. In 1833 and just a year after the French occupation of Algeria, ‘illiteracy did not 
exceed 14% while it reached 53% in France at that time’ (Ladjal & Bensaid, 2014, p. 575). 
Additionally, in 1837 the number of students in higher learning institutions of Constantine 
alone reached approximately seven hundred, while in 1850 the number dropped to sixty 
students, General Beidou revealed (Ladjal & Bensaid, 2014, p.573, emphasis added).  
 
During the Ottoman era, the majority of Algerians were capable of writing and reading in 
Arabic. Algerians were not deprived of rights such as the right to education at Islamic schools, 
their right to learn Arabic. Local elites and scholars, for instance, gained ‘administrative and 
judiciary positions’ and were not completely excluded as was the case during the French 
occupation (Ladjal & Bensaid, 2014, p. 568). However, during French colonisation mosques 
were replaced by churches (Fontaine, 2016) and most Muslim traditional education at religious 
schools had been banned and replaced by French education (Laaredj-Campbell, 2016). 
Weakening intellectual institutions in Algeria aimed at ‘producing a new generation of 
Algerians steeped in ignorance and illiteracy’ (Ladjal & Bensaid, 2014, p. 574). Consequently, 
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by 1901, the level of illiteracy among Algerians climbed to’ 92.2%’ (Ladjal & Bensaid, 2014, 
p. 574). During Ottoman rule, Islamic establishments namely ‘Qur’an Schools (al-Kuttāb)’, 
‘Zāwiyahs, ‘The Madrasah’, and ‘Higher Education institutions’ played a prominent role in 
preserving Algerian national identity via the fields of religion, education, politics, social work 
(Ladjal & Bensaid, 2014, p. 573). During the French occupation, French policy makers adopted 
‘a policy of Christianisation’ (Ladjal & Bensaid, 2014, p. 572) and closed all Islamic 
institutions. Both girls and boys were recruited at French schools in Algiers, Constantine, Blida, 
Oran, Bône (present-day Annaba) and Mostaganem (Chabou, 1969 in Laaredj-Campbell, 
2016). 
 
Speaking of education and schooling, the French educational system aimed at changing the 
social composition and structure of Algerian society starting with pupils at schools. Allix 
Eugénie Luce, a French teacher and a headmaster of girls’ school in Algiers, believed in the 
fusion of races and explicitly delivered her objectives to members of the -Conseil 
d’administration- on January 31st, 1846 
‘These girls … would become our guarantee of the country’s submission to our authority as well as the 
unimpeachable pledge of its future assimilation (cited by Rogers, 2011, p. 734 & Rogers, 2013, p. 65)’. 
 
In this respect, ‘the French viewed their language and culture as superior over that of Algerians’ 
(Laaredj-Campbell, 2016, p. 96). Algerian cultural and linguistic backgrounds would have 
needed to be completely disregarded in the pedagogical programme as the French director of 
schools in Paris Ferdi and Buisson argued 
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‘The Arab child would be distracted at any moment by a single word, a phrase, a playful reference to facts, or a 
traditional custom while reading the content of a French school book, which would otherwise be completely 
comprehensible to us. He looks at the text with his great wide eyes, sparkling with intelligence, and is filled with 
despair and because there is no proper way to reach him, he slowly withdraws. Truly no impression can be more 
painful than this’ (Chabou, 1969, p. 86 in Laaredj-Campbell, 2016, p. 97).  
 
Marrouchi’s viewpoint also confirms that scholarly works such as ‘Jacques Berque’s 
translations and interpretations of manuscripts and religious texts helped the administrative and 
the military missions of building the French Empire in Algeria (2004, p. 94-95)’. ‘The number 
of historical and literary works that were written during the colonial era documented the socio-
cultural life of Algerians and shaped the European imaginations of Muslim Algerians as rude 
and uncivilised, largely the result of successful Ottoman and Algerian military expeditions in 
Europe’ (Ladjal and Bensaid, 2014, p. 579).  As a part of the Orientalist policy, Edward Said 
(1985) focused on the connection between scientific, civilising practices and national pride for 
the colonisers. The interrelationship between orientalism, empiricism, society, scientific 
practices and national benefit lay with establishing the scope of a commercial geography. It is 
important to say that the scientific practices of orientalists acted as symbols for political 
dominance and imperial expansion. Similarly, Withers (1997, p. 23) argued that chorography, 
which is not only the act of describing or mapping a region but is also a ‘political practice to 
establish authority over space and situate a particular population historically’. It is also a 
strategy of human production that encourages the development of an inductive and public spirit 
in the human sciences. Thus, the orientalist projects took advantage of the discipline of 
geography in order maintain the sense of self-identity and patriotism among European people. 
In this regard, the French Minister of Education, Jules Ferry, declared 
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‘Keep them (the Algerians) in the schools until they reach the age of 14. That is enough, more than adequate. We 
do not intend to integrate them into our fine public-school programs because we do not plan to teach them too 
much history or geography, just French, above all French, French and nothing else’. (Cited in Laaredj-Campbell, 
2016, p. 96). 
 
Ferry’s declaration, on the other hand, reflects the intentions of the ideology of Orientalism 
that aimed to make Algerian society an object of French policy in order to destroy any potential 
for unity amongst the indigenous population. This policy had to be comprehensive enough to 
absorb the whole of society which involves culture, religion and language. Said (1985) reveals 
how important geographical knowledge was in the orientalists’ civilising missions. He claims 
that the motivation for the French conquest was to take possession of more geographical spaces 
to satisfy France’s national pastime and interests. His general observation lies behind the fact 
that France promoted the knowledge of scientific geography which later paved the way for 
commercial practices such as travelling ‘how-to-travel’ and ‘how-to-see’, as Withers explains 
(1995). Having a clear understanding in scientific geography had been a means of establishing 
empirical knowledge about the peoples of Algeria in order to establish a political regime to 
control the territory of the colony.  
 
The reason behind the deliberate omission of history and geography from the pedagogical 
programme is that the history and geography of Algeria would make people aware of the 
Algerian nation which had existed before the French occupation. The science of geography 
was the key in France taking control over Algerian territory by dividing and mapping the 
territory into provinces or departments: the department of Oran, department of Algiers, 
department of Constantine, and territories of the South. The division of the Algerian territory 
was advantageous for the French government to control the economic power which was largely 
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based on agriculture. With commerce dominating industry, Algerian villages were converted 
into pools of reserve labour (Prochaska, 2004). 
 
3.1.2. Citizenship: A Practice of Exclusion and Ethnic Division  
 
As metropolitan France continued to grow as a great European power in the 19th century, it 
annexed its largest colony, Algeria, to its territory. As such, Algeria was declared an integral 
part of the French Republic, according to Article 109 (French Constitution, November 4th, 
1848), and was divided into multiple administrative units. The French discriminative policy 
started by dividing Algerian society into citizens and subjects by imposing unfair laws on 
Algerians such as citizenship and nationality laws (Lorcin, 1995). Although Algeria was 
considered a part of France, ‘Sénatus-consulte on July 14th, 1865’ represented a French policy 
of alienation between citizens and non-citizens or subjects in colonial Algeria (Vince, 2020, p. 
07). According to Sénatus-consulte, “indigenous Muslims” were named French and thus were 
obliged to serve in military service and join the civil service. However, one would not receive 
French citizenship by naturalisation and enjoy citizenship rights unless they renounced their 
‘Muslim personal status’ (Vince, 2020, p. 07). The latter was not about being a Muslim only, 
but about adopting Islamic rule in all aspects of life such as: family law, inheritance, marriage, 
and the like. Therefore, the Muslim personal status can be understood as an ‘ethnic-legal’ 
categorisation designed by the French regime to determine political rights of citizenship 
(Vince, 2020, pp. 07, 197). The Sénatus-consulte did not allow Algerians of Muslim personal 
status to receive full access to their social, civil or political rights unless they were naturalised 
after they renounced their Muslim personal status and accepted French citizenship. The process 
of full naturalisation into French citizenship was introduced as a possibility only for Algerian 
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elites, intellectuals or ‘war veterans’ but at a cost: they would have renounced their Muslim 
personal status and adopted French culture under the judicial law of Jonnart (la loi de Jonnart) 
on February 9th, 1919 (Vince, 2020, p. 25). Approximately ‘425,000’ Algerian men could enjoy 
their voting rights at the level of local and regional elections but still could not elect their 
political representatives or deputies at the French parliament (Vince, 2020, p. 25). 
Exceptionally, in 1936 the Blum Violette project granted full citizenship rights including 
political and parliamentary rights to around ‘25,000’ Algerian ‘war veterans, students, elected 
officials and trade union leaders’ without being obliged to renounce their Muslim personal 
status (Vince, 2020, p.38).     
Those who chose not to give up on their Muslim personal status were later governed by the 
Code de l'indigénat which was issued in 1881 (Vince, 2020, p. 09). Code de l'indigénat is often 
translated as ‘the Native Code’ which is ‘‘a regime of exception’ based on rule by decree, 
enacted in often arbitrary and sometimes spectacular punishments and concerned primarily 
with asserting administrative power’ (Mann, 2009, p. 333 & 335). Code de l'indigénat can be 
seen as a disciplinary power which is exercised through ‘colonial tribunals where French 
commandants could jail, fine or bind people’ (Mann, 2009, p. 333, italics in original text). 
Regime of indigénat was an act of animalisation, as Doho (2017) would call it, that turned 
Algerians of Muslim personal status into colonial subjects that were inferior as opposed to 
superior citizens with rights. Under Sénatus-consulte, Algerian Jews also had the opportunity 
to receive full citizenship rights in case they renounce their Jewish personal status (Vince, 
2020, p. 08). Algerian Jews were later legally declared ‘Europeans’ and received full French 
citizenship under Crémieux decree (Décret crémieux) on October 24th, 1870 (Taieb-Carlen, 
2010 & Parolin, 2013). Crémieux decree declared (Abitbol, 2003): 
‘The Government of National Defence 
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Decrees: 
The Israelites native to the departments of Algeria are declared French citizens; consequently, their real status and 
their personal status shall be, dating from the promulgation of the present decree, regulated by French law, with 
all rights acquired until this day inviolable. 
All contrary legislative dispositions, sénatus-consults, decrees, rulings, or ordinances are abolished. 
At Tours, October 24, 1870 
Signed: Ad. Crémieux, L. Gambetta, Al. Glais-Bisoin, L. Fourichin’. 
 
It can be argued that French citizenship in French Algeria was both assimilationists, racist, 
conditional and selective. Within the context of colonial politics, granting Algerians full French 
citizenship and full citizenship rights with conditions to certain groups aims at proving that the 
process of assimilation designed by French politicians was based on ethnic-religious personal 
status of individuals. By excluding a group of people, such as Algerians of Muslim personal 
status, from citizenship and full citizenship rights while including others, such as Jews, the 
colonial power expanded in Algeria through ‘governmentality and surveillance’ (Roberts, 
2017, p.16 & 19). The Biggest reform in citizenship law was in 1958 when the French 
citizenship was granted to majority of the Muslim population. However, this was still rejected 
by anti-assimilationist figures such as Ibn Badiss and his association because by declaring 
Algerians ‘French of North African Origin’ (Vince, 2020, p. 09), the French colonial 
governmentality was still formally and officially denying their Algérianité. 
 
Poverty, mass illiteracy and economic backwardness were allowed to continue with the absence 
of political and civic status for the Arab masses. In an attempt to solve the issue, the colonial 
administration started reforms at the levels of finance, education, judicial systems, and the 
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political regime by assimilating institutions and administrative organizations of the colony to 
those in France. This assimilation led to the exclusion of the indigenous population from power 
(Lorcin, 1995, p. 172). In 1881, the indigenous population had no national representatives; 
however, the French population had a ‘National Assembly’ that was represented by senators 
and deputies (Lorcin, 1995, p. 09). In this respect, Ernest Gellner argues that there are a number 
of ways in which the nationalist principles or rights can be violated: ‘the political boundary of 
a given state can fail to include all the members of the appropriate nation; or it can include 
them all but also include some foreigners; or it can fail in both these ways at once, not 
incorporating all the nationals and yet also including some non- nationals’ (2006, p. 01). 
 
Algerian society was a traditional Muslim society that was based on tribal factionalism. The 
French policy tended to dismantle this society and break it down into small ethnic groups. The 
French conquest divided the Algerian nation into two ethno-cultural categories: Arabs were 
considered as inferiors and Kabyle as superiors (Lorcin, 1995). In fact, Berbers of Algeria refer 
to a large ethnic group which consists of Chaouia (in Aures Mountain), Kabyles (in Great 
Kabylia –Djurjura now-), Mozabites (in Northern Sahara-) and Touareg (in central and South 
Sahara). The Berbers of Algeria speak different varieties of Berber language which differs from 
one region to another (Lorcin, 1995, p. 04). In addition to an ethno-cultural dichotomy, a non-
accurate socio-geographic division was set up: the Arabs were plain-nomadic residents and 
Berbers were mountain- sedentary residents. Eugene Bordichon, a French physician who lived 
in Algeria at the time, looked forward to taking advantage of these ethnic divisions. He argues 
in 1845 that 
‘Without breaking the laws of moral and international rights, we will be able to defeat our African enemies with 
gunpowder and steel, which will lead them to starve and through the use of alcohol, bribes, and decay we will 
provoke inner conflicts between the Arabs and the Kabyle Berbers, between the tribes of the Tell and those of the 
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Sahara. Now it is the easiest thing in the world. Without spilling blood, we can decimate them every year by taking 
possession of their subsistence and confiscating their food, blocking their way until even the fig trees and cacti 
flee’ (Chabou, 1969, p. 63 cited in Laaredj-Campbell, 2016, p. 94). 
 
The French conquest increased in size and power and dominated the intellectual, social, 
political and religious levels. From the very start, piéds-noirs settlers were protected by the 
Republic’s conscript army; however, the image of ‘bad Arabs’ and ‘good Kabyle’ became a 
colonial norm in society. There was no need of a formal policy due to the fact that the Kabyle 
people were more likely to convert and assimilate into French colonial society, they could 
appear to the rest of the ethnic populations to have a privilege over Arabs.  
 
Charles-Robert Ageron, a historian of colonial ideologies, refers to this dichotomy as the 
‘Kabyle Myth’ (Lorcin, 1995, p. 11). However, in colonial Algeria the Salafi reformist 
movement’s argument was that Kabyle people should be united with Arabs within the same 
nation. Arab and Berber historiography tells us about the advantage of Islam in the Maghribi 
region (North Africa) in creating a spiritual kinship between both ethnic groups. For instance, 
during Tariq Ibn Ziyad’s successful conquest of Spain, Arabs and Berbers created a strong 
army during battles. McDougall (2006) argued that the Salafi socio-cultural reformist program, 
which drew the Arab language and Islam as signifiers of Algerian nationalism, had inevitably 
urged a conflict between the Arab and the Berbers which lasted even after independence. The 
socio-political movement known as the Berber spring in 1980s in Algeria is evidence of his 
argument. This is when the Berbers claimed official recognition of their language and culture 
in modern Algeria (McDougall, 2003b).  
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On the other hand, Kabyles had been a favourite case study for most French ethnographers, 
anthropologists and sociologists during the twentieth century (Scheele, 2009). In this respect 
and in the light of this theory of race and nationhood, Ernest Renan (1873, pp. 193, 140 in 
Scheele, 2009, p. 25) argues that ‘the Berber race has now not only incontestably gained 
acceptance in the world of anthropology; henceforth, it is the object of a science’.  
 
‘The five things that constitute the essential attribute of race and allow us to speak of it as a distinctive unit within 
the human species, are language, literature, religion, history and legislation (Ernest Renan, 1873, p. 104; in 
Scheele, 2009, p. 25)’. 
 
In the colonial imagination, Kabyles were remote from the essentially Arab national identity. 
In contrast to McDougall’s argument discussed above regarding the movement of Salafis, I 
believe that colonial writers, in their writings, brought up and fostered the propaganda of ‘good 
Kabyle’ and ‘bad Arab’ in order to ignite an inner conflict within the Algerian society by 
projecting the image that Arabs and Kabyles are different (linguistic and cultural differences) 
and that they need to claim legitimacy as a Kabyle nation and maintain their Berber identity 
that is different from the Arab nation.  This sociological ideology was designed by French 
rulers in order to divide and rule under the conquer-strategy (in Latin; dīvide et īmpera) which 
aims at dismantling and breaking up the power of society in order to consolidate the cultural, 
administrative military, and political dominance and power in Algeria. After issuing the 
nationality and citizenship laws, Kabyles recognized their marginalization along with Arabs. 
In 1871 France received ‘a stab in the back’ by dwellers of Kabylia that rebelled against French 
rule and its racist paradigm (Lorcin, 1995, p. 07). Lorcin (1995) argues that this insurrection 
took place because Kabyles hoped that France would offer them a special privilege and legal 
status over Arabs, but it did not. 
 99 
Depriving Algerian Muslims from citizenship and citizenship rights in colonial Algeria was a 
punitive measure of the French administration for those that chose not to give up on their 
religious identity in Islam. Having said that, it can be said that the citizenship laws designed 
by the French occupier in colonial Algeria were a disciplinary device which was subject to 
numerous limitations such as race, ethnicity and religion. As such, it included European 
immigrants and Algerian Jews and excluded Algerian Muslims. Similarly, the French 
educational system played a role of exclusion through cultural assimilation. The French 
curriculum completely excluded Algerian culture, including language (Arabic) and religion 
(Islam). Just like citizenship and nationality laws enacted by the French administrators in 
colonial Algeria, the educational system was another dimension of racial and ethnic colonial 
governmentalities in Algeria. Matereke (2011) argues that in order to understand how 
governmentalities operate within a colonial context, a distinction between power and 
dominance is crucial for the understanding of how the colonial power, citizens and colonial 
subjects are produced as categories in a colonial state.  
 
3.2. Resistance to Colonial Power and Colonial Governmentalities: Algerian 
Nationalist Movements in the 19th and 20th Centuries  
 
According to Breuilly (1993), nationalism refers to the idea of the nation as an independent 
group of citizens. He further argues that nationalism is ‘political movements seeking or 
exercising state power and justifying such action with nationalist arguments’ (Breuilly, 2001, 
p. 32 in Özkırımlı, 2010, p. 84): 
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‘A nationalist argument in turn is a political doctrine built upon three basic assertions: 
1. There exists a nation with an explicit and peculiar character. 
2. The interests and values of this nation take priority over all other interests and values. 
3. The nation must be as independent as possible. This usually requires at least attainment of political 
sovereignty’ (Breuilly, 1993, p. 2 in Özkırımlı, 2010, p. 84). 
 
Colonial governmentality can be understood in terms of the operations of colonial power and 
how natives responded to them (Matereke, 2011, p. 13). The Algerian response to French 
colonial governmentality can be divided into the following main technologies: cultural and 
religious, political, and armed responses. The Algerian response to French governmentality 
took the form primarily of an Algerian nationalist movement. Algerian nationalism was 
gradually developed by Muslim elites, scholars, teachers, writers and others. This ideology 
addressed issues of radical change, total independence and an Algerian nation-state (Behr, 
1961). Intellectuals played a prominent role during the twentieth century in reforming the 
sovereign national identity of Algerians (McDougall, 2006). Three main figures of Algerian 
nationalism during the colonial period are El Amir Abdu El-Kader el Jazaei’ri in the 19th 
century, Messali Hadj and Abd El-Hamid Ibn Badiss in the 20th century. The choice of these 
three protagonists in the Algerian history of resistance has a rationale; El Amir Abdu El-Kader 
el Jazaei’ri is considered as the first leader of the Algerian resistance movement against French 
colonialism; Messali Hadj is considered the father of Algerian nationalism (Abu el Wataniya) 
and is the leader of political nationalism in colonial Algeria; Ibn Badiss played a crucial role 
in preserving the normative force of the Algerian identity / Algerianness through culturally and 
religiously contributing to Algerian nationalism. It is worth mentioning that by focussing on 
these three men, the present thesis does not promote anti or pro-FLN ideologies or politics. 
Instead, these men were widely mentioned by my research participants especially Amir Abdu 
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El-Kader and Ibn Badiss. Messali Hadj, on the other hand, was mentioned once in order to refer 
to nationalists that were living in France but had never forsaken their Algerian identity. In terms 
of solidarity between Syria and Algeria, El Amir Abdu El-Kader gained a good reputation 
among the Syrian community as a role model of solidarity, hospitality and humanity. His exile 
in Syria contributed in building strong ties between both nations. The contribution of Houari 
Boumedienne to strengthen bonds between Algeria and Syria within the framework of pan-
Arabism was implicitly referred to by my Syrian participants such as Ayman who argued that 
Algerians provide a special treatment to Syrians, Iraqi and Palestinians. The three figures 
namely: Abdu El-Kader, Ibn Badiss and Messali Hadj, shared the same vision about 
Algerianness in the sense that it is completely independent from Frenchness and should not 
assimilate into the French values as French citizenship laws intended to construct ‘the ideal 
citizen’ in colonial Algeria. While Amir Abdu El-Kader and Ibn Badiss created a solid 
normative foundation of Algerianness based on religion, language and social values, Messali 
Hadj provided a political base of Algerianness. Messali’s vision of Algerianness can be 
interpreted as the enjoyment of civil, social and legal rights of citizenship in a modern state. 
The conceptualisations of these three men were later embodied through citizenship laws in 
post-colonial Algeria. The visions of the three men on Algerianness and the value of being 
Algerian has later governed the levels of openness of Algerians towards non-citizens in post-
colonial Algeria. 
 
After the military expeditions in Algeria, French troops took possession of several lands in the 
eastern and western parts of the colony, Algerian resistance to French colonisation was 
galvanised under the leadership of El Amir Abdu El-Kader el Jazaei’ri (1832- 1847). El Amir 
Abdu El-Kader el Jazaei’ri was born in 1808 in Mascara. His full name is Abdu El-Kader ibn 
Muḥyi el-Din ibn Musṭafa el-Ḥasani el-Jazaei’ri. He belonged to a very conservative and 
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religious Islamic family. He received his religious education at the religious schools. His father, 
Muhyi el Din was an influential figure in his region. Abdu El- Kader expanded his knowledge 
in Islamic law, mathematics, Greek philosophy, geography, astronomy, veterinary science and 
plant pharmacology during his trips to Tunisia, Tripoli (in Libya), Egypt, Syria, and Iraq 
(Faruqi, 2012). Abdu el-Kader’s nationalistic and patriotic resistance against the French 
occupation made him one of the most famous iconic figures in Algerian historiography. He 
succeeded in uniting the volunteers who became patriot-soldiers in the nineteenth century. 
Abdu El-Kader’s sense of humanitarianism did not reach only Muslims, but all people of the 
book, Christians and Jews included. During his exile in Damascus, he had been known for his 
efforts in achieving peace and protection for the Christian minority during the massacres of 
1860 in Syria (Kiser, 2013). The incident marked strong historical ties between Algeria and 
Syria. It was also widely narrated by my Syrian participants that argued that El Amir Abdu El-
Kader el Jazaei’ri remains an influential figure for both Algerians and Syrians. Amar, for 
instance, stated:  
‘…despite major differences between middle eastern countries such as Syria and the countries of the great 
Maghreb such as Algeria in terms of dialectal Arabic, lifestyle, culture, food, customs and traditions, there are 
two main similarities: ‘… in addition to being Muslims, Algerians and Syrians share the same history: Syria 
supported the Algerian revolutionary war against the French colonial regime when the Algerian leader El Amir 
Abdu El-Kader lived in Syria…’ [… fi ikhtilaf kbir min nahiyat logha, l adat, takalid, tarikat el hayat, lmakla bin 
takafa charkiya w takafa el magharibiya … lakin el mojtamae el jazaei’iri tkabalna nahna ka souriyin la ano 
awalan muslimin w nokta el aham hya tarikhiya … ayamat El Amir Abdu El-Kader .. souriya saedat el jzaei’ir 
awkat el istiemar el faransi …]. 
 
My research data revealed that the exile of El Amir Abdu El-Kader el Jazaei’ri in Damascus, 
Syria, has played a major role in uniting Syrians and Algerians since the 19th century until now. 
Abdu El-Kader’s moral values of humanitarianism and hospitality have contributed in 
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achieving unconditional inclusion of Syrians at a societal level. It was also one of the major 
motives, in addition to work opportunities, Islam and Arabness, that made some Syrian 
participants choose Algeria as a country of refuge rather than other Arab countries. Mohamed, 
for instance, replied to my question about “what made him choose Algeria and leave Egypt?” 
as: ‘… because Algerians and Syrians share a history since the times of El Amir Abdu El-
Kader … [… la ano bin el jazaei’riyin wa souriyin tarikh kbir min ayam Abdu El-Kader …]’. 
However, at a legal and a state level, these moral values were not too promising for most of 
my Syrian participants in Algiers. Most Syrians criticised their exclusion at a legal level and at 
the level of employment and mentioned how the grandchildren of El Amir Abdu El-Kader 
received privileges in terms of citizenship and employment in Syria while the Algerian state 
did not offer even a legal status to Syrians which will pave the way to legal employment, 
freedom of mobility outside Algeria and national insurance. I argue that the Algerian 
biogovernmentality securiticised humanitarianism and hospitality and turned them into 
strategies of care and exclusion from legal status. This idea will be investigated in detail in the 
analysis chapter (chapter 6).  
 
Abdu El-Kader is the first leader who rebelled against the French Republic’s unfair laws that 
led to geographic, social, and political expansions and divisions in Algeria. He is considered 
the leader of the nationalist movement in the 19th century (Hill, 2009). Abdu El-Kader led 
armed resistance in order to liberate the western and the eastern regions of Algeria, namely 
Oran and Constantine (Marston 2013, Kiser 2008). At educational religious schools known as 
Zawiyah, Abdu El-Kader el Jazaei’ri spread the concepts of independence and nationalism to 
the people, Algerian Arabs and Berbers alike; Abdu El-Kader el Jazaei’ri played a vital role in 
raising awareness against French rule and fostering the sense of national identity. 
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After more than fifteen years of stubborn resistance and struggle against the French, Abdu El-
Kader successfully recovered control over two-thirds of the Algerian territory. Algerian Arabs 
and Berbers both refused to surrender or give up on their identity, nationality, religion, 
language, rights, customs and they collaborated with Amir Abdu El-Kader in all the battles 
against French commanders namely Desmichels in February 1834, Maréchal Clauzel in 1836, 
Maréchal Valée and Trézol (Hill, 2009). At the time, Abdu El-Kader took advantage of the 
defeat of the French commanders because of the instability of France in Europe, this era sees 
the fall of Napoleon. It was marked by the violence of revolution and counter-revolution; for 
instance, in 1848 there was an abolition of the National Workshops; a Coup d'état in 1851 and 
in 1870 during which Alsace-Lorraine were occupied by the Germans (Lorcin, 1995). Abdu 
el-Kader failed to get support from Britain, USA, Spain and Morocco in a battle against 
Bugeaud and consequently he was vanquished in 1847. After his defeat, Abdu El-Kader was 
exiled in 1848 to France and then to Damascus (Kiser, 2008 & Marston, 2013).  
 
Ernest Gellner (2006) defines nationalism as a sentiment or a political movement which can be 
considered as a reaction to the violation of rights and principles of a particular nation. 
Sentiments of nationalism will grow stronger if the violated rights and principles are satisfied. 
Gellner (2006, p. 01) points out 
 
‘If the rulers of the political unit belong to a nation other than that of the majority of the ruled, this, for nationalists, 
constitutes a quite outstandingly intolerable breach of political propriety. This can occur either through the 
incorporation of the national territory in a larger empire, or by the local domination of an alien group’. 
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As a strong believer in a political ideology to Algerian nationalism, Messali Hadj was the first 
Algerian intellectual who sought to sustain total national independence and for Algerians to 
exercise complete sovereignty over their territory.  Messali Hadj was born on May 16th, 1898 
in Tlemcen (Western Algeria). He received his education at religious schools and French civil 
schools in Tlemcen. He was forced to do military service in the French army and to participate 
in WW1 in 1918 in France. Messali Hadj married Émilie Busquant, a French anti-colonialist 
who strongly believed in the independence of Algerians and who always supported Messali 
Hadj during his political resistance. He then joined the French communist party’s central 
committee and headed ‘the Star of North Africa’ (ENA; in French étoile nord-africaine) that 
he founded in 1926. Knowing that Messali Hadj was an activist and a politician who propagated 
a Communist ideology, the French regime had menaced his life and imprisoned him for his 
opposition against the integration and assimilation of Algerians into French culture. Messali 
passed away on June 3rd, 1974. (Stora, 1986; Behr, 1961).  
 
Messali’s organization was banned by the French government in 1929 but it remained secretly 
active until its activities were completely barred after 1933. For Messali Hadj, the nationalist 
political movement was at a difficult phase of actualisation because it was a reaction against 
the violation of principles by a stranger group (French rule). After completely shutting down 
the “Star of North Africa”, a new association known as PPA (Algerian People's Party, in 
French; Parti du Peuple Algerien) had emerged in 1937. The new organization had the same 
objectives as the former one aiming at peacefully protesting against the coloniser and the 
violation of rights. The Blum-Viollette proposal, which did not pass, (1936) would have 
allowed nearly 30,000 of Algeria’s elites and those who served in the French army to attain 
French citizenship without abandoning their Muslim identity (Chamberline, 1998). Messali 
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Hadj disagreed with the Blum-Violette proposal, with the Vichy regime and the administrative 
integration of Algeria in France. Instead, he called for a totally free nation (Stora, 2005). 
 
On the other hand, Ibn Badiss’s organizations: “the Islamic Reform Movement in Algeria” and 
“the Association of Algerian Muslim Ulama” (AUMA) contradicted the law of Jonnart (la loi 
de Jonnart) in 1919 which was introduced as an attempt to obliterate Arab and Muslim features 
of Algerian identity. As an Islamic reformer, Ibn Badiss has a prominent role in promoting the 
sense of nationalism as a socio-cultural feature that would implicitly serve political purposes 
(McDougall, 2006 & Lorcin, 1995). Unlike Messali Hadj, Abd-el Hamid Ibn Badiss adopted a 
religious orientation and declared ‘Algeria is our country, Islam is our religion, Arabic is our 
language’ (Vince, 2015, p. 44). His work did not aim at spreading a political ideology as a 
primary objective (Hill, 2009). As a scholar and a religious leader, Abd El -Hamid Ibn Badiss 
sought to establish a nation with a strong cultural and religious identity. As a revolt against the 
French policy of Christianity and the orientalist development of the natives, his organization, 
AUMA, assumed responsibility to define ‘the true religion’ of Algeria that is Islam and 
resurrect the Algerian Muslim society (McDougall, 2006, p. 14). Nationalism to Abd El-Hamid 
Ibn Badiss and his followers is a linguistic, religious, social, and cultural ideology which in 
turn represents a system of ‘ideas, signs, associations, and ways of behaving and 
communicating’ (Gellner, 2006, p. 06).  
 
Abd El-Hamid Ibn Badiss further claims in 1936 that independence is the natural right of all 
peoples (Horne, 2012). In other words, he clearly criticised the thinking in Farhat Abbas after 
he shared his opinion in public denying the existence of a nation-state for Algerians. Farhat 
Abbas’s quote states that, for him, it is possible to be French and Muslim. He declares 
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‘If I had encountered the Algerian nation, I would be a nationalist and, as such, would have nothing to be ashamed 
of. Men who have died for a patriotic ideal are honoured and respected every day. My life is worth no more than 
theirs. And yet I will not die for the Algerian fatherland, for this fatherland does not exist. I have not encountered 
it. I have questioned history. I have questioned the quick and the dead. I have visited cemeteries. No one has 
spoken to me of such a thing …. You cannot build on wind. We have eliminated all fogginess and vain imaginings 
to link our future once and for all of that of French endeavour in this country’ (Clark 1960, p. 17). 
 
As a part of its primary objectives, ‘AUMA created a network of schools, madrassa, and 
intellectual societies and issued its own magazines such as ‘Al Shihab, Al Basair and El Sharia 
al Mutahhara’ in order to enable every Muslim to read and write Arabic’ (Hill, 2009, p. 45). 
Magazine articles tackled several subjects: sermons of Muslim scholars on the Prophet 
Mohamed’s life and death; poems praising the Prophet; the existence of the Algerian nation 
before French colonisation with its own language, culture and identity. Indeed, the AUMA had 
a defining role in shaping Algerian nationalism by focussing on Islam as the religion of the 
nation and Arabic as its language. For instance, El-Mountakid magazine published in 1925 
defines the cultural and the religious orientations and principles for Algerians. For instance, in 
page 5 it is stated: 
‘We are Algerian Muslims, living within the colony of the French Republic. As we are Muslims, we do our best 
to preserve and maintain the principles of our religion that involves humanity, equality and brotherhood among 
nations and all people [Nahnou kawmoun moslimoun jaza’riyoun fi nitak mosta’amarat el jomohoriya faranssiya. 
Fa li anana moslimoun na’malo ana ala al mohafada ala takalid dinina aladi tada’aou ila kamal insani wa toharido 
ala el okhoua wa salam bayna cho’oub]’ (My ransliteration from source language -Arabic- / My translation from 
Arabic into English; source: El-Montakid, 1925, p. 05). 
 
Both El Amir Abdu El-Kader and Ibn Badiss gained a significant appreciation among the 
Syrian community in Algiers that seemed very knowledgeable in the history of the Algerian 
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nationalist movements and the main figures of these anti-colonial movements. Most of my 
Syrian participants remembered learning about these Algerian men at Syrian schools as being 
loyal nationalists that devoted their lives for Islam and the Arab Umma by promoting religious-
based ethics and values within their society, sacrificed for their nation and country and fought 
against religious extremism at all levels. Both values of Abdu El-Kader and Ibn Badiss of 
humanity, acceptance of the other, Arabness and Islam contributed in developing a welcoming 
atmosphere for Syrians within the Algerian society. Fatima, from the Algerian cohort, whose 
education was a mixture of Qur’anic schools and the state’s schools, is a member of three 
national charity organisations in Algiers that provide Qur’anic / Islamic lessons for both 
Algerian and Syrian children, claimed that: 
  
‘… Algerians are very kind to others …. Souriyin ikhwatna regardless their religion … we learnt these values 
from our religion and our ancestors such as Ibn Badiss that always taught us how to be proud of our Arabness and 
Islam … [el cha’eb el jazaei’iri cha’eb tayib … ta’alamna had lkiyam mn dina el hanif w aydan mn jdoudna kima 
cheickh el alama Ibn Badiss]’.      
 
Being emotionally charged, Fatima expressed Algeria’s obligation to unconditionally support 
Syrian war refugees, and further argued: 
‘…while many of the Arab countries totally closed their borders in the face of Algerians during the Algerian civil 
war and accused Algeria of being a source of terrorism in the world, Algerians did not turn their backs to their 
Syrian brothers during the Arab spring…’ [nahna fi wakt el irhab el alam kolo kan did contre el jazaei’ir hata 
boldan moslima tahmet el jazaei’ir anaha Masdar irhab lakin nahna lama ikhwatna souriyin rahom fi mihna li 
fotna aliha nahna sa’adnahom w nsa’edo ay wahed yahtaj el mosa’ada].  
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Fatima, surely, meant the Kingdom of Morocco that accused Algeria of being responsible of 
Marrakech terrorist attacks in 1994 and other Gulf countries that implicitly may have added 
fuel into fire by ‘financially supporting Islamists in Algeria’, as Sidaoui claimed (Sidaoui in 
Redissi & Lane, 2009, p. 232). A year after I met Fatima in 2018, in 2019 during the Algerian 
movement “Hirak” against Bouteflika’s regime, Algerians presented posters with different 
slogans: ‘No to foreign intervention’, ‘No Emirates in the land of the Martyrs’, ‘No to France, 
No to the UAE’ to express their refusal of foreign intervention into Algeria’s internal affairs 
(Arab Center for Research & Policy Studies, 2020, p. 26). The sensitiveness of Algerians 
towards foreign interference is due to their colonial past with the French coloniser (Arab Center 
for Research & Policy Studies, 2020, p. 26) and post-colonial experience with terrorist groups 




‘We are not allowed to assume the task of governance by reason of ambition, pride, or love of power, but to fight 
for the cause of God to prevent fratricidal bloodletting among Muslims, to protect their properties and pacify the 
country as required by the fervor of faith and patriotism’ (El Amir Abdu El-Kader el Jazaei’ri; in Kiser, 2008, p. 
68).  
 
A few lines in El Amir Abdu El-Kader’s sermon show how his faith stimulated his national 
sentiment. His efforts in building an Islamic nation are undeniable. In order to achieve unity 
among Algerians, Abdu El-Kader acted as an example of good morals, rectitude, 
incorruptibility, education and reform. He used to remind Algerians of the main source of 
strength that is Islam. His certainty of the main element that made a good governor was to be 
able to ensure equality and social justice, was inspired by the divine law in Quran, the Sunna, 
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Hadith, the different legal traditions and the wisdom of the prophets (Kiser, 2008). During the 
process of raising national consciousness, El Amir Abdu El-Kader planned to solve three 
problems notably: creating a central administration, financing the administration, enforcing the 
payment of taxes and building an army. His army was financed by the taxes collected from 
people and was faithful and very determined to fight against the French coloniser. After his 
defeat by Abdu El-Kader, General Camille Alphonse Trézel wrote: 
‘In this deadly struggle, I saw the hopes I considered reasonable evaporate. I need victory for them to be realized. 
Obviously, I overestimated our own forces and underestimated those of the Arabs (Kiser, 2008, p. 85)’. 
 
The central objective of Abdu El-Kader’s divine mission was to unify Algerians. The words of 
the Prophet Mohamed were often on his lips ‘Muslims are like a body. If an eye suffers, the 
whole body suffers with it …’ (Kiser, 2008, p. 97). It can be said that the nationalist movement 
started with Abdu El-Kader’s local resistance during the 19th century. His efforts in establishing 
social power and the characteristics of an Algerian national identity shaped the future 
movements of nationalism in Algeria. His thoughts were driven by strong national cultural and 
religious values; he demonstrated a political wisdom and power of persuasion (Marston, 2013).  
 
The Algerian nation was culturally and politically equipped enough to search for and build the 
modern nation rather than just imitating or accepting assimilation with a foreign orientalist 
culture. This is what Algerian nationalists in the 20th century focussed on as a continuation of 
Abdu El-Kader’s distinctive beliefs. In the twentieth century, the nationalist movement started 
with Messali Hadj. His organizations included ENA (L’étoile Nord-Africaine) in 1926, the 
PPA (Algerian People’s Party; in French Parti du Peuple Algérien) in 1937, the MTLD 
(Mouvement pour le triomphe des libertés démocratiques) in 1946. He had been a political 
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activist from 1926 to 1962 during which he focused on total independence for the Greater 
Maghreb (Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco) from foreign occupation. Unity and solidarity 
between the countries of the Greater Maghreb were his main claims and objectives. Benjamin 
Stora argues that Messali Hadj is a pioneer of Algerian nationalism in the 20th century with his 
discourse entitled ‘this land - Algeria - is not for sale’ (cette terre n’est pas à vendre) delivered 
on August 2nd, 1936 in Algiers. This is one of the most influential discourses in the history of 
modern Algerian nationalism in the 20th century. 
 
Messali’s discourse was engraved on Algerians’ minds; indeed, they realised that there is a 
need for a radical change along with a political and civil separation from the French nation.  In 
his discourse, Messali calls for a revolution: ‘we will take back this land’ (Messali Hadj on 
August 2nd, 1936). Messali’s discourse is divided into two parts; the first is a greeting in Arabic 
to all Algerians in the name of his organization (ENA) and in the name of   200, 000 North 
African immigrants living in France. He shows that despite his exile, neither his Algerian 
Muslim identity nor his mother tongue (Arabic) changed. After the greetings comes the call to 
nationalism which was delivered in French. The reason for stating these principles in French, 
I believe that Messali wanted to transfer his message not only to Algerians or North Africans 
but to the French audience who were against colonisation. Messali ended his discourse by 
saying ‘No to the indigenous code, no to the racial policy and hatred among races; long life to 
the Algerian people and to ENA’ (Messali, 1936).  
 
Abd El-Hamid Ibn Badiss, on the other hand, followed a cultural and religious orientation. By 
establishing the AUMA organization in 1931, scholars contributed to Algerian nationalism by 
defending the culture. Their slogan for cultural nationalism was ‘Algeria is our country, Islam 
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is our religion, and Arabic is our language’ (Berger, 2002, p. 03). They implicitly focused on 
the political doctrines of nation, people, and homeland. They took a strong opposing stand 
against the orientalist project of civilization. Islamic schools known as madrasa or zawiyah, 
magazines, newspapers and sermons in mosques aimed for social reformation, protection of 
the original purity of Islam (policy of Islah) and unity between Algerians in the name of 
brotherhood in Islam (the Umma). 
 
In addition to religion, the focus on cultural aspects did not prevent Ibn Badiss and his followers 
from raising consciousness among the national community and make Algerians more 
passionate about liberty. In his study, Abd el- Aziz Filali shows how Ibn Badiss supported the 
revolutionary movements. As published in Dahleb publishing and printing house in Algiers, 
Ibn Badiss called the Algerian people and elites  
 
‘…O’ scholars, now Allah (God) has blessed you with his support in order for you to be able to assume 
responsibility with your ultimate courage and sacrifice. On this day, I would like to say that there is no chance; 
you either die fighting for your country (Algeria) or surrender or leave it to your enemy (France)…’ (Nacer, 2010; 
My translation from Standard Arabic to English). 
 
Similar to El Amir Abdu El-Kader, the reformist discourses of Ibn Badiss were inspired by the 
Quran and the Prophet Mohamed’s saying and this narrative covered different aspects of life. 
In this respect, the Malaysian journal of Islamic sciences (USIM’s journal) published Bey 
Zekkoub’s work in Arabic in 2015. An explanatory study based on descriptive and analytical 
methods and the inductive historical approach indicates how Ibn Badiss called to the use of 
Qur’an and Sunnah, the understanding and straight action, the reform of souls, to the 
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brotherhood, to the unity of Muslims, to system and the Shūrā Council (Shūrā in Islam means 
to ask every member of their opinions before making a final decision). He enjoined upon 
Algerians, his people, to seek right knowledge, to think clearly, to face realism and adopt 
gradual change, and to practice modesty in language and writing. He strongly focused on 
Algerian nationalism, and stability in principles (against apostasy in Islam). 
 
As Özkırımlı (2005) argues, it is a failure to define nationalism either by culture or politics. 
Nationalist movements led by El Amir Abdu El-Kader el Jazaei’ri, Ibn Badiss and Messali 
Hadj were important in raising consciousness, for creating a desire for liberty and 
independence, and instilling a sense of nationalism in every Algerian’s mind and soul. 
Together, these ideologues give power to nationalism and its discursive claims. El Amir Abdu 
El-Kader was the first who started the resistance against the French coloniser. His resistance 
was not based on creating political organisations, but it was based on fighting in battles to 
liberate Algeria. Alloula (1987) argues that the nationalist movements that were purely political 
started in the twentieth century. Indeed, the wave of Algerian nationalism started when Messali 
Hadj took a political stance when he was exiled in France. Additionally, Ibn Badiss added faith 
to the Algerian soul by educating and reforming society. Finally, I argue that each of the 
nationalist figures stated above provided a significant contribution to the twenty-first century 











‘The long French attempt to crush anything but French culture in Algeria, culminating in a 
murderous war that finally brought independence, surely contributed to the extremist 
tendencies seen there today’ (Edward H. Thomas, 1999: 27 in Benrabah, 2013, p. xi) 
 
 
The narratives of the three pioneers of Algerian nationalism and national belonging: El Amir 
Abdu El-Kader el Jazaei’ri, Ibn Badiss and Messali Hadj, provided a solid foundation for post-
colonial Algerian nation to grow within the Republic’s Islamic ethos. The following few lines 
from Ibn Badiss’s poem summarise the foundation of the Algerianising mission that came as a 
reaction to the assimilationist mission of the French regime: 
 
‘The People of Algeria are Muslim,                                                          and they lay claim to the Arab na tion  
Whoever says the Algerian people is far from its origins                          or has lost its life is uttering lies. 
And whoever seeks to ‘assimilate’ it into some other nation                   Seeks an impossible goal to achieve…’ 
(Ibn Badiss in Alghailani, 2011, p. 61). 
 
Chapter Four: Who Counts as an Algerian? Algerianisation of the 




By the start of the Algerian revolutionary war, the statement of 1st of November 1954 
interpreted in words the visions of the three pioneers by refusing all acts of French 
governmental imperialism, achieving full independence, recovery of territorial sovereignty and 
achieving unity between Muslim countries through the following main objectives:  
 
• ‘Total independence of Algeria by setting up Algerian citizenship and achieving territorial independence 
by rejecting the annexation of Algeria to the French territory. 
• Establishing Algeria as a People’s Democratic Republic State within an Arabo-Islamic ethos.  
• Respect and recognition of different ethnic and religious groups in Algeria. 
• Unity of the Great Maghreb countries in North Africa: Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco under same principles 
of Islam and Arabism’ (Statement of 1st of November 1954; My translation from classical Arabic to 
English). 
 
Not only did the statement of 1st of November 1954 aim at achieving full political, cultural and 
economic independence to Algeria but it focussed on re-uniting the Great Maghreb countries 
to end the French civilising mission in North Africa. By achieving this, France would have lost 
its linguistic, cultural and economic dominance over the countries of Algeria, Morocco and 
Tunisia. However, this has not happened, and France still dominates the linguistic and 
economic terrain of the three countries and the dream of uniting of the Maghreb countries 
sooner collapsed after the Algerian and Moroccan conflict during the Sands war in 1963 and 
the closure of the Algerian-Moroccan land borders in 1990’s following the accusation of 
Morocco to Algeria of being responsible of terrorist attacks in Marrakech in 1994 (Lounnas & 
Messari, 2018, pp. 06, 09).  
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In this chapter, I will elaborate how the principles of statement of 1st of November were 
implemented through the state’s biogovernmental policies of Algerianisation after its 
independence in July 1962. The main state strategies that the present chapter will discuss are 
Islamisation, Arabisation and re-connection with the rest of the Arab world, and enacting 
citizenship laws and social welfare policies based on egalitarianism and their administrations. 
These post-colonial state’s biogovernmental strategies came as a strong reaction to what the 
French tended to eradicate through sénatus-consulte in 1865. The state biogovernmental 
policies of Algerianisation aimed at promoting and protecting nationalistic values of the 
Algerian nation, and had, in turn, unconsciously and implicitly influenced the openness of 
Algerianness towards “the other”: Syrian displaced people in this case. These unconscious rules 
that are governing the state’s openness towards “the other” can be observed through new 
evolving modalities of Algerianness / citizenship namely: hospitality, security and 
humanitarianism in the age of human migration in the twentieth and twenty-first century. In 
the Algerian case, not only has hospitality been securitised since the start of 2015, but also 
humanitarianism has been securitised since the black decade (1990s) in the way described in 
Mark Duffield’s book Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development 
and Security (2014) as new or political humanitarianism that offers conditional assistance to 
displaced people (Duffield, 2014, p. 75, emphasis added). Algeria’s securitisation of 
humanitarianism was not seen as a necessity by some of my Syrian participants ‘because 
Algeria already experienced a civil war in the 90s and is now safe [el balad halae aman … el 
jazaei’ir achat min kabl el irhab wa el harb el ahliya bi tiss’inat]’ (Mohamed). Kamal, an Arab 
and Sunni Muslim, expressed the same viewpoint as Mohamed but added that:  
 
‘… unlike in Syria, in Algeria we do not see many different ethnic or religious groups that are constantly in a 
conflict … in Syria for instance, we have kurds, Arabs, Druzes, Yazidis, Christians, Sunni Muslims, Shias, Jewish 
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people …’ [nahna b souriya adna ktir tawa’if diniya … adna kord, el arab, drouz, el yazidiyin, w adna ktir diyanat 
mitl souna, Shia, el yahoud,w lmassih … ama bi el jazaei’r ma fi ktir tawa’if w ma fi khilafat ktir ….]. 
 
While some Syrians did not find strong reasons for the state’s securitisation of humanitarianism 
and hospitality, others, such as, Fateh, tried to find excuses for these state’s strategies. He 
added:  
 
‘…Algeria has had a long history with terrorism during the black decade and these state decisions aim at efficiently 
securitising Algeria’s borders against terrorist groups or migrant smuggling especially from the Algerian-Libyan 
land borders or even a wave of the Arab spring… I understand it is Algeria’s right to protect its borders…’ [… 
ana bzon ano el dawla min hakha t amane hodoudha w khassatan anou el jazaei’ir achat fatra s’iba ma’a el irhab 
w hala’e ma’a tahrib wa irhab w rabie el arabi…]’. 
 
Analysing what Mohamed, Kamal and Fateh argued about the state’s securitisation refers to 
Foucault’s conceptualisation of power. While Mohamed and Kamal criticised the state’s 
practice of security power and perceived it as negative and more controlling, Fateh, on the other 
hand, saw the state’s power as positive because it aimed at protecting the security of the 
population against terrorist threats. Indeed, Fateh’s viewpoint leads us to the idea of biopolitics.  
  
The previous chapter critically reviews literature of colonial Algerian history by focussing on 
the French civilising mission which can be observed as “the will to improve” adopted by a 
colonial power to boost the wellbeing of the French settlers and Algerian Jews in Algeria. 
Within the educational setting the French policy excluded Islamic studies and Arabic language 
from the school curriculum. Likewise, by excluding Algerian Muslims from citizenship rights 
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in colonial Algeria, French colonial governmentality and its policies and practices resulted in 
language, ethnicity and faith-based conflicts that continued to exist in post-colonial Algeria. 
The present chapter explains how colonial governmentalities shaped Algeria’s post-colonial 
decisions in citizenship and education. These two state policies were responsible of shaping 
Algerianness and fostering Algerian national pride in post-colonial Algeria. This statecraft 
produced an “ideal Algerian citizen” in the collective imagination and in an indirect way, also 
help set up boundaries between who deserves inclusion into the Algerian community and who 
does not.   
 
‘If the history of metropolitan Europe in the last century and a half has been a struggle to 
establish statehood for nationalities, Europe left Africa at independence with states looking for 
nations’, writes Appiah (1992, p. 262 in Adamson, 1998, p. 87). Appiah’s quote shows that the 
challenge of nation building in Africa is principally a reaction to European occupation. 
McDougall (2003a) argues that nation is the unifying norm that determines a shared history, 
culture, and political belonging for any population. Nationalism is the sentiment of belonging 
to a certain nation whose community members share the same history, values, culture and 
political destiny. Ernest Renan views the fact of ‘I am French’ does not make sense unless it is 
associated with notions that add meaning to the status of being French (in Breuilly, 1993, p. 
06). In this chapter, I discuss how the meaning of being Algerian has been shaped by state 
practices after independence. 
 
Adamson (1998) argues that the search for an Algerian nation, for example, started with 
different written and oral discourses since 1930s during the French occupation. During colonial 
Algeria, cultural and political discourses of Algerian nationalism were led by Ibn Badiss 
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‘Algeria is our country, Islam is our religion, and Arabic is our language’ (Berger, 2002, p. 03) 
and Messali Hadj by claiming full independence during colonial Algeria. After a 132 year-
period of French brutality and occupation, turmoil ended, and Algeria gained total 
independence in July 1962. The next challenge after gaining full independence would be to 
embark on a nation- building process that would re-establish Algeria’s diplomatic status at an 
international level.   
 
The name of the new independent state is the People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria and 
Ahmed Ben Bella was the first president of the state in 1962. His presidency did not last long 
because he had to face a bloodless coup d’état led by the minister of national defence, Houari 
Boumedienne on June 19th, 1965. Algeria’s first National Charter had been adopted under the 
FLN ideology that rejected cultural assimilation of Algerians into western culture, French 
imperialism, and it supported political, cultural and economic independence. The process of 
framing Algeria as an Arab-Muslim nation-state and Algerians as Arabs and Muslims 
successfully occurred during Boumedienne’s era through adopting different national 
reformation policies such as national language policies (Arabisation), citizenship and 
nationality laws, industrial and land reforming policies and the like. In the rise of a nation-state, 
Sassen (2006) argues that the three capabilities or assemblages of territory, authority and rights 
(TAR) should exist in all complex organizational forms and may change and vary in the ages 
of nation-state and globalisation and internationalism. In the case of Algeria, during 
decolonisation, Algerianisation had been a long process in nation-state building which was 
shaped by a certain social and political order based on the historical past of Algeria and based 
on rejecting the western values and western imperialism that the French enacted. After gaining 
full independence, Algeria gained power, exclusive authority and sovereignty over its own 
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territory and its natural resources such as ‘mines’ and ‘all banks and foreign firms’ 
(nationalisation of hydrocarbon industry in Sahara) (Layachi, 1998, p. 12).  
 
Referring to independent Algeria, Choueiri (2000, p. 02) adds that ‘the birth of the nation-state 
announces and solidifies uniformity in political organization, economic activity and cultural 
growth’. In this regard, during Boumedienne’s rule, Algeria witnessed a significant growth in 
the national economy and moved into a phase of industrialization and agrarian revolutions 
along with a cultural redefinition of Algeria (Naylor, 2015, p. 196) as a part of economic 
decolonisation from French dependency. Culturally, Algeria chose Arabic as its only official 
language and Islam as the official state’s religion. Economically, modern Algeria had been 
established a socialist state and its principal economic sector, oil and gas, were nationalised in 
1971 (Adamson, 1998). Since then, oil and gas have played a prominent role in Algeria’s 
economic revival. Algeria, then, succeeded in setting up rights for people by establishing social 
justice that was based on an egalitarian philosophy of distributing the state’s wealth among the 
population (Crowley, 2017) and making sure that all citizens enjoy equal rights and duties. In 
June 19th, 1975, Boumedienne introduced a new ‘National Charter’ with ‘a new constitution’, 
a ‘new parliament’, APN (Assemblée Populaire Nationale / Popular National Assembly), and 
a ‘presidential political system’ and new economic ideologies (Layachi, 1998, p. 12). Adamson 
argues that the national Charter aimed at introducing three main ideological objectives 
 
‘… to assert and consolidate Algerian national identity and promote all forms of cultural development; to raise 
continuously the level of education and technical skills; to adopt a way of life which is in harmony with the 
principles of the Socialist Revolution as defined in the present charter’ (1998, p. 69). 
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The previous chapter discussed different definitions and conceptualisations of Algerianness 
during colonial rule (1830 to 1962). This chapter continues to explore the state’s process of 
framing and reshaping Algerianness after independence (post-1962) from a perspective of 
Foucault’s concept of governmentality. This chapter will focus on how post-colonial 
Algerianness has been re-defined through conflicting discourses of laws of citizenship, 
Arabisation, Islamisation and the Berber civil movement in 1980s. In this respect, it will focus 
on how post-colonial state of Algeria has used the social rights of citizenship, such as 
education, to foster national pride and shape Algerianness by Arabising the community and re-
establishing ties with the rest of the Arab world through teacher exchange programmes with 
countries such as Syria, Iraq and Egypt. Algeria’s re-connection with the Arab world cannot 
be limited only to Arabization programmes that were adopted in educational and administration 
settings, but it can be observed in Algeria’s military support during the Arab war against Israeli 
forces in 1967 and 1973 when the Algerian military backed up Syria and Egypt. Since then, 
Algeria continued its unconditional support to Palestine and the Algerian-Israeli relations never 
crystallised into official diplomatic and political relations between both countries and people. 
The state’s approach to re-connect post-colonial Algeria with the rest of the Arab world shaped 
Algerians’ openness towards the Arab nations. This point was articulated by my Syrian 
participant, Ayman, for instance stated that: ‘…generally, Algerians are not very open towards 
people from Gulf countries, but they offer a special treatment and hospitality towards 
Palestinians, Syrians and Iraqi people … [Chaeb el Jazaei’iri chaeb tayib lakin andhom 
I’etibarat okhra maa souriyin, falasstiniyin wa irakiyin yorahibouna bihom aktar min cho’oub 
el okhra ou mitl nas min boldan el khalij …]. This reflects Algeria’s policy during the era of 
Boumedienne to boost the sense of nationalism and belonging to the Ummah within a 
framework of pan-Arabism by supporting nationalist states and their armies. Surely, Ayman’s 
viewpoint and his assessment of the treatment and the level of openness of Algerians towards 
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Syrians, Iraqi and Palestinians intended to reflect how post-colonial Algerianness was designed 
as a nationalistic force that is unconditionally open to Algeria’s brothers-in-arms and 
nationalistic nations in Syria, Iraq and in Egypt that fought for their independence against 
imperialism compared to the Gulf monarchies.      
 
The sequence of events that took place in post-1962 Algeria reveals that Algerianness is a real 
image of a complex struggle of four main state discourses namely: political, cultural, religious 
and nationalistic values that have always defined the “ideal Algerian citizen” and have shaped 
and defined the nature of Algerian citizenship and automatically set up norms and values of 
inclusion and exclusion of non-citizens including refugees. This chapter will also demonstrate 
how a Badissian view of ‘Algeria is our country, Islam is our religion, and Arabic is our 
language’ (Vince, 2015, p. 44) has promoted and framed Algerianness and in particular, how 
this species of modern nationhood can be viewed in terms of governmentality that reproduces 
the power-knowledge relation in post-1962 Algeria. This has revealed that Algerian citizenship 
has been governed by three main powerful technologies, the state’s territorial sovereignty, 
religion and language. The state technologies will automatically interfere in how the state 







4.1.  Different Discourses of Algerianisation in Post-colonial Algeria and the 
Production of the “Ideal Citizen” 
 
4.1.1. Arabisation and Pan-Arabism 
 
Following Badissian cultural nationalism, the first decision taken by the independent state of 
Algeria was to agree on the status of Islam as the only official and national religion of the state. 
In order to promote Islamisation, mosques that were converted into Christian churches and 
cathedrals during the French occupation, were reconverted into mosques, as was the case of 
‘La mosquée de Ketchaoua’, the oldest mosque in Algiers (Entelis, 1986, p. 80). Politically, 
the presidency remained the source of power and decision-making and the FLN was the only 
legal political party. The reason why the FLN has gained a high status in Algeria even after 
adopting multi-party politics is because the sense of paying tribute to the revolutionary war, 
martyrs and Algerian nationalism have always been embedded into the sense of legal and social 
norms of Algerianness. In this regard, Algerianness has been strongly designed as a 
nationalistic and a patriotic community of values. Indeed, Layachi (1998, p. 11) confirms that 
after Ben Bella’s short presidency (from 1963 to 1965), ‘Boumedienne used nationalism to 
unify the Algerians’.  
 
Culturally and linguistically, Arabisation was obtained as an ideology of decolonising 
Algeria’s linguistic heritage from the linguistic history and dominance of France. Although 
having different ethnic minorities in Algeria, including non-Arabs whose first language is not 
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Arabic, Modern Standard Arabic (the type of Arabic used in the Qu’ran) was agreed to be the 
only official language of Algeria. The Berber language, however, gained national status in 2002 
and a status of second official language in 2016. I believe that the reason why the decision to 
give an official and a national status to the Berber language came late, after 40 years of 
independence, is because Algeria’s first mission after independence was to redefine identity by 
creating a unified society after being dismantled by the French linguistic and cultural policies 
and practices of division during colonisation. The policy of Arabisation aimed at creating a 
homogeneous nationalist society composed of people that share the same language and the 
same ethnicity. Although Arabisation started in Ben Bella’s period when he announced after 
independence that ‘Algeria is an Arabo-Muslim country’ (Cheref, 2015, p. 40), the policy 
boosted during Houari Boumedienne’s rule. 
During Boumedienne’s presidency, Algerian society and the conceptualisation of 
Algerianness, in general, have been designed as Islamic and Arab within a socialist state 
framework. This has resulted in a nation-state that is very proud of its history of revolutionary 
war against the French and proud of its martyrs that participated in attaining full independence 
of Algeria. Silverstein (2004, p. 70) claims that Boumedienne’s ideology of Arabisation 
considered the Berber identity as ‘backwards’.  
 
President Houari Boumedienne was a strong believer in pan-Arabism and Arab unity as a 
cultural policy and a political ideology that entirely rejects western imperialism and revolts 
against the Israeli colonising policies. In addition to the application of Arabisation in 
educational settings and the project of Algerian programmes of teachers exchange with Iraq, 
Egypt and Syria, Algeria’s contribution during the Arab Israeli wars in 1967 and 1973 is 
undeniable. Its attitude towards Palestine remains unchangeable since the day Houari 
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Boumedienne declared that Algeria will always stand by the side of Palestine. The Algerian-
Palestinian alliance has remained strong and Algeria, to date, has not established diplomatic 
relations with Israel as an act of solidarity with Palestinians and as a rejection to the Israeli 
project of modern colonialism in Palestine. Prior to that, Algeria retained strong relationship 
with Syria where Amir Abdu El-Kader el Jazaei’ri, the significant leader of the Algerian 
resistance during the 19th century, was exiled by the French coloniser. As a devout Sufi, a 
scholar and a promoter of openness and tolerance among religious faiths, Amir Abdu El-Kader 
el Jazaei’ri gained an international reputation especially after he protected Christians in his 
palace in Damascus until he achieved reconciliation after the sectarian riot in Syria and 
Lebanon in 1860 (Wien, 2017, p. 08). This is similar to the most compelling story of 
unconditional hospitality and protection for vulnerable lives in the Islamic history (Kidwai, 
2017). The story started when followers of Prophet Mohamed were forced to leave Makkah 
and they sought refuge in the land of ‘Abyssinia’ (Kidwai, 2017, p. 175). Although not a 
Muslim land, the king of Abyssinia offered unconditional welcome, generosity and protection 
to Muslims among his Christian community (Kidwai, 2017, p. 175). Abdu El-Kader’s act of 
hospitality, openness and solidarity with ‘the other’ remains a vital aspect in Algeria’s response 
during the displacement of Arab populations such as the Syrian displaced community that 
sought refuge to Algeria after the Syrian civil war.   
 
Within the educational setting, education has been free for Algerians and nearly 35% of the 
state’s budget was devoted to the education and professional training during Boumedienne’s 
era (Layachi, 1998, p. 11). In order for the process of Arabisation to be successful, during 
Boumedienne’s era, Algeria was supplied with Arabic teachers from Arab countries namely 
Egypt and Syria for its new education system right after the independence (Benrabah, 2013). 
Surprisingly, the policy of Arabisation was challenging for Arabophones rather than for 
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Francophones who carried out their educational and professional training in French. Although 
all subjects came to be taught in Arabic, the French language lost its status and has been 
classified as a foreign language, the job market still required, at that time, people to master 
French (Benrabah, 2013, p. 63).  
 
4.1.2. Arabisation and Berberism  
 
After Boumedienne’s death in 1978, the image of a utopian Algeria started to be questioned 
(Crowley, 2017, p. 6) and all genres of tribalism and regionalism started to emerge. This means 
that the Algerian community of values might be re-shaped in the coming years. During Chadli’s 
presidency, the Boumediennist doctrine started to change and was re-oriented; relations 
between the state, the government and the population were redefined (Stone, 1997). This has 
allowed public opinion and the opposition to strengthen and Algeria has moved to liberalism 
in several sectors; politics, economy, press and media (Stone, 1997).  
 
As an opposition to Boumedienne’s National Charter, Chadli designed a new Charter in 
January 1986 (Stone, 1997).  The new National Charter rejected socialism and adopted 
capitalism and went towards free markets. As it was during Boumedienne’s era, Chadli’s era 
also witnessed an acceleration in the programme of Arabisation of the judiciary and the press. 
This even affected the linguistic landscape of Algeria and many French names in street signs 
were replaced by Arabic ones (Stone, 1997).  
The questioning of the existing community of values started during Chadli’s era when the 
Berberist movement commenced by university students in Tizi Ouzou in March and April 
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1980. This came as a reaction to banning Mouloud Mammeri from presenting his works in 
Berber by the Algerian authorities (Crowley, 2017). The state authorities, in turn, responded 
violently to student protests and strikes. The uprising and demonstrations challenged the 
regime’s ideology of shaping the Algerian community of values through educational, religious 
and linguistic policies that marginalised and did not grant the Berber language any status 
(Entelis, 1986). Popular protests defending human rights were almost impossible during 
Boumedienne’s presidency when freedom of speech was curtailed by the executive authority 
that was the only source of power and decision making (Crowley, 2017; Naylor, 2015). It was 
only in April 1987 that the Algerian government officially approved the first Human Rights 
league in Algeria. Consequently, ‘the Berberist movement has largely given way to liberal-
democratic movement agitating on the issue of human rights’, Roberts adds (2003, p. 29).  
 
The Algerian programme of Arabisation had been welcomed by the Arabophones yet rejected 
by Kabyle people and the Francophones that have chosen to hold an opposing stand to 
Boumedienne’s ideology. In other words, they rejected the Algerian community of values, 
Algerianness, designed by Boumedienne’s government. Although not being excluded from 
citizenship and entitlement to legal, social and civil rights, Kabyles looked forward to 
redefining Algerianness by adding Berberism as a fundamental element, like Islamism and 
Arabism, claiming that the origins of the Algerian people are Amazigh (Berbers). However, 
social unrest and protests among Berber activists did not have a strong platform to rely on 
during the 1980s because Algeria was still, at that time, adopting a one-party politics -FLN-. 
Stone (1997), on the other hand, argues that the Berber spring, referring to popular uprising in 
the region of Kabylia, was one of the stimuli that pushed Chadli’s regime towards liberalism 
and towards a multi-party system of politics.  
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After Algeria adopted liberalism during Chadli’s government, a series of demonstrations 
during the 1980s, led by Berber civil society and Berber activists, continued until Bouteflika’s 
government (1999- 2019) approved their proposal by introducing the Berber language into the 
Algerian national parliament. In 2002, the question of Berber identity that adopted ethnic, 
cultural and linguistic affiliations was revived and was stronger than before because Algeria 
has opened doors to democracy and paved the way to multiple political parties to operate since 
1988. As a result, the Berber language has been recognised in the constitution as a second 
national language, after classical Arabic, in 2002 and as a second official language in 2016. 
After making the Berber language official, it started to be taught in schools. It even started to 
appear in Algeria’s linguistic landscape as a second language after Arabic, that has always 
dominated the Algerian context as a first official language. Interestingly, the decision to 
formalise the status of Berber and approve it as a national and official language during 
Bouteflika’s presidency was taken without a popular agreement of the majority or a national 
opinion poll of Algerians. This means that the state has always monopolised power over the 
design of the Algerianness as a social / normative force since independence in 1962. 
 
Following the historical changes of post-colonial Algeria, Algerianness has implicitly been 
composed of three main elements namely Islam, Arabism, and Berberism because the Algerian 
citizenship did not exclude Berbers from legal, social or civil rights. However, it is worth 
mentioning that this has explicitly been approved only when the Berber language and culture 
were legally recognised by the Algerian constitution in 2002. Algerianness has always been a 




4.1.3. Islamisation and Security Issues in Post-colonial Algeria   
 
Benrabah (2013, p. 63) argued that the intensive process of Arabisation, rather than a gradual 
shift, resulted in economic inequalities that created social differentiations among social classes. 
He further argues that the ideology of Arabisation in late 1960s and early 1970s resulted the 
spread of ‘Islamic fundamentalism, xenophobia, chauvinism and obscurantism’ and, therefore, 
contributed to the cause of the civil war -the black decade- between a secular state and Islamic 
extremists in Algeria in the early 1990s (Benrabah, 2013, p. xiii). The civil war was a critical 
phase for Algeria which affected its economy, politics and all echelons of society. Similarly, 
Stone claims that ‘language in Algeria is still a political, ideological, social and a psychological 
issue in Algeria’ (1997, p. 18). Along with language, the focus on maintaining Islam as modern 
Algeria’s religion has contributed to the triggers which led to the civil war (Stone, 1997). 
 
Society and culture in Algeria had gone through fundamental changes during the 1980s 
(Entelis, 1986, p. 69), but it is Islam that succeeded in maintaining unity among Algerians and 
preventing social chaos from happening despite their societal and cultural differences. Indeed, 
I agree with Sidaoui that ‘one cannot speak of radical or fundamentalist movements before 
1980s,’ during Boumedienne’s era (Sidaoui in Redissi & Lane, 2009, p. 225). This is because 
the conflict between the state and Islamic extremists (FIS- Front Islamique du Salut / Islamic 
Salvation Front- & GIA- Groupe Islamique Armé / Armed Islamic Group-) was primarily and 
strongly driven by political, social and economic factors rather than linguistic or religious ones.  
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The first stirrings of the Algerian crisis (civil war) emerged when a series of strikes and protests 
in different places started in 1985 due to the failure of social policy to cover and manage a 
significant baby boom, drop of oil prices that led to high rate of unemployment, housing crisis 
(Stone, 1997; Crowley, 2017) and most importantly the rise of social inequalities. Sudden 
eruption of riots in October 1988, known as Black October, in Algiers protestors attacked 
government offices and organisation which later spread to the western and eastern parts of the 
country (Stone, 1997). As a result, more than 200 were killed and at least 3,500 protestors were 
arrested (Stone, 1997, p. 64). The social discontent was exploited by Islamic extremists and, 
indeed, on October 10th, 1988 in central Algiers, Ali Belhadj, cofounder with Abbassi Madani 
of the FIS, gathered more than 100 protesters for his first sermon (Crowley, 2017; Stone, 1997, 
p. 64). The gathering ended up with a massacre as the Algerian authorities reacted violently to 
the gathering. The state still considered the gathering as an illegal Islamist and extremist 
gathering and consequently, the sermon was banned, and the ensuing riot left approximately 
40 people killed (Stone, 1997, pp. 64-65). Following a series of traumatic riots in October 1988 
that had shaken Chadli’s regime, social justice and the sense of egalitarianism, which were 
achieved during Boumedienne’s era, had disappeared. Stone further (1997, p. 66) gave an 
example of the social gap that became wider than before between state officials, elites and 
tycoons that were able to ‘fill their swimming pools’ as opposed to ordinary citizens that were 
suffering from water and food shortages.  
 
As an attempt to solve the deteriorated social situation Algerians witnessed during the 1980s, 
Chadli started reforming his regime to be based on full democracy and introduced a new 
constitution by the end of 1989. Yet, the new constitution did not do much to fulfil social justice 
or focus on ameliorating the social conditions at that time. Instead, it only omitted the terms 
‘socialist’ in the end and replaced it with the slogan of ‘popular democratic’ (Entelis, 1986, p. 
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81). Due to catastrophic social conditions, FLN lost the trust of people and Chadli’s regime 
customized the nature of Algerian politics by ending single-party politics and projecting 
political pluralism. The new constitution offered the chance to several political parties to 
operate legally in provisional and municipal elections organised in 1990 and 1991 that were 
the first elections to take place after adopting multi-party politics in Algeria. Despite all parties 
taking place in elections, the state regime and army forces gambled on the FLN winning but 
the majority of people in Algeria hoped that FIS, as an Islamic party, would resolve the 
disastrous social situation the FLN’s government led the country to. The FLN became less 
popular, and the FIS won a majority of seats (‘853 out of 1539’) during the first and the second 
rounds of provincial and municipal elections (Stone, 1997, p. 72; Crowley, 2017).  
 
FIS, led by Abassi Madani, won a majority of seats and could practice power to promote 
changes in the political agenda of the state. Abassi Madani claimed his Islamic party to be the 
legitimate ruler of Algeria and was looking forward to winning the presidential elections 
planned in 1993 (Stone, 1997, p. 72). The programme of reform designed by the FIS party had 
a poorly defined idea of Algeria’s real economic and social circumstances during the 1980s 
and barely any of the political scene and how Algeria’s national power as an independent state 
was still weak at an international level. Their programme of Islamisation also isolated the 
military and considered replacing the armed forces with the classical consultation in Islamic -
Shura- (Sidaoui in Redissi & Lane, 2009, p. 234). Politics, to them, was simply a mission of 
mobilizing groups in terms of a perspective of display of power (Sidaoui in Redissi & Lane, 
2009, p. 234). Indeed, Sidaoui explains how extremists had contradictory propagandas; they 
believed in democracy as important in the Algerian politics, yet they did not have a clear 
programme towards a concrete achievement of it (Sidaoui in Redissi & Lane, 2009, p. 235).  
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Given the fact that the FIS won a majority of seats in both provincial and municipal, they started 
applying their agenda by imposing radical extremist ideology on the population. Following the 
sequence of events, the armed forces declared a ‘state of emergency’ and had to ban them by 
cancelling the result of the elections, ‘arresting most of their leaders including Abassi Madani 
and Ali Belhadj’ and, afterwards, forcing Chadli to resign in January 1992 (Crowley, 2017, p. 
6; Stone, 1997, p. 75). The reaction of the Algerian government was criticised by radical 
extremist Islamists as a neo-colonial policy (Vince, 2015). Events went very quickly from 
clashes with extremists to massacres, bombing of public spaces and assassinations of 
intellectuals. Consequently, Algeria fell into a tragic civil war and political instability that 
resulted in approximately 200,000 victims (Benrabah, 2013).  
 
Sidaoui explains how the Algerian army adopted several strategies to defeat extremists, isolate 
them and to stop the spread of their effect on the Algerians. During the first years, it was hard 
to ban the extremist movement because ‘the Algerian army was operating in a very traditional 
manner using tanks and heavy equipment as trained by the Soviets advisers’ (Sidaoui in Redissi 
& Lane, 2009, p. 237). After 1995, in addition to the traditional strategy, the army adopted new 
strategies by employing ‘sudden and small-sized operations’ against Islamic groups (Sidaoui 
in Redissi & Lane, 2009, p. 238). In 1997, the Algerian state created a self-defence group that 
belongs to the Ministry of Interior composed of 100,000 men (Sidaoui in Redissi & Lane, 2009, 
p. 238).  
Following the sequence of events during the Algerian civil war in 1990s and the state’s reaction 
to it can still be seen as complex and very contradictory with the design of Algerianness. If 
Islam has always been a key component of the Algerian community of values, why would the 
state power reject the Islamist groups and categorise them as illegal groups? Why did the 
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establishment of an Islamic state fail in Algeria? In order to answer these questions, I will 
briefly demonstrate the main differences between an Islamic state regime and a regime of a 
modern state as detailed by Hallaq’s book (Hallaq, 2014). Theoretically, the Islamic state is 
both impossible and contradictory in the age of modern states and globalisation whose legal, 
political, and moral patterns are incompatible with those of the Islamic state. This does not 
mean that the Islamic state is corrupt, or it would fail in whatever context, but it means that the 
paradigm of the modern state and the structure of the globalised world that are secular are 
designed not to fit Islamic governance and its principles. One of the differences is that modern 
state principles are based on western / European values derived from Europe’s history; the 
other, the Islamic state, is based on moral codes described in Shari’a law. In this regard, the 
modern state system is dominated by capitalism and corporations and Islamic governance is 
genuinely based on religious, moral and normative principles rather than political ones. Within 
a nation state context, law and morality are separated, power is monopolized and is separated 
as executive, legislative and judiciary authorities, whereas ‘in the Islamic state the function and 
authority of the executive and legislature are subordinate and ancillary to the judiciary’ 
(Roberts, 2003, p. 05). Hallaq (2014, p. 23) adds further that ‘ the modern state possesses five 
form-properties: (1) its constitution as a historical experience that is fairly specific and local; 
(2) its sovereignty and the metaphysics to which it has given rise; (3) its legislative monopoly 
and the related feature of monopoly over so-called legitimate violence; (4) its bureaucratic 
machinery; and (5) its cultural-hegemonic engagement in the social order, including its 
production of the national subject’. Additionally, sovereignty within the nation state is the 
power that a particular state has over its own territorial boundaries while within the Islamic 
state paradigm, sovereignty is derived from the divine power of God that is the only source of 
ultimate moral authority (Hallaq, 2014).  
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Within the Algerian context, the failure of the FIS can be traced back to both internal and 
external factors (Sidaoui in Redissi & Lane, 2009). Internally, Sidaoui argues that the strategies 
adopted by the Algerian regime, especially during Zéroual’s presidency (1995-1999), were 
effective in weakening the FIS. Politically, the Algerian regime carried out modernisation at 
the level of the security and military forces which made the relation between the military and 
the regime more congruent and homogeneous. The Algerian regime isolated the FIS and started 
supporting parties of Islamic moderates and not extremists. This resulted in pulling the rug 
from under the FIS’s feet which made them lose the societal support they had during 1990 and 
1991 elections (Sidaoui in Redissi & Lane, 2009, p. 239). Economically, the rise of oil and gas 
prices helped economic growth and the rate of inflation and corruption significantly decreased 
in the late 1990s (Redissi & Lane, 2009, p. 240). Externally, Sidaoui (in Redissi & Lane, 2009) 
adds that the stance of the US, EU countries and UK against extremism by the late 1990s 
enhanced Algerian policy towards eradicating extremism and proved that the crisis is 
international and not only Algerian. After the terrorist attack on 11 September 2001 in the US, 
all possible international relations established by the FIS militants outside Algeria have been 
eradicated. 
 
With a multi-party-political system, the GIA and FIS exploited Islam as ‘a political vehicle’ to 
justify the acts of Islamist extremists (Stone, 1997, p. 13). Indeed, Entelis argues that Islam has 
always been incorporated within the socialist ideology of Algeria as a modern state, however, 
after the 1970s, ‘Islam’s politicisation has become a central fact of the Algerian society’ (1986, 
p. 77). This politicisation tended to force Algeria as a modern state to adopt extremism as a 
denomination of Islam by applying Islamic laws (Shari’a law) in all aspects of a nation-state 
rather than applying it in certain codes such as the Family Code (marriage, divorce, 
heritage…etc). Claiming to be an authentic Islamic party, the FIS, for instance, started making 
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modifications to the existing community of values, although against Islamic principles and 
values, by rejecting anything that may have been brought by the western culture by banning 
cinemas, ‘forbidding co-education schooling’, ‘forbidding girls to continue formal education 
after the age of twelve’ (Entelis, 1986, p. 86), human rights abuse, unlawful killings, the 
violation of women’s rights and disappearances.  
 
It is very important to mention that Islam in Algeria is moderate and belongs to the Sunni 
denomination which is the official religion of the state that has always been associated with 
reformists namely Ibn Badiss and his organization Ulema (Entelis, 1986). Entelis (1986, p. 81) 
argues that the role of Islam in Algeria has always been an instrument of unity and identity 
formation, ‘not as a legal code by which to order state and society’. He (1986, p. 81) further 
claims that Algeria is ‘a secular state with an Islamic cultural component’. However, I should 
confirm that Islam is not only a cultural component in the Algerian state, but it is a religion and 
a source of legitimacy. Indeed, some laws are based on Islamic laws. For instance, adoption in 
Islam, which is supporting an orphan and giving them the name of the adoptive parents, is 
illegal. But sponsoring an orphan, which is supporting an orphan without giving them the name 
of the adoptive parents, is legal in Islam. Another example is heritage law in the Algerian 
Family code; this is the same as mentioned in the Quran and Sunnah (family code: book 3, 
chapter 1 to 10, 2003 & 2007). It should be mentioned that while some of Algerian laws are 
derived from the Quran and Sunnah, others are not necessarily influenced by the Islamic laws 
(Shari’a) such as finance code, trade code. They are adapted to the realities of international 
laws within the age of globalisation. Additionally, this has created an antagonistic conflict 
between religion and secular forces, as we saw with the military and state regimes in Algeria 
during the 1990s.  
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Volpi (2003, p. vii) argues that the Algerian crisis is the first clash of Islamic and Western 
ideologies of democracy in ‘the Middle East and North Africa’. Benrabah (2013) argued that 
the state’s policy of Arabisation provoked xenophobia and chauvinism to grow in the Algerian 
society. Most my research participants from the Syrian cohort believed the opposite and 
research data revealed that one of the strong factors that paved the way towards social inclusion 
in Algeria is the ethnic heritage: Arabness, that both nations share. In this regard, Fatima, from 
the Algerian cohort, added: ‘being Arabs, this has helped in avoiding major problems or huge 
differences between Algerians and Syrians’ [b hokm anana Arab makanch machakil kbira wala 
ikhtilafat kbira]. Unlike what Benrabah (2013) argued, my research data revealed that it was 
rather the black decade in the 90s that caused “a fear of otherness” to grow among Algerians 
towards others. Fatima, confirmed that  
 
‘…at the beginning some Syrians were not used to the Algerian mentality and the way Algerians think about the 
other … they felt that Algerians may be aggressive … Algerians are, by nature, somehow nervous and hot 
tempered and this is not because they are aggressive but because Algerians have gone through hard times from 
the French colonisation to the black decade in the 90s. All have impacted the way Algerians treat people they do 
not know / foreigners… in every Algerian family, everyone has at least witnessed one of these historical events 
… these events have impacted the way Algerians deal with the ‘other’, however, once Algerians are sure that ‘the 
unknown other’ is kind and trustworthy, they can give whatever they ask for … I know some Syrians that 
complaints about the mentality of Algerians but after few months they deduced that Algerians are one of the 
kindest and most caring people… these are what Syrians themselves admitted to me’ [… W kayen haja okhra and 
chaeb el jazaeiri li hiya narfaza w lazem lwahed yefahmo bach yekder y’ ich ma’ah. W had narfaza w sor’aat el 
infi’aal hiya b hokm dorouf tani li achha el chaeb el jazaeiri; kima ta’arfi ano mafatch bezaf ala el ihtilal el faranci 
w el ochriya sawdae/ el irhab. Fa telkay fi kol bit jazaeiri aala el akal wahed ayach hado el ahdat fa akid rah t’atar 
fih w fi ‘akliyto … fa el jaliyat el okhra momkin yafahmo ano el chaeb el jazaei’iri saeb mn na7iyat ‘aklito lakin 
ba’ed modat achhor mn ta’ayouch ma’ahom bdaw yefahmo ano cha’eb el jazaeiri w hadik narfaza maykssad biha 
walou w blakss el fahmo ano cha’eb el jazaeiri ykder yaetik malo w khobzo w daro w howa mayedi walou … 
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souriyin fi el bidaya hkaw ala narfaza li fi tab’e el jazaeiri lakin fi el akhir fahmo ano makanch atyab w ahan mn 
kalb el jazaeiri w hadi b chahadathom w I’etirafathom…].  
 
4.1.4. Who Counts as a Citizen? Citizenship Law, Rights, and the Boundaries 
of Post-colonial National Identity  
 
In addition to the processes of Islamisation and Arabisation of people, the Algerian state 
enacted citizenship and nationality laws after independence to mark the birth of a new 
independent nation-state. Roberts (2003) argues that Algerian nationalism was not an extension 
of Arab nationalism; it has its own cultural context and roots and political history that are traced 
back to the colonial period. The colonial status of Algeria had influenced the post-1962 
decisions in developing the nationality code (Mahiou, 2005 in Parolin, 2013). After 
independence, the Algerian government enacted the first Nationality Code on March 27th, 1963 
which granted Algerian nationality and citizenship only to those whose father and grandfather 
had Muslim personal status (Loi n° 63-96 du 27 mars 1963 portant code de la nationalité 
algérienne, J.O.R.A., n° 18, 2-4-63, p. 806-808). Decisions determining who is Algerian were 
not arbitrary. Post-colonial Algerian citizenship could be seen as a reaction to Code de 
l’indigénat of 1881 and Senatus-consulte (1865) that excluded all people of Muslim personal 
status, instead appointed them as subjects in French Algeria. Additionally, the law of Algerian 
citizenship is also a reaction to Crémieux decree (1870) which granted full French citizenship 
and rights to Jews in Algeria, in contrast to those whose fathers and grandfathers held Muslim 
personal status, who did not receive legal, social or civil status unless they abandoned their 
Muslim personal status. 1963 nationality law came with some provisions. Firstly, through the 
options provided by Evian accord, another category of people could possibly receive Algerian 
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citizenship ‘within three years of the date of self-determination’ provided they were not 
involved in any crimes against the Algerian nation. This category included European 
population in Algeria that could demonstrate 10 years of residency in Algeria (if born in 
Algeria) or 20 years of residency in case they were not born in Algeria but of Algerian-born 
parents (Loi n° 63-96 du 27 mars 1963 portant code de la nationalité Algérienne, J.O.R.A., n° 
18, 2-4-63, p. 806-808: Vince, 2015, p. 150). Secondly and most importantly, the acquisition 
of Algerian citizenship was still possible to a category of people regardless of their ethno-
religious status or residency criteria. In this respect, between 1962 and 1965, about 300 anti-
colonialists of European origins were declared Algerians for their «participation in the Algerian 
war of liberation» (Mohand-Amer & Benzenine, 2012, p. 191, my translation from French to 
English). Finally, at that time, new-borns of unknown parents and stateless people were still 
eligible to Algerian citizenship. However, this law was gendered because Algerian females 
could not confer citizenship to their children unless the father was stateless or was unknown. 
An Algerian female could also lose her nationality in case she marries to a non-Algerian (Loi 
n° 63-96 du 27 mars 1963 portant code de la nationalité Algérienne, J.O.R.A., n° 18, 2-4-63, 
p. 806-808: Vince, 2015, p. 150). 
 
Looking at how law of Algerian citizenship has been structured and how the process of 
determining who is Algerian has been carried out proves that religion has always been a key 
element of Algerianness and has remained aligned with the concept of nationalism even after 
independence as demonstrated in the post-independence nationality code. Ethno-cultural and 
religious factors defined Algerianness and as such, only people of Muslim personal status 
would unconditionally become citizens in the new independent state. Algerians whose 
ancestors were not Muslim, yet Christians and Jews, known as pieds-noirs (black feet) within 
the Francophone world, (Crowley, 2017) had to leave the country and emigrate to France. 
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In 1970, the law of Algerian citizenship was substituted with an order excluding religious status 
but keeping the parental condition for citizenship. Although the Algerian constitution (article 
2) states that the state’s official religion is Islam, it remains more liberal compared to other 
Muslim countries and religious minorities in Algeria can be Algerian citizens (Marzouki, 2012, 
p. 75). Nowadays, a Christian evangelised minority (between ‘20.000 and 30.000’) still lives 
in Algeria (Marzouki, 2012, p. 75). Article 36 of the Algerian constitution ‘establishes freedom 
of consciousness and opinion as inviolable liberties’. This includes freedom of religion because 
‘conversion and apostacy are not considered as criminal offences’ (Marzouki, 2012, p. 75).  
 
According to Law of citizenship in 1970, only Algerian fathers could confer citizenship to their 
offspring; mothers, on the other hand, could only pass nationality to their children in cases 
where the father is stateless or unknown (Law 1970-86, 15 December 1970, Algerian 
Nationality Law). Algerian law of citizenship in 1970 was discriminatory and did not give 
women the right to confer nationality neither to her children nor to her foreign spouse. Gender 
had been a determining factor when it comes to the status of Algerian citizenship during the 
1970s and the 1980s. In the UK, for example, the concept of social rights of Marshallian 
citizenship were founded to put an end to discrimination and differentiation between social 
classes. In T.H Marshall’s conceptualisation of citizenship, enjoying equal civil, political and 
social rights shape citizenship in the sense of protection and social justice, i.e. all citizens have 
equal status in law and equal rights (Dwyer, 2010). Legal citizens should enjoy the same social, 
civil and political rights such as the right to education, healthcare, voting/electing rights and 
the like (Basok & Ilcan, 2013). In other words, it can be argued that in order to achieve social 
equality among citizens of different social classes, they should fully enjoy their legal and social 
forms of citizenship. However, in independent Algeria, all Algerians received equal and free 
access to social rights of citizenship including healthcare, education, housing and employment. 
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Unlike in the UK, it was the right to confer citizenship to children that made Algerian females 
equal to males. After joining the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (CEDAW) in 1996, Algeria enacted the new Nationality Code on February 
25th, 2005 which gives women the right to confer nationality to their children following the 
CEDAW Art.9 (2) (UNHCR, n.d ; L’ordonnance n 5-01 du février 2005. Réactif journal 
officiel n 63/ 1972). Consequently, nationality by descent is now granted to children whose 
father or mother is Algerian. The right of conferring citizenship became equal between 
Algerian males and females and Algerian females have been able to confer citizenship to their 
foreign spouses (Home Office UK Border Agency, 2013). There is an exception in Algeria’s 
citizenship law that is, in case of a child born to unknown parents in Algeria, the child could 
receive Algerian citizenship. Citizenship and nationality laws also give an idea about how 
Algerianness has been shaped throughout time. 
  
In French Algeria, in 1949, the French biopolitical governmentality had established a social 
security system which excluded 90% of the Algerian population and covered only those who 
served the French army and the French administration (World Health Organization, 2002). The 
French welfare system was primarily dedicated to French nationals and naturalised citizens in 
colonial Algeria. After Algeria’s independence, Boumedienne’s era fostered national pride and 
boosted the process of Algerianisation by establishing a strong social policy to achieve social 
justice. Algeria’s biopolitics aimed at enhancing the welfare and the well-being of the new 
independent population through free education, free healthcare, employment and housing. 
From a perspective of biopolitical governmentality, ‘this mode of governing to increase the 
‘utility and docility’ of populations is enacted through concern with welfare - bodies, health, 
subsistence and habitation (Foucault in Judge, 2010, p. 06).  
 141 
Before diving into the Algerian context, the concept of social protection system should be 
clarified. Karshenas and Moghadam (2006, p. 93) state that a solid social protection system is 
a mechanism of redistribution of wealth by using the income from GDP (Gross Domestic 
Product) in order to support ‘vulnerable, elderly, disabled and underprivileged people’. 
Additionally, the social security system should cover all citizens and should be adequate to 
ensure the well-being of all members of society. For instance, among Middle Eastern and North 
African (MENA) countries, the Tunisian model of social welfare has been the most successful 
mainly because it adopted a fusion of capitalism and western social programmes and strongly 
guaranteed the right of women to fully participate in all aspects of life through the enhancement 
of their socio-economic status by developing tourism and being open to ‘export-led 
industrialization’ (Karshenas and Moghadam, 2006, p. 20, 21). However, in the Algerian 
context, the model of social welfare is completely different. After independence and because 
of a weak and a dislocated national identity and unity, openness was not the best option for 
Algeria to adopt. In order to develop the new independent nation, it was the state’s decision to 
adopt a ‘socialist model of development-industrialization and generous social policies’ that 
have been fully dependent on oil industry income with no emphasis on tourism or agriculture 
like its neighbouring countries, namely Tunisia and Morocco. Over the period of more than 
twenty years, between the 1980s and 2004, Algeria struggled to move from a socialist system 
of economy to a more liberal regime in terms of political and economic policies (Karshenas 
and Moghadam, 2006, pp. 20, 21, 78, 79). This ultimately contributed to the violent civil war 
due to the government failure to manage the political and economic situation in the country 
(Ringen, 2006).  
 
Over the past 20 years, the economic issues Algeria has witnessed can be referred back to the 
original design of the national mechanism of social policy and the heavily loaded bureaucratic 
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procedures imposed by the state (Karshenas and Moghadam, 2006, p. 93). The socialist design 
of social policy did not offer a radical change, it only masked the real issue by offering a 
temporary assistance to Algerians after independence which made them more state dependent 
(Karshenas and Moghadam, 2006, p. 93). State schemes such as: ‘ANEM (National 
Employment Agency)’, ‘ANSEJ (National Agency for Supporting Youth Employment)’ and 
‘CNAC (National Unemployment Insurance Fund)’ (ETF, 2017, p. 08) are designed for 
Algerian citizenship holders and established to financially assist both Algerian youths to start 
their own projects and unemployed youth.   
 
While the state’s strong social policies should be based on maintaining strong economic growth 
that follows a ‘solid programme of economic development, the Algerian social policy neglected 
this aspect and put its primary focus on social protection: assistance for employment, social 
security and social assistance dependent’ (Karshenas and Moghadam, 2006, p. 93). Though 
being one of the richest countries in Africa in ‘natural resources, material wealth, and its human 
capital’ (Aghrout and Bougherira, 2004, p. 62), the start of civil protests on February 22nd, 2019 
was a reaction to the failure of a social policy, that remained fixed, unchanged and has not been 
updated since independence, within the age of globalisation and technological changes and 
development. Consequently, the insufficiency of social policy has widened the gap between 
lower and upper social classes of people and the middle class has almost disappeared in the 
Algerian socio-economic scene and social justice has failed to maintain equality in distributing 
wealth. Additionally, Karshenas and Moghadam (2006) confirm that despite all the social, 
economic, political changes that took place in independent Algeria, its social policy that was 
designed during Boumedienne’s era has not yet been adjusted or updated to meet the needs of 
the population in the context of globalised capital. There is no doubt that this has resulted in 
social inequalities, a high rate of unemployment, especially among youth and degree-holders, 
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a significant expansion of the informal labour market that is not regulated and checked to meet 
the official and legal rules of employment law (Karshenas and Moghadam, 2006, p. 92). The 
World Bank annual report released in April 2018 indicated that inflation in Algeria climbed 
from 4.8% in 2015 to 8.1% in 2019 and is expected to increase to 9.0% in 2020 (World Bank, 
2018). In an attempt to revive Algeria’s national economy, the new elected president 
Abdelmadjid Tebboun announced a new plan which aims at integrating more youth into 
national economy, decreasing bureaucratic procedures, encouraging youth with start-up ideas 
and turn them into successful businesses, exporting Algerian products to the African market.  
 
4.2. Discourses of Algerianness in the Age of Mass Migration  
 
In his work on Reflections of Migration and Governmentality, William Walters inserts that if 
Foucault’s concept of governmentality is applied within the context of border control, and 
critical migration or people’s displacement, in general, it should be investigated from a 
perspective of a struggle of power / knowledge (2015). In its relation to the analytical 
framework of migration, governmentality also focusses on rationalities, technologies, and 
subjectivities of power (Walters, 2015, p. 15 & 16). In this respect, governmentality should be 
seen as an ‘encounter’ and not only as ‘a ready-made framework’ (Walters, 2015, p. 04). He 
explains  
 
‘… the relationship between governmentality and migration is better modelled as one of encounter rather than 
application, since the idea of an encounter presumes that what we understand by migration, but also 
governmentality will change when these two phenomena are brought together … governmentality affords a 
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valuable perspective precisely because its understanding of power is not wedded to a static concept like the state, 
nor to any telos of transformation like global governance. With its characteristic analytical focus on rationalities, 
technologies, subjectivities, and bolstered and extended with other midrange concepts, it is well suited to map the 
new territories of power that are being brought into being by the encounter between politics and migration’ 
(Walters, 2015, p. 15-16). 
 
Foucault’s concept of governmentality offers a demonstration of the state’s construction, 
technologies, and art of governance throughout history from an angle of subjectivity and 
governance of the self (Bröckling et al, 2011, p. 02 in Walters, 2015, p. 02). The reason why I 
use biopolitical governmentality within the context of displacement, is because it frames 
‘discursive constructions and debates around asylum as part of constituting national identity’ 
(Doty 1996, Pirouet 2001, Steiner 2003 in Judge, 2010, p. 14). Another reason is because the 
struggle of power within the Algerian context that is manifested in the state’s biopolitical 
practices of managing the flow of displaced people demonstrates a complex image of Algerian 
citizenship and openness of Algerianness towards displaced Syrians. In this regard, national 
identity or the national body is considered as a social construction which is monitored by the 
production of knowledge around the “ideal citizen” that can be included and who does not 
belong (Doty, 1996 in Judge, 2010, p. 14). This means that today’s state decisions on whether 
to include or exclude Syrians from Algerian citizenship are still governed by the past. 
Postcolonial states often see the refugee body as a threat to the national body and often the 
production of knowledge around refugees is governed by the colonial discourses of ‘the other’ 
(Phil Hubbard, 2004 in Judge, 2010, p. 14). Due to the nature of Algerian citizenship, the 
process of naturalisation in Algeria is often mysterious and its success is not guaranteed. Perrin 
(2016, p. 16) claims that immigrants in the Maghreb states including: Algeria, Tunisia, 
Morocco, Mauritania and Libya, became an ‘object of rejection and negation’ whose rights are 
often denied. Besides, the immigrant population is not well organised to defend them. The 
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current thesis relates to this gap. It argues that, in Algeria, for instance, because of the nature 
of citizenship which still retains its normative and nationalistic force, Algerian citizenship is 
still seen as a privilege rather than a right to an immigrant that fulfils the conditions of 
naturalisation. Although Arabs and Muslims, Syrian war refugees are no exception. Most of 
my Syrian participants reported inability to apply for Algerian citizenship because of legal 
procedures that limit their rights to legalise their status. Mohamed (32), a shop owner, was one 
of my Syrian participants that I asked about the possibility of naturalisation. With a despairing 
attitude, he expressed his view: ‘I cannot apply for the Algerian citizenship because I do not 
have legal status in Algeria such as: long-residence permit and that is the problem [… la jinssiya 
mafi … la … w hada lmochkil el wahid li ‘andna nahna souriyin houn w ntmana anhom 
ysa’adouna fiha. L mochkila ano ma’adna ikama (ikama da’ima) …]’.  
 
In his work about ‘governing population through the humanitarian government of refugees: 
Biopolitical care and racism in the European refugee crisis’, Mavelli (2017) explains the 
difference between biopolitical governmentality and the humanitarian government and 
demonstrates how they can be used as state rationalities to govern both the host community 
and non-citizens. The humanitarian government of refugees can be understood as a biopolitical 
government of the host community. This can be possible through targeting both their 
‘emotional and material well-being’ (Mavelli, 2017, p. 818). The humanitarian government 
describes the conflict between values of ‘humanitarianism’ and ‘securitisation’ in governing 
asylum seekers and refugees. Additionally, it is at the same time an indirect way of governing 
the host community because it still governs them through biopolitical government by taking 
into account their biological and emotional care and needs when trying to set up immigration 
and asylum policies and deciding who is ‘valuable’ and deserves inclusion and who is ‘not 
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valuable’ to the host community and deserves denial (Mavelli, 2017, p. 809). Mavelli further 
adds:  
 
‘With the term ‘biopolitical governmentality’, I understand a rationality of government that aims to biopolitically 
enhance the lives of the population under power’s control both in biological and emotional terms … 
governmentality as the promotion of positive forms of self-understanding and self-appreciation – through 
biological and emotional biopolitical – rationalities of care which are the condition of possibility for forms of self-
government. Humanitarian government makes the decision of which refugees need to be welcomed and which 
ones need to be rejected a function of the biopolitical care of the populations of the countries that accept them. 
This biopolitical governmentality, I will show, rests on a ‘differentialist’ understanding of racism that draws on, 
but partially transcends, traditional accounts of racism based on nationality, ethnicity, religion, colour, gender, 
and alleged intractable cultural differences. This biopolitical racism redraws the boundary between ‘valuable’ (to 
be included) and ‘not valuable’ lives (to be excluded) according to the refugees’ capacity to enhance the biological 
and emotional well-being of host populations’ (Mavelli, 2017, p.812). 
 
Within the context of the present thesis, Stone (1997) argues that after Algeria achieved 
independence, the Algerian regime adopted three main challenging missions which are 
Algerianisation, Islamisation and Arabisation to unify the enormous regional and ethnic mix in 
Algeria under one national identity of similar values. I believe, post-1962 Algerianisation 
policies, to some extent, have created a homogeneous society and achieved social harmony in 
independent Algeria. However, any utopian thinking of creating and protecting the 
homogeneity of Algerianness would struggle in the age of globalisation and mass migration. 
Besides, the level of openness towards foreigners, especially ‘precarious lives’ of vulnerable 
displaced populations such as asylum seekers and refugees (Mavelli, 2017, p. 809), will be 
questioned.  
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From a perspective of biopolitical governmentality, Algerianness can be seen as a struggle of 
powers that defines the host community, Algerians, and sets up dynamics of inclusion and 
exclusion of non-Algerians such as Syrian displaced people. This can be noticed in the struggle 
of different types of power namely: Arabness / pan-Arabism, Islam, nationalistic power and 
globalisation, when managing the flow of Syrians and the state’s response to their flow. The 
humanitarian government of refugees is a form biopolitical governmentality whose rationalities 
aim at biological and emotional care for the host population (Mavelli, 2017). Mavelli (2017) 
sees the latter point as missing from the Foucauldian biopolitical governmentality.  
Algerianness and Algerian citizenship as political forces can, thus, be seen as forms and 
rationalities of the humanitarian government of Algeria through which the Algerian state 
governs both Algerians and Syrians. It includes “worthy” and excludes “unworthy” lives. 
Having said that, both the Algerian community and the Syrian community represent political 
objects of Algerianness / Algerian citizenship.  
 
Power games in the Algerian context at different levels: cultural, political, and religious, led 
by movements of nationalism (Arabism and Moderate Islam), state secularism, and Islamic 
extremism, have created a chronic identity crisis that continues in twenty-first century Algeria. 
The historical struggle during colonial and post-colonial periods reveals how the dynamics of 
inclusion and exclusion of others have been governed by biopolitical state rationalities to 
minimise the level of diversity in Algerianness by protecting the homogeneity of its legal and 
normative forces. This demonstrates the nature of Algerianness which is exclusive and 
conditional to others that do not share the same values. The latter involve values of loyalty and 
willingness to sacrifice for the Algerian nation. However, even being Arabic native speakers, 
the challenges for Syrians are far beyond than just being Muslims or being able to speak Arabic. 
In the age of mass migration and international terrorism, the integration of refugees in host 
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societies is often dependent on the protection of national security and state sovereignty. This 
questions the norms and requirements of inclusion and exclusion of foreigners set by the 
Algerianness and Algerian citizenship both legally, normatively and socially. These norms of 
inclusion and exclusion are not clear in the Algerian constitution but can still be observed 
through the state practices of hospitality that are governed by principles of the ethics of Arabic 
and Islamic traditions and through the state’s exercise of power that manages the integration 
of foreigners in Algerianness and granting rights of citizenship. The Algerian state’s decision 
on 2015 to close borders due to the world’s refugee crisis and adopting a non-deportation 
approach of Syrians even with the absence of a refugee national mechanism in the Algerian 
law reflects a conflict within the humanitarian government of refugees between norms of 
hospitality that are governed by brotherhood between Algerians and Syrians, humanitarianism 
and state’s security.  
 
Having said that the humanitarian government creates dynamics of inclusion and exclusion of 
refugees, the western reaction, especially that of Germany and the UK, to the world’s refugee 
crisis is a conflict of rationalities of biopolitical governmentality and humanitarian government. 
The decision taken by the British government in 2014 to stop rescuing illegal migrants trying 
to cross the Mediterranean and reach Europe is an indirect of biologically governing and 
preserving the well-being of British population, culture, wealth, health (Mavelli, 2017, p. 824 
& 825). Additionally, after the Brexit referendum in 2018, police recorded statistical data of 
rising hate crimes, especially against EU migrants. A Polish-born student was stabbed in 2016 
in the neck for speaking Polish (Dearden, 2016 & 2018).  
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Discussions around timely issues of refugees, asylum seekers and immigrants often play a 
central role in political events and populist campaigns by European extremist parties and this 
narrative is fast gaining general traction. Mafu (2019, p. 03) confirms that mass migration has 
provoked social tensions in the host community in many of the EU countries such as in 
Germany, France…etc. During Trump’s campaign, for instance, one of his major 
announcements was to ban Muslims, refugees and migrants from reaching the US. Similarly, 
the Turkish government started implementing integration schemes, and Turkish politicians and 
leaders during local election events still announce that long-term integration of Syrian refugees 
into the Turkish society is not an option. Consequently, the Turkish government insists that 
Syrians return to their home country (Makovsky, 2019).  
 
4.3. Conclusion and Discussions 
 
The Algerian national identity, Algerianness, is designed, shaped and created by the state 
power because in post-1962 Algeria, Algerians were not given the chance to choose the 
normative values that best represent and cover the ethnic diversity in Algeria. It was a state 
decision that has relied on the historical events that colonial Algeria witnessed and which has 
been welcomed by the majority of Algerians. Arabic and Islam have been declared national / 
official languages and the only religion, respectively. This decision was driven by strong anti-
western imperialism attitudes and values of nationalism. Additionally, the decision can be seen 
as a reaction to what the French civilising mission tended to eradicate. Before the French 
colonization to Algeria, Islam bound together different ethnic backgrounds (Berbers and 
Arabs) in the name of one common religion. The French used Islam to divide the Algerian 
community and at the same time Islam had played a significant role in the cultural aspect of 
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Algerian nationalism and Algerian identity along with Arabic language. Without a national 
poll, the Berber language and Berberism have gained their place in the constitution of Algeria 
in the 2000’s in response to the Berber spring in the region of Kabylia in Algeria, though 
kabyles have always enjoyed equal rights of citizenship as Arabs. 
 
In post-1962 Algeria, moderate Islam with its Sunni denomination represented the main factor 
that defined who had the right to belong and who was deemed outsider. However, Islamic 
extremism is a form of religious extremism that had been brought to Algeria by different 
extremist groups such as GIA and FIS. Leaders of extremist groups were banned from creating 
political groups; thus, denied their political rights. This decision was not because Islam is no 
longer an important element of Algerianness or Algerian citizenship but because Islamic 
extremism does not belong to Algerianness that has been designed and shaped by the state. In 
1994, US president Clinton declares that enemy of the Algerian regime was Islamic extremism 
and not Islam (Sidaoui in Redissi & Lane, 2009, p. 242). During the civil war in Algeria, the 
FIS conceptualised Algeria as a radical Islamic state by penetrating extremist thinking into the 
Algerian society through politicisation and mobilisation of university students and others in 
mosques during Friday prayers (Sidaoui in Redissi & Lane, 2009, p. 233). The FIS discourse 
is ‘characterized by oppositions such as good-bad and positive-negative’ (Redissi & Lane, 
2013, p. 234). Madani’s discourse, ‘the people is us and we are the people, because it only 
recognises itself within Islam’, was analysed by Sidaoui who indicates that Madani strongly 
believed that the legitimate representative of the Algerian people is only FIS (Sidaoui in Redissi 
& Lane, 2009, p. 233). According to Sidaoui, discourses delivered by Ali Belhadj, on the other 
hand, ‘were more poetic rather than rational’. ‘His messages were simply jihad: the holy war’ 
(Sidaoui in Redissi & Lane, 2009, p. 228). He believes in democracy as long as it leads to an 
Islamic state. He states:  
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‘… multipartism is unacceptable because it is the result of an occidental vision … There is no real democracy, as 
the sole source of power is Allah and the Koran, not the people. If the electorate votes against the law of God, 
then that is nothing else but blasphemy. If this happens, one must kill the false believers’ (Sidaoui in Redissi & 
Lane, 2009, p. 234). 
 
Given the literature I have reviewed, Algerianness can be observed as a struggle of internal 
powers such as Arabness and Islam as key cultural components of Algerian nationalism and 
the Algerian identity, Berberism, state secularism and principles of globalisation in the 21st 
century. Reviewing the historical struggle in Algeria, Algerianness has originally been 
designed as conditional if not exclusive to others. The question that should be raised can be 
about the perception of the other within from a perspective of Algerianness in the 21st century. 
In other words, within a world of globalisation and a refugee crisis, how far is Algerianness 
inclusive of “other” in the 21st century?   
 
The internal struggle of powers within Algerianness did not confront a high flow of refugees 
until the Syrian civil war started in 2011. Algeria has hosted more than 50,000 Syrians. The 
21st century’s challenges that Algerianness has been facing are values of globalisation that are 
far beyond Islam, Pan-Arabism and Arabité that shape the values of hospitality. Additionally, 
Algerianness is now facing new evolving challenges of humanitarianism and security. 
Humanitarianism and securitisation are two principles of the humanitarian government which 
is designed to govern both the refugee population and host population biopolitically (Mavelli, 
2017). Consequently, the humanitarian government of refugees controls the state’s 
immigration and asylum policies by deciding who deserves inclusion and whose inclusion is 
denied (Mavelli, 2017). However, the fact of ‘blaming refugees for their own suffering’ is a 
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manifestation of biopolitical racism within the framework of a humanitarian government 
(Mavelli, 2017, p. 824, italics in original text).  
 
Duffield’s (2014, p. 75, 78) insight onto the new emerging humanitarianism in the world is a 
response towards ‘new wars’ in different parts of Africa, for example, and the new system of 
‘global governance’ that has emerged as a result of a change in development and security 
discourses in nation states. This is when political concerns and sovereignty stand above the 
humanitarian need for saving lives and providing humanitarian assistance. Within the Algerian 
context, due to the civil war in the 90s and due to the current challenges, that have constantly 
menaced Algeria’s territorial security because of the instability in the Sahel region and the rest 
of the Arab world, humanitarianism has been securitised. A new humanitarianism (Duffield, 
2014) has emerged and has governed the state’s discourse towards Syrian displaced people 
since 2015. At the Foreigners’ Office (Maktab el Adjanib), Asma, confirms that Algeria has 
tightened the access of displaced people due to instability in neighbouring countries: Libya and 
Mali. Consequently, this has affected the state’s social policy of egalitarianism and offered 
conditional social rights and restricted access to legal rights of citizenship. Not only did security 
concerns lead to securitisation of humanitarian assistance but the state’s rationality to define a 
national destiny for the majority in-group has also played a role in offering conditional 
assistance to war refugees in Algeria. In this respect, Asma, a state official, added: ‘… Most 
Syrians do not have a sense of belonging towards Algeria, they came to Algeria just because 
they had to leave their country due to a civil war, besides, most of them had chosen Algeria 
because it is near to Europe and they consider it as a transit point to the EU countries…’. 
Asma’s quote illustrates that citizenship is securitised in Algeria and it requires commitment 
to Algeria rather than just sharing the same faith or language. Chapters 6 and 7 will discuss in 
detail how humanitarianism has been securitised through the state strategies of hospitality and 
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security that have offered conditional assistance to war refugees in terms of social and legal 
































This thesis is a qualitative account that demonstrates the conceptualisation of Algerianness by 
sociologically investigating the historical, social and political aspects of citizenship in Algeria. 
Using Foucault’s insights into territorial security, political sovereignty and human subjectivity, 
I will explore the relation between the practice of biopolitical governmentality and citizenship 
discussed in the previous chapters by documenting how these norms or dispositifs are lived out 
by Syrian minorities escaping war. In addition to using Foucauldian biopolitical 
governmentality, I also used thematic analysis in order to produce general themes and sub-
themes in order to understand which rights are given to whom and why. A Foucauldian analysis 
is vital to answer the “why” questions and identify power-knowledge relations. Conducting a 
Foucauldian analysis is not only an analysis of power but more importantly a creation of a 
history of modes by which a kind of power has created humans as subjects (Foucault, 1982, p. 
208 in Al Amoudi, n.d, p. 03). A Foucauldian insight into biopolitical governmentality is 
necessary to explain how state strategies will bridge the gap between the state practices of 
integrating Syrian displaced people into certain rights of citizenship. Additionally, Foucault’s 
insight helps analyse the nature of Algerian citizenship in terms of its biogovernmental norms 
and investigates how they treat non-citizens in drawing boundaries between “valuable” citizens 
who deserve partial inclusion and “unworthy” citizens that need to be excluded. This chapter 
also discusses the aims and objectives of the fieldwork and will defend the philosophical choice 
of research design, including use of data collection methods, analytical strategies, and ethical 
considerations.  
Chapter Five: Methodological Considerations 
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5.1. Research Design 
 
5.1.1. Qualitative research Approach and Analytical Strategy 
 
A very basic distinction between qualitative and quantitative research methods, is that 
qualitative research treats context and meaning as important while quantitative research is 
primarily interested in numbers and statistics (Braun & Clarke, 2013, emphasis added). A 
qualitative research paradigm refers to a set of beliefs, assumptions, values and practices 
involved into a framework of a qualitative research which are different from that of the 
quantitative research paradigm (Braun & Clarke, 2013). Discourse analysis was deemed 
appropriate to the present thesis in order to draw back on cultural and historical events that 
make sense to today’s reality (Gill, 2000 in Jones, 2014, p. 06). A Foucauldian Discourse 
Analysis, which is a form of discourse analysis, has been used as a strategy of data analysis 
because it offers insights on relation between power and discourse. More specifically, 
conducting an analysis in terms of governmentality allows me to examine the implication of 
power in society through state practices at a societal level and the production of knowledge and 
its circulation in a specific context and real societal situations. In the power- knowledge 
relation, a Foucauldian perspective suggests that ‘power and knowledge directly imply one 
another; there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, 
nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute ... power relations’ (Foucault, 1980, 
p. 27 in Hall, 1992, p. 203). Undoubtedly, power has a manipulative and a controlling nature 
but when power operates in favour of ‘truth’, it produces rituals of truth and enable a certain 
behaviour to happen. Discourse produces ‘a regime of truth’ (Hall, 1992, p. 205). If discourse 
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produces knowledge, knowledge will have real consequences and will constitute a kind of 
power over those who are “known”; the latter can be subjected and referred to as a “subject” 
when that kind of knowledge is exercised in practice (Hall, 1992, p. 205). This will define the 
subject position which is tied to power in order to regulate and control people’s conduct. This 
epistemological position will provide a definition and a description of the nature of the main 
concern (Salmons, 2019) of the present thesis which is how different power discourses of 
Algerianness / Algerian citizenship compete and conflict in the Algerian context when trying 
to manage the flow of Syrian displaced people. Certainly, these power discourses have their 
historical context, and they are bound up by institutional practices in order to organise and 
regulate and administer social life. For example, Algerian citizenship and the process of 
naturalisation cannot be separated from its history and the history of the Algerian state 
especially during the colonial era when Algerian Muslims were excluded from citizenship 
rights and were considered as French subjects. In post-colonial Algeria, Algerian citizenship 
was offered to Muslims and the majority of non-Muslims, including Jews and Christians, left 
the country and immigrated to France. In the age of mass migration and human movement, 
Algerian citizenship, although offering limited or full access to social rights, naturalisation still 
remains a privilege for those who can express deep nationalistic feeling of belonging to Algeria 
and relate to its past. As mentioned earlier, Syrians of Algerian ancestors that belong to the 
family of El Amir Abdu El-Kader el Jazaei’ri were lucky enough to receive Algerian 
citizenship by naturalisation. What remains questionable is how to gauge the loyalty of 
potential citizens or even citizens themselves?  
 
This thesis is interested in analysing how the Syrian displaced community in Algeria is 
governed and how the diversity of the local population (Algerians) is still managed and 
controlled by excluding Syrians from Algerian citizenship. The art of governing a population 
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is referred to as ‘governmentality’ in Foucault’s thinking (Foucault, 2007). Foucault’s concept 
of governmentality refers to the ‘ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses, 
and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit 
complex form of power’ (Foucault, 1991, p. 102 in Lippert, 1999, p. 295). When governing a 
population, knowledge about health, housing, economy is very important in practicing control 
and surveillance. Governmentality studies employ the ‘programme of government’ that refers 
to the state’s ‘imagined projects of administering social life’ and within which state 
technologies are brought together with state rationalities (Lippert, 1999, p. 296). In 
International Relations and in its relevance to the notion of refugeeness, governmentality 
defines state technologies, strategies and rationalities: ‘governmental power and refugee 
studies invoke Foucault's "power-knowledge" knot: There is no cause and effect that can be 
unravelled here’ (Lippert, 1999, p. 319). Using Foucault’s governmentality in relation to 
refugee studies, I will investigate two main state strategies namely: hospitality and security. 
Hospitality is a state strategy that has been adopted from 2011 to late 2014 to care for Syrian 
displaced people. Hospitality has been ordered by historical ties and relations between both 
Algeria and Syria. In addition to historical ties that started since the exile of one of the most 
influential figures of Algerian popular resistance against the French colonialism, El Amir Abdu 
El-Kader el Jazaei’ri, hospitality in Algeria, is an Islamic virtue that is dictated by values of 
faith (Islam) and ethnicity (Arabness). The ethos of hospitality in Islam should not only be 
from a Muslim towards a Muslim, but a Muslim should also show it to their guest regardless 
their faith or origins because the hospitality relationship in Islam is triangular; it includes ‘the 
host’, ‘the guest’ and ‘Allah (God)’ (El-Aswad, 2015, p. 462). In this regard, Prophet Mohamed 
said: ‘He whoever believes in God and the last day should honor his guest’ (Rababah & 
Rababah, 2016, p. 44).  
 
 158 
Having said that, from 2011 to December 2014, subjectivation and knowledge production 
around Syrian refugees shaped them as ‘guests’ that are worthy of inclusion and unconditional 
welcome and they should be honoured. The state welfare rationalities offered them 
unconditional access to social rights of citizenship including healthcare, education, and 
accommodation. However, the state discourse and strategy of managing Syrian displaced 
people have changed since January 2015. Given its complex history of decolonisation, the 
struggle against terrorism in 1990s and constant threat of international terrorism coming from 
unstable countries such as Libya and Mali, security became a dominant discourse. This shift in 
state strategies and power discourses produced a new knowledge around displaced people. As 
such, Syrians and displaced people in general started to be classified as a ‘potential threat’ to 
national security. For this reason, new state technologies have been applied to achieve more 
control and surveillance around Syrians’ life. In January 2015, Algeria closed its borders with 
Syria and Syrians were obliged to submit visa files prior to their arrival to Algeria; if granted 
access they must stamp their passports every 45 days because they have short-residence 
permits. Short-residence permit is not a travel document and does not grant its holder a freedom 
of travel outside Algeria; only inside. Additionally, rationalities of welfare restricted access to 
employment. By policing the imagination and knowledge around the group of short-residence 
permit holders, one can tell who counts as a potential citizen according to practices of Algerian 
citizenship. Those who hold short-residence permits are unfortunately not eligible to apply for 
Algerian citizenship even if they spend more than 7 years of continuous residence in Algeria. 
This shift in state strategies, technologies and knowledge production in dealing with the flow 
of Syrian displaced people is not arbitrary, but it has multiple reasons that are linked to 
struggles of prominent power discourses in the Algerian context such as: nationalism, Arabness 
/ pan-Arabism, Islam, globalisation, humanitarian obligations and biopolitical practices. These 
discourses remain embedded in the national body politic and remain shaped by the imagination 
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of Algerianness and Algerian citizenship. Therefore, a historical and critical reading of how 
these discourses conflict in the past is crucial in the present thesis in order to investigate the 
state actual practices within the framework of migration in the 21st century. This shift from a 
welcoming approach to a very restrictive and exclusionary approach also reflects how the state 
categorises and differentiates Syrians.  
 
5.1.2. Levels of Analysis  
 
In order to locate biopolitical governmentalities of refugees and displaced people in the 
Algerian context, this research identified the state’s produced knowledge and changes in 
knowledge practices through which the state strategies, technologies, rationalities and 
mentalities practice power over the governed subject. In his essay ‘The subject and power’, 
Foucault argues that “power” and “subject” are two main elements in his analysis to power 
relations (Foucault, 2000e, 326–327 in Välikangas and Seeck, 2011, p. 05 italics in original 
text). In the archaeological phase of Foucault’s, Foucault sees the elements of subject and 
power connected to discourse (Välikangas and Seeck, 2011, p. 06). Moving from archaeology 
to genealogy, through discourse we can identify power relations and answer questions such as: 
who governs what? according to what logics? with what techniques? toward what ends? who 
or what is to be governed? why should they be governed? how should they be governed? to 
what ends should they be governed? (Rose & O’Malley & Valverde, 2009, p. 03). As such, 
what would lead us to the phase of genealogy is that we can identify explicit and implicit / 
hidden rationalities of power games and knowledge practices that have taken place throughout 
history of a certain power game (Välikangas and Seeck, 2011).    
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The present thesis addresses how conscious and unconscious rationalities of nationalism, 
national security, Islam and Arabness and pan-Arabism in colonial and post-colonial Algeria 
have played an integral role in producing a constantly changing knowledge around Syrian 
displaced people in Algeria. Välikangas and Seeck (2011, p. 08) argue that in Foucault’s 
genealogy, power can be seen as ‘not only negative, but as positive, productive and enabling’. 
In this research, the constantly changing knowledge illustrates how power games can produce 
Syrians as either guests, brothers in faith at different times or a threat to national security.  
 
The first level of analysis identifies and analyses the state strategies / technologies of dealing 
with the flow of Syrian displaced people since 2011. This analysis discusses two main state 
strategies: hospitality and security and they represent Algeria’s paradoxical response to the 
waves of Syrians. The second level of analysis discusses the production of knowledge and 
subjectivity of Syrians. Power-knowledge relations suggest an ontological study of what is 
reality or what is the nature of the relation between inseparable elements namely: discourse, 
power, knowledge, reality and ‘episteme’ or ‘whom discourse serves’ (Schneck, 1987, p. 24). 
This analysis will discuss the following questions: what is the status of Syrians in Algeria? 
What could “guest” and “potential threat” representations tell us about the dominant discourse 
in Algeria and how they reflect a struggle of powers in the Algerian context and why?  For how 
long can Syrians be “guests”? Can Algeria’s guests, Syrians, receive long-term / permanent 
inclusion into the Algerian setting? Will “guests” be qualified for the status of “citizens” by 
granting them citizenship and political participation in the Algerian context? Why do Algerian 
state officials often use the word “guest” as opposed to “refugee” or “immigrants”? Does the 
“guest” status grant Syrians any rights within the Algerian context and what might be the 
limitations associated with this status? What might be the state’s policy and ideology behind 
labelling Syrians as “guests”? What can this knowledge-power relation tell about the nature of 
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Algerian citizenship? The third level of analysis will discuss how the state welfare rationalities 
that shape the state technologies treat Syrians differently according to their ability and capacity 
to enhance the biopolitical condition of the host population. ‘A discursive formation will 
manifest a set of relations between institutional sites, functions, activities, subjects …etc’ 
(Young, 2001, p. 405 italics as in original text). By analysing discourse at a macro-level rather 
than then analysing it at a sentence level or analysing its grammar, the discursive formation 
will provide an image about how knowledge functions in practice, technologies and their 
rationalities, and how refugees and refugee related issues are conceptualised within Algeria 
and how they are shaped by discourses of nationalism, state sovereignty and security, and 
hospitality.  
 
5.2. Profiles of Research Participants and Research Setting 
 
Participants that took part in this research belong to two main cohorts: Syrians and Algerians. 
Both cohorts reside in Algeria, in the capital of the country, Algiers. The city of Algiers was 
not chosen arbitrarily but it is the first Algerian city that hosts a large population of displaced 
Syrians. Given the fact that there is a large population of Syrians in Algiers, I believe they 
would be noticeable in the Algerian society if they are facing either inclusion or exclusion at 
both legal and normative levels. Additionally, the choice of the capital is because Algiers is 
where the main Algerian authorities that have been involved in the management and 
resettlement of asylum seekers, refugees and immigrants; it is where the Foreigners’ office and 
the Algerian Red Crescent Society are based. The choice of location is also based on 
connections I built with Syrian and Algerian volunteers that have agreed to take part in this 
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research and have facilitated the flow of research and the continuation of semi-structured 
interviews.  
 
This research was undertaken in urban places where both Syrians’ working places, the Algerian 
ministries and participants are based. The main research locations in Algiers included different 
districts such as: Dali Ibrahim, Bir Khadem, Kouba, Baba Hassan, Bab El Zouar, Staouali, Sidi 
Yahia, Alger centre, Salambier, le Golf, El Madania, 15 bis Boulevard Mohammed V, and 
Place du 1er Mai 1945 (Mustapha Pacha). 
 
Regarding the inclusion and exclusion criteria, both the Algerian and Syrian cohorts were 
chosen regardless of their gender, sexual orientation, religion, or their ethnic background. 
Unlike participants from the Syrian cohort, my Algerian participants were chosen based on 
their profession. Because one of my research is to look at how the state’s welfare system and 
social rights of citizenship (healthcare, education, housing, and employment) are delivered to 
the Syrian community, I included Algerians who come into contact with this population such 
as doctors, teachers, landlords, employers. The Algerian cohort also included representatives 
from Algerian Red Crescent and state officials at the level of the Foreigners’ Office (Maktab 
el Adjanib). The latter is responsible of delivering legal rights such as the renewal of Syrians’ 
residence permits. 
a- Inclusion criteria 
 
 
The sample of this research is mostly restricted to the Syrian displaced community living 
in Algiers, Algeria. This research limits itself to state officials at the level of Algerian 
ministries such as Algerian Red Crescent and Foreigners’ office in Algiers; Algerian 
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social care providers including healthcare providers, teachers, landlords and employers; 
Algerian charity organisations that have been involved in dealing with issues related to 
managing and resettlement of displaced people in the Algerian host community.  
 
b- Exclusion criteria 
 
 
The choice of the Algerian local community was not random. Participants from the 
Algerian cohort were chosen based on their relationship with Syrians and based on their 
activities of providing emotional and humanitarian aid and supporting Syrians during 
the processes of resettlement and integration into the Algerian setting. Therefore, 
random Algerians that did not have direct contact with Syrians were completely 
excluded. This does not mean that their opinions do not matter but it is because they 
may not be aware of Syrians’ personal experiences when it comes to either inclusion or 
exclusion from Algerian citizenship and Algerianness.  
 
As far as the process of recruiting research participants, a snowballing method was helpful to 
get in touch with more participants from both the Algerian and Syrian cohorts and gain their 
trust and consent. Relying on snowballing methods to recruit research participants, it was 
essential to involve primary contacts that acted as gatekeepers. Initial gatekeeping individuals 
involved Syrians living in Algeria such as Samer, who acted as cultural insiders and Algerian 
volunteers, and landlords such as Fatima Zohra. In order to get in touch with the Algerian 
authorities and state officials at the Foreigners’ Office the Algerian Red Crescent in Algiers, I 
used a different technique. I had to follow bureaucratic procedures and hierarchical connections 
between state authorities. In order to do that, I had to request an authorisation letter (check 
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appendix 5) from the Algerian Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research which 
stated that I am a sponsored PhD student at Portsmouth University and I needed information 
from state officials regarding my research around Syrians in Algeria. The letter had to clearly 
state the academic purposes for the fieldwork. In addition to following the state bureaucratic 
procedures, I had to follow the state’s security procedures at the level of the Foreigners’ Office 
in Algiers as research data that would be provided during the conversation may be sensitive 
and may disclose the anonymity of refugees’ lives and experiences or may violate the state’s 
security procedures related to issues of migration that are not available to the public. For these 
reasons a security check was done.  
 
This thesis relied on semi-structured interviews with both cohorts: Algerians and Syrians, in 
Algeria, Algiers. Due to UK’s Tier 4 student Visa restrictions, interviews were conducted 
during three research trips between 05/03/2018 to 08/05/2018; 12/08/2018 to 08/09/2018; and 
18/11/2018 to 21/12/2018 (check appendix 6) in different public spaces such as cafés, 
interviewees’ working places, homes, restaurants, shops and offices. In total, 32 semi-
structured interviews were collected from participants. The socio- economic profiles of 
research participants can be summarised as follow:  
a. Gender 
Females = 9 (5 Syrians and 4 Algerians). Males = 23 (18 Syrians and 5 Algerians). 
 
b. Age and civil / marital status 
The target population did not involve children or teenagers. All participants are adults aged 
between 21 and 53 years. 
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c. Religion and Ethnicity 
 
All Syrian and Algerian participants described themselves as Muslims and Arabs and of 
Muslim and Arab origins. Exception was made for one Algerian participant that described 
herself as an Algerian Muslim of Berber origins of Boumerdass region in Algeria.  
 
d. Legal Status in Algeria 
 
Apart from participants who belong to the Algerian cohort that are Algerian nationals, 16 
Syrians held short-resident permits and 3 of them held long-resident permits. Only 4 Syrians 
were registered with the UNHCR and they held legal documents which proved that they are 
protected from the state’s illegal deportation and they were eligible for UNHCR’s humanitarian 
aid. None of the Syrian asylum seekers held refugee status because there has been no refugee 
national law in Algeria that would adjudicate their asylum applications and issue them legal 
status. The names of participants were deliberately changed in order to ensure confidentiality 
and anonymity and commit to research ethics of protecting participants’ identity. The following 
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The table above provides information about age, gender, civil / marital status, religion, legal 
status in Algeria, job and date of arrival to Algeria of my Syrian participants. These details are 
important in reviewing every participant’s profile and in grouping them according to the three 
modes of biopolitical governmentality namely: hospitality, security and humanitarian support. 
Generally, Syrian participants that entered Algeria before 2015 can be grouped under the mode 
of hospitality as a strategy that had been embodied through unconditional access to welfare 
services and legal restrictions. Exceptions were made for businessmen and Syrians of Algerian 
ancestors that received either long-residence permits or were naturalised. As such, they 
received certain privileges such as: freedom of mobility outside Algeria, right to family re-
unification. On the other hand, those that arrived with an entry visa to Algeria after 2015, would 
provide more information about how the state security measures have impacted their 
integration into the Algerian context in terms of social welfare and legal recognition. In 
comparing and contrasting Syrians who arrived before and after 2015, data gives more details 
about the state’s practices of inclusion and exclusion. In terms of similarities, both groups can 
register with the UNHCR in Algiers. Additionally, from a lens of biopolitical governmentality, 
information about the economic status of every participant will provide a deep understanding 
about how the state strategies have included “worthy” Syrians and excluded “unworthy” 
Syrians according to their ability to enhance the well-being of the Algerian local population. 
Both the date of arrival to Algeria and the economic status are related to the status of every 
Syrian respondent because they define whether a Syrian is eligible to short-residence permit or 
a long-residence permit. The gender and religion of my Syrian participants are important in 
comparing / contrasting how different genders face different challenges and have different 
experiences. For instance, research data revealed how Syrian females are very dependent on 
their male siblings even in participating in this research, looking for jobs, commuting to 
different parts of Algeria and the like.    
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Research data were gathered through face-to-face semi-structured interview conversations with 
research participants from both the Algerian and the Syrian cohort. A checklist interview 
format was followed in order to make sure the conversation covered all research areas and 
attained the interview objectives. As most research participants had busy schedules, I had to be 
flexible according to their circumstances. Interviews took place during the participants’ lunch 
time, at their workplace, at night at their homes and at the weekend or outside their working 
hours. While interviewing research participants, or on our way to the interview venues or places 
such as cafés or when we walked along the street and even during our lunch or dinner, I kept 
fieldnotes to analyse the body language of respondents and to check their personal documents 
when they openly decided to share them (a copy of UNHCR document issued by the UNHCR’s 
office in Algiers, a copy of long-resident permit issued by the Algerian state, passport’ stamps 
for short-residence permit holders and the like). Accompanying recorded interviews with 
fieldnotes was helpful in case the respondent wanted to share extra information linked to the 
study that they forgot during the time of recorded conversations. The length of interviews was 
from 45 minutes to one hour. The primary language of interviews was Arabic in both its 
standard form and in its dialectal version including Algerian and Syrian dialectal Arabic. This 
has ensured mutual intelligibility and understanding. The Algerian cohort alternated between 
the use of Algerian Arabic and French. During the interviews, no problems were raised in terms 
of language as a means of communication. Both my participants and I spoke Arabic fluently. 
  
5.3. Ethical Consideration 
 
Given the fact that this research had involved vulnerable people, some ethical concerns were 
raised. One of the major issues during the present research was the uncertainty, ambiguity and 
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polemic regarding Syrians’ legal status in Algeria. Due to the absence of a national refugee law 
in Algeria, some Syrians preferred to call themselves as immigrants, others preferred to be 
addressed as refugees or asylum seekers because they sought refuge in Algeria after the civil 
war in Syria in 2011. I will not use stateless people as this has not been used by my research 
participants neither from the Syrian cohort nor from the Algerian state officials. Additionally, 
as there are different discourses that conflict at a state level and at a societal level when 
addressing Syrians in Algeria, I will use the term “displaced people” throughout my thesis in 
order to cover all my Syrian participants. 
 
The political and legal marginality of refugees shows that they enjoy limited rights; this reflects 
that they are vulnerable to arbitrary actions on the part of the state authorities and sometimes 
even to the international relief community (Jacobsen & Landau, 2003, p. 187). For these 
reasons, refugees are discreet when it comes to their opinion regarding the host state and local 
community. It is the researcher’s duty to gain trust and familiarise themselves with the cohort 
and guarantee anonymity and safety. After receiving the approval of my ethical application 
from the ethical committee at Portsmouth University, I contacted my primary contacts and 
visited them in Algiers, Algeria, to start my research. I adopted a snowballing technique known 
as ‘chain referral method’ of sampling and recruiting participants (Neuman, 2011). I had 
connections with cultural insiders (Syrian males, an Algerian female, and Algerian volunteers) 
who have always shown willingness to collaborate and take part in the present research. 
Prior to the interviews and with the help of my research gatekeepers, I started by visiting 
potential participants, disseminating information sheets, invitation letters that included my 
contact details and distributing consent forms. I had to explain the ethical obligations of my 
research, rights of participants and my obligations towards the anonymity of research 
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participants. The next step would be either receiving a phone call from participants or re-
visiting them at their workplaces to take their decisions. The majority of participants I visited 
accepted to take part in this research immediately and provided both verbal and written consent. 
I have to mention that about 10 Syrian males declined to take part in my research. Although 
their participation was voluntary, they apologised for not being able to take part in the present 
research because of their time limitations, work commitments, or because they preferred not to 
share their personal experiences. 
 
Unlike Algerian female participants and due to cultural differences, Syrian female interviewees 
had to obtain the consent of their fathers, brothers or husbands prior to agreeing to take part in 
the study. Only 5 female Syrians gained the consent of their male siblings and agreed to take 
part in the current research and accepted our conversation to be voice recorded. For instance, 
Lara (45) gained consent of her brother; while Wissal (40), Wafae (27), Nirmin (49) and Nora 
(21) gained consent of their husbands as they were married. After the interview day and before 
starting the analysis of interviews, participants were given two weeks in case they wished to 
withdraw their recorded conversations and decline their participation in the study for any 
reason. During this period of time, nobody decided to withdraw from the research.  
 
Although the purpose of the present sociological research is not to influence Algerian 
immigration policy or to suggest a national refugee mechanism or even suggest solutions to 
Syrians facing legal problems, conducting research that is related to social sciences in Algeria 
is still monitored by the state, as Faradji (2015) argues. As hinted earlier, before conducting 
interviews with the Algerian state officials, I requested an authorisation letter from the Algerian 
Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research which had reassured that the present 
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research would take place within an officially permitted framework according to state’s 
regulations and laws. Initially, the authorisation letter paved and eased the way to conduct 
interviews and talk to representatives at the level of the Foreigners’ Office (Maktab el Adjanib) 
in Algiers and the Algerian Red Crescent society. An information sheet about the study and 
areas of interest, aims, objectives of my study, and confidentiality of data were provided in 
order to gain access to these state’s organisations.  
 
As far as the legal and public interests are concerned, it is my legal duty and responsibility as 
an Algerian citizen and resident to report any suspicious acts and crimes such as prostitution, 
human trafficking, ethnic conflicts, terrorism, spying or any activities that threaten national 
security. In order to mitigate potential risks associated with vulnerable groups such as Syrian 
asylum seekers, refugees and immigrants, I informed my participants that I am legally obliged 
to report any criminal activities so that they can avoid incriminating themselves. Additionally, 
many, if not all, have experienced tough journeys in fleeing war and reach safety. Discussing 
their traumatic experiences during the Syrian war could have brought back violent events to 
their minds and may have made some participants reluctant to share their experiences in 
Algeria, despite the overt public interest in their situation. Therefore, I avoided sensitive 
subjects and situations and paid attention to the kind of questions I planned to ask and how 
they were asked. Additionally, the aim of this research does not discuss the path that displaced 
people took to reach Algeria, it only discussed their life experiences after they started residing 
in Algeria. In order to protect the anonymity and ensure confidentiality, the real full names of 
respondents were not asked during the interviews. If they have been provided by mistake, I had 
to change them during the process of transcription and data analysis. Respondents were given 
pseudonyms instead. Besides, exact personal data which may lead to the identification of the 
research respondent were not used in this research.  
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Generally, conducting semi-structured interviews and voice recordings did not raise major 
sensitiveness among both Algerian and Syrian research participants. However, surprisingly, 
voice recording raised issues with Algerian participants. Syrians expressed enthusiasm to talk 
to me and were open to be recorded because they perceived the experience as an opportunity 
that could create a platform through which they become more visible within the Algerian 
context. My Syrian participants also considered this research as a means through which their 
voices could reach policymakers and suggest solutions to solve legal, not societal, restrictions 
that Syrians displaced people have been facing and which have affected their daily lives. The 
Algerian cohort, on the other hand, did not accept voice recordings easily. Only one Algerian 
female out of 9 Algerian respondents accepted her voice to be recorded. The experience with 
the Algerian cohort was not easy as I anticipated and my experience at the Foreigners’ Office 
was not an exception. Before the state official at the Foreigners’ Office, Asma, accepted my 
invitation to participate in the present research, she needed to make sure I am an Algerian 
national and I am conducting a research within a legal and ethical framework that the funding 
body approves. The secretary at the Foreigners’ Office (Maktab El Adjanib) had to question 
my identity and asked if I am Algerian. I confirmed my Algérianité by nationality and 
confidently said: ‘yes, I am an Algerian citizen’. He replied: ‘saying you are Algerian or 
speaking Algerian Arabic does not mean you are Algerian’. At that moment, I realised that I 
sounded “a source of suspicion” although I had an authorisation letter from the Ministry of 
Higher Education and Scientific Research. I had been informed that they would conduct a 
detailed investigation regarding my background, legal status and my records before accepting 
my invitation as my research deals with a sensitive topic. This reflected the level of censorship 
applied by the state on researchers dealing with vulnerable groups and may be collecting 
sensitive information regarding their life which could be exploited by foreigners serving 
different political agendas. After an investigation that lasted for more than 10 days, my 
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invitation was approved, and I was accepted to see Asma. At the door and due to security 
measures, I had to leave my belongings with the security guard. As filming and voice recording 
is banned in state organisations, Asma declined the use of voice recorders or video filming 
devices as this was against internal rules and regulations of anonymity and confidentiality 
stated by the Algerian state at sensitive workplaces such as ministries or their branches which 
was the case of the Foreigners’ Office (Maktab el Adjanib) that is branch of the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs. I have to state that my Algerian respondents, including state officials, were 
very cooperative and dedicated ample time for note taking and interview-writing. However, 
they had limitations concerning what kind of information they would be able to provide. Asma, 
for instance, set up rules before the start of our conversation and ensured that she cannot answer 
any questions related to the state’s strategies to counter terrorism in the light of the Arab spring 
as this was out of her responsibilities and tasks. She ensured that the Foreigners’ Office can 
only renew residence permits for all Syrians including Syrians in the country. Anis, at the level 
of the Algerian Red Crescent was not able to offer further details about financial budgets the 
state has provided for Syrians in Sidi Feradj guest centre. Details about the state’s 
counterterrorism strategies or the state’s financial budget to support Syrians were not among 
the primary objectives of my thesis. My research focusses on how the state has been managing 
the flow of Syrian displaced people since 2011 and what are the strategies that the state adopted 
to integrate Syrians at both a societal and a legal level? (check appendix 2 and 3). 
 
I believe the issues I faced with the Algerian cohort are not primarily because of a lack of trust 
but rather a fear from “the unknown other” that resulted in a lack of trust at the first encounter. 
The latter raised an issue among the Algerian population that refused to be recorded. The 
reaction of the Algerian cohort and the state of fear from the other has been developed since 
the black decade (civil war) in 1990s. Additionally, the unpopularity of social researchers that 
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deal with sociological aspects of the Algerian local society also contributed in raising these 
issues among the Algerian cohort. In this regard, Faradji (2015) confirms that the Algerian state 
does not give much attention to sociological research compared to scientific research that is 
more developed.  
 
The present study had different types of semi-structured interviews designed for the purpose 
of obtaining different information from different cohorts. For instance, a semi-structured 
interview that was designed for the Syrian displaced community has covered four main 
sections: social networks and social cohesion; legal procedure (civil and legal rights); the 
feeling of belonging and national identity; social rights of citizenship (labour market, 
accommodation, healthcare and education). Each section contains related in depth-questions. 
Although the interview has been divided into different sections, some probing questions related 
to the main themes of this research still emerged and were covered during the conversation. 
Semi-structured interviews with the Algerian state officials discussed the legal status of Syrian 
displaced people and how the state manages their flow and provided emotional and 
humanitarian support. While conducting interviews with state officials, I kept in mind the 
reason of my research which was to decipher the state discourses associated with Syrian 
displaced people and how they have been changing due to certain circumstances and historical 
events.  For instance, Asma’s use of words like: ‘guests’ [doyouf], ‘brothers in faith’ [ikhwatna 
fi din], ‘potentials threats’ [Masdar khatar], ‘dangerous’ [khatirin], ‘hospitality’ [diyafa w 
tarhib], ‘national security’ [amn el kawmi], ‘state challenges’ [tahadiyat li twajha l bilad] and 
the like, all gave hints about the state discourses that govern the Syrian community.  
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Semi-structured interviews with Algerian social care providers namely: healthcare providers, 
teachers, employers and landlords, discussed legal procedures that Syrian displaced people 
need to comply with in order to receive their social rights. Generally, they covered the social 
integration of the Syrian displaced community into the welfare system in Algeria in order to 
deduce how the welfare state treats Syrians. This has also given information for why social 
rights have changed throughout time and the reason for limiting their access.   
 
5.4. Positionality, Voice and Valuation 
 
Within a qualitative research paradigm, qualitative sensibility represents a research orientation 
in terms of research questions and data analysis and interpretation. Braun & Clarke (2013, p. 
09) argue that reflexivity is a crucial skill in making up a qualitative sensibility. It refers to the 
positionality of qualitative researchers and their ability to act as ‘insiders’ or ‘outsider’ vis-à-
vis their research (Gallais, 2008 in Braun & Clarke, 2013, p. 10). A qualitative researcher can 
be referred to as an ‘insider’ when they share the same identity of their research participants. 
An ‘outsider’ status, on the other hand, is when the qualitative researcher does not share the 
same identity with their research participants (Braun & Clarke, 2013, p. 10). In the present 
research, I could refer to myself as both an insider and an outsider. Sharing the same status of 
being an Algerian myself, I can be referred to as an insider when I conducted interviews with 
Algerians. However, I could be perceived as an outsider when I dealt with respondents from 
the Syrian cohort as I do not share the same identity with them. The roles of being both an 
insider and an outsider in relation to both cohorts and their perceptions to researchers could at 
the same time alternate and I saw myself swapping positions at different points in time. 
Although I share the same identity of being Algerian with the Algerian cohort, I was perceived 
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as an outsider and a source of suspicion by some Algerian respondents because of the 
unpopularity of sociological research that deals with people in Algeria. During my interview 
with the state official, Asma, she gave hints that Algerianness is a matter of being a nationalist 
if not a patriot. Additionally, because I have been registered as a PhD student at a Western 
country, the UK, I sounded suspicious. This can be due to the representation of the Western 
world in the eyes of Algerians due to the complex violent history between France and Algeria 
or the opposite: the representation of Algeria by Western media. For instance, on September 
20th, 2020, the Algerian state banned the French television channel from continuing its work in 
Algeria over a reportage on Hirak, the popular uprising that led to the downfall of the former 
president, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, in 2019. After the reportage that lasted for 75 minutes, the 
Algerian authorities denied the fact the that these French journalists, of both Algerian and 
French origins, have received an authorisation from the Algerian Ministry of Communication 
to conduct or film a reportage in Algeria. In fact, in the region of Ouragla in the south of 
Algeria, the journalist, Bernard de la Villardière, confessed that his team had to use a hidden 
camera to film because people of the region refused to be filmed. The Algerian authorities 
described the reportage as being subjective and biased because it was not honest and did not 
reflect the real image of the Algerian youth and the value of the Algerian Muslim woman in 
Algeria. The reportage entitled ‘L'Algérie, le pays de toutes les révoltes [Algeria, the country 
of all uprisings]’ (North Africa Post, 2020) was unethical and was led by hidden socio-political 
agendas which aim at attacking and destroying the reputation of the Algerian nation at an 
international level. Sidaoui, an expert in socio-politics and at Geneva university in Switzerland, 
has claimed that Algeria has always been targeted by terrorist groups and foreign intelligence 
agencies since the start of the so called “the Arab Spring” and the French reportage realised by 
M6 channel was, in reality, manipulated by the French intelligence agency and was a part of 
their plans to ignite social anger and destabilise the country (CARAPS Riyadh Sidaoui, 2020). 
 180 
The M6 reportage was not the only one produced by a French TV channel. Prior to it and in 
May 2020, France 5 and the channel of the Parliament (LCP) released a documentary about the 
popular uprising, Hirak, that created a polemic among the Algerian society (Ouest-France, 
2020). The Algerian authorities claimed that the documentary did not reflect the real aim of the 
Algerian popular uprising which was the change of the old political, social and economic 
system, it rather portrayed the Algerian Hirak, also known as the revolution of the Smile 
[tawrat el ibtissama], as a terrain where feminists, Islamists and secular parties claimed rights. 
Following the incident, the Algerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs immediately summoned the 
Algerian ambassador in Paris, France for negotiations (Ouest-France, 2020). These reportages 
and documentaries caused an implicit crisis to the French-Algerian socio-political scene. I 
believe, for reasons similar to these, I sounded suspicious to my Algerian cohort and this could 
prove their refusal for being recorded and their willingness to know more about me before 
accepting to take part in my research.   
 
In order to mitigate the risks associated with me sounding suspicious, I submitted my 
authorisation letter issued by the Algerian Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific 
Research to state officials at the level of the Foreigners’ Office and the Algerian Red Crescent 
in Algiers. When approaching the Syrian cohort, I relied on Syrian gatekeepers who had direct 
relations with Algerian landlords and employers. Surprisingly, I have been perceived as an 
insider by the Syrian community in Algeria, as an Algerian who shares the same values of 
religious and ethnic brotherhood in the name of Pan-Arabism and Islam. When I revisited my 
fieldnotes, I remember when I finished my interview with Moataz (23), we left his workplace 
for lunch. He offered help and referred me to his friends that took part in my research. I thanked 
him for his efforts and for his invitation for lunch, he replied: ‘You are my sister … we are all 
Muslims; Syrians and Algerians are brothers… [inti okhti … kilayatna ikhwa ... nahna 
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moslimin]’. The Syrian community that I interviewed were very open and welcoming. Lara 
(45) is another example. After we finished the interview, she invited me to her house where I 
met her mother and her brother’s children. They prepared a Syrian dish for dinner called 
‘Mahchi Koussa wa Batinjan’. I appreciated their invitation and openness, but Lara and her 
family expressed their feelings towards Algerians and argued that ‘Algerians and Syrians are 
Arabs and Muslims; they are the same’ [ el jazae’iriyin w souriyin kilayathon ikhwa… nahna 
moslimin]. 
 
The awareness of Syrians about the historical relation between Algerians and Syrians, since 
the exile of Amir Abdu el-Kader el Jazaei’ri in Damascus in the 19th century during the French 
colonisation has played a crucial role in building a good rapport and trust between the Syrian 
community and the Algerian host population. This also contributed in minimising obstacles 
between me, as a researcher, and my Syrian participants and made us very comfortable 
discussing further details even after our recorded interviews finished. Additionally, some 
Syrians whose families were in Algiers even invited me to their houses for dinner or coffee and 
expressed willingness to build a relationship of friendship and brotherhood. Just like Lara and 
Nora, Wafae, for instance, was another female participant that opened her door and welcomed 
me to her house in Algiers and prepared some traditional Syrian sweets for coffee. I remember 
another day when my gatekeeper, Fatima, Wafae, her baby and I went for a picnic at Dounia 
Park in Algiers where we met her Syrian friends and many other Syrian families with their 
children. These events made me feel at ease within the Syrian community in Algiers and 
revealed more details about life experiences of Syrians in Algiers. In these cases, for instance, 
I relied on accompanying my semi-structured interviews with a fieldwork diary which 
documents this additional contextual information either provided by the research respondents 
or observed by the researcher. All in all, Syrians’ emphasis on the historical ties that have 
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united Algerians and Syrians explained how they were referring to their identity from a 
perspective of belonging to a general community of Arabs and Muslims.  
As an insight into handling bias associated with the funding body, although this research is 
fully funded by the Algerian Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research, as a part 
of my contract, the funding body has not had any influence on the present research topic 
including data interpretation or the choice of research stakeholders. Obtaining an authorisation 
letter from the funding body was part of a bureaucratic procedure that will ensure that I am 
conducting a research within an ethical framework. The letter also eased the flow of 
bureaucratic procedures with the Algerian state officials. Knowing that the present research is 
funded by an Algerian body, most research participants did not feel monitored or under 
surveillance, they rather considered it as a confirmation of my identity. Syrians, for instance, 
felt secured because I shared my personal details, phone number and my email with them. The 
fact of sharing my details with my participants made them feel legally protected especially after 
knowing that ‘some Syrians at Sidi Feradj guest centre were interviewed by foreigners that 
claimed to be Algerians or Syrians but in reality, they were not’, the security guard at Sidi 
Feradj guest centre informed me. This was also confirmed through Moataz’s hesitation before 
knowing me. He thought I was ‘a journalist that would cause more pain to vulnerable people 
from the Syrian community and steal their stories’. Surely, Moataz was referring to the group 
of people that claimed to be Algerians or Syrians who paid a visit to Sidi Feradj guest centre 
and inhumanely took advantage of Syrians’ vulnerability without paying attention to their 
emotional and wellbeing.  
Generally, interview questions did not raise any sensitiveness, Ayman and Samer, for instance, 
appreciated that they have more freedom of speech in Algeria compared to Syria. In this regard, 
previously a journalist and an activist in Syria that opposed Assad’s regime, Ayman argued:  
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‘… in fact Algeria and Syria are similar in terms of the weather, sunny days …, but what is different between 
Algeria and Syria is that people in Algeria can criticise the regime and even the president of the state which is not 
the case in Syria at all… and that is why we revolted but our revolution was stolen from us by foreign parties… [ 
amatan el jazaei’ir w souriya mitlhon mitl ba’ad min nahiyat el jaw w lmonakh w taks lmochmis bas ana b’olak 
lfark yali binatna hya antom fi jazaei’r andkom chway horiya zayda alina ya’eni tekdro tantakdo nidam w hata 
ra’iss dawla bas nahna bi souriya ma fina w hada li khalana nantafed did dolm bas tawratna nsarakat mena min 
kibal jihat ajnabiya …]’.  
 
I have to admit that the Syrian cohort was very open compared to the Algerian cohort although 
they knew that my research would not, by all means, find solutions to their problems in Algeria. 
Other techniques can be adopted at the level of research setting, participants and data collection 
methods in order to handle bias (Rajendran, n.d). In terms of research setting / context, all 
provinces and counties in Algiers were included into my research. In terms of research 
population, this research did not exclude anyone because of their ethnicity, religion, race, age, 
gender, socio-economic level, or legal level. As such, this research included documented and 
undocumented people from the Syrian community. The exclusion criterion that I adopted 
initially was based on nationality; only Syrians and Algerians were included because the 
present research aims at looking at how the Algerian state manages the flow of Syrian displaced 
people. In terms of data collection methods, I offered several options such as voice recordings, 
note taking, fieldwork diaries, and interview writings. In case my participants did not accept 
voice recordings, for example, or wanted to disclose any information that they felt was 
important to my research but may identify them, I had to write it down rather than recording 
their voices.  
It is worth mentioning that my gatekeepers played a crucial role in my positionality with 
Syrians especially males. Khan referred to this as ‘gendered positionality’ (2015, p. 84). During 
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my research fieldworks, some Syrian male respondents were not comfortable to talk to me 
alone as I was perceived as a female foreigner from a religious perspective. Kamal, a Syrian 
participant, for instance, was very timid to talk to a female alone lest he should fall in an illicit 
relationship or the public’s negative perceptions. He argued: ‘If we were in Syria, for example, 
I could not sit for a chat alone with a female foreigner without a third party [… law kouna fi 
Souriya makouna nk’od lawahadna w nahki …]’. He backed up his attitude with the Prophet 
Mohamed’s saying: ‘no man is alone with a woman but the Shaytaan (Satan) will be the third 
one present [… la yakhlou rajoul bi imra’a ila kana chaytan thalithouhoma …]’ (translation 
into English at: “And Shaytaan…”, 2013). Being a Muslim myself, I understood that this was 
not due to a lack of trust or an attitude of sexism, but the participant was still timid and 
expressed a very religious mindset although the interview was planned to take place at his 
workplace which was not separate from the public. His Syrian and Algerian friends, that acted 
as gatekeepers, had to invite us for lunch so that he could overcome his timidity and be ready 
to take part in my research. Being very conservative, Kamal also expressed his attitude and 
viewpoint regarding mixed education and the absence of single-gender education in Algeria 
which is not the case in Syria. He believed that separating genders at the age of adolescence 
may be beneficial for students’ academic achievement and emotional balance as they will be 
in a more relaxing environment where either boys or girls can express themselves more openly 
without having to worry about gender stereotyping from the opposite gender [… fi Souriya mn 
el ibtidaei ila el jamie’i ma fi ikhtilat bin el jinssayn bas houn fi ikhtilat mn el ibtidaei. Fi 
Souriya … la ano hada el wakt li yatakawan fih el maraa aw rajol ama houn fi el jazaeir mn el 
ibtidaei hata el jamie’i fi ikhtilat. Ana b choufa ano amr mohim jidan mn ajl istikrar el nafssi 
wa tawazoun el moyoul el jinssi…]. Female employment also seemed a taboo among the Syrian 
community. That is why my research covered only 5 females from the Syrian cohort. In this 
regard, Kamal argued that in his culture (Syrian culture), women will be more respected if they 
 185 
assume their responsibilities at home and play their roles as housewives and do not go out for 
work where males are females are mixed. Instead, it is the responsibility of men to work and 
earn money and women are only supposed to look after their children. Kamal described ‘the 
Algerian lifestyle to be similar to the European lifestyle and saw that the people in Algeria are 
westernised [… Fi el jazaei’ir, chway mota’atirin bi Europa min nahiyat el hayat wa tarikat el 
aych …]’. Amar, like Kamal, was worried because his sister has been “algerianised” especially 
after she started her university studies in Algeria. He stated that, ‘she started thinking like 
Algerian women and wanted to finish her studies and work … the majority of women in Algeria 
are employed and they work in all sectors …, however, in Syria not many women work and 
even if they work, they have certain sectors where they can work … not in all sectors like 
Algerian women… [Kayen ikhtilaf okhar ano horiyat el mar ‘a f jazaeiir aktar mn horiyat el 
mar’aa souriya. Matalan mn nahiyat choghl al mar’aa, houn b jazaeiir fi ktir nissae ychtaghlo 
bas fi souriya la, klal li ykhdmo w houn tssibihom ykhdmo kolchi ama fi souriya, kayen mihan 
mo’ayana li ykhdmohom. Ana okhti jat sghira mn souriya, kan kolchi sahel fi lmadrassa, krat 
houn b jazaeiir w el an takra ma’ahom fi ljami’aa w sar ‘andha nafs tafkir el jazaeiiri … tani 
hiya haba tkhdom kifhom …]. Kamal and Amar’s viewpoints explained why my female 
participants from the Syrian cohort namely Lara, Wissal, Wafae, Nirmin and Nora did not agree 
to take part into the present research unless their male siblings approved their participation. 
 
5.5. Concluding Remarks 
 
This chapter discussed key areas of research design that are crucial in generating and analysing 
data. It also provided a detailed overview about the fieldwork and how it was conducted, 
research setting (place and time), gaining access to the cohorts and gaining their consent, and 
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ethical issues that I faced when approaching participants from both the Syrian and Algerian 
cohort. Additionally, I have provided a detailed profile of research participants but still 
respected their private and personal identities by ensuring anonymity and confidentiality. In 
addition, I have highlighted important research aspects which are the perceptions of my 
research participants towards me as a female researcher and how I was positioned as both an 


























Anis (49), a staff member at the level of the Algerian Red Crescent, expressed Algeria’s 
obligation to unconditionally support Syrians. He stated:  
 
‘we have to help our Syrian guests and brothers that chose to come to Algeria due to war and instability in their 
country… for instance, every year during Ramadhan the Algerian Red Crescent organises collective Iftar (a 
ceremony to break fast) … the reason we do this is to make our Syrian brothers feel like home […nahna lazem 
‘alina ana nsa’ed el ikhwa wa doyouf souriyin souriyin li ijaw ‘adna b hokm dorouf li ymoro biha haliyan fi 
baladhom … matalan fi Ramadhan dayman l hilal el ahmar el jazaei’ri ynadam iftar jamaei’I li el ikhwa souriyin 
li khalk jaw maykhalihom yhasso anhom fi ghorba]’. 
 
During our interview, I wondered why Anis addressed Syrians as either ‘guests’ or ‘brothers’ 
rather than using words like refugee, asylum seeker, or immigrant. He explained 
 
‘… in our religion, Islam, we do not have the word ‘refugee’… Whether a Muslim or a non-Muslim, as Muslims 
we must help everyone that is in need … Besides, Syrians are privileged: they are our brothers in Arabité and 
Islam and we have a strong kinship since El Amir Abdu El-Kader went to Syria during the French colonisation in 
Algeria …’ [nahna fi dina el islami lhanif, makanch kalmet laji’e … sawa’e kan moslim awla machi moslim nahna 
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wajbna n’awen ki ykouno b haja lina. W zid b zyada hadou souriyin khawtna … rana kaml arab w moslimin w 
manensawch ano el Amir Abdelkader lama ach fi souriya khalkat rawabit amika bayn cha’ebayn]. 
 
Anis’s narrative reflects the state’s discourse of hospitality that is mostly based on maintaining 
ethnic, religious and historical relations between Algeria and Syria. One of the limitations of 
Algerian hospitality, is that it does not offer a legal status and does not guarantee any legal, 
social or civil rights by law to Syrian displaced people in Algeria. Instead, it offers privileges 
at a societal level. Some of my Syrian participants such as Wael did not see the fact of showing 
acts of hospitality as important to him. According to him, in the name of Islam, historical ties 
and Arabité, Syrians should not be considered as foreigners and should not be excluded from 
enjoying legal status in Algeria.  
 
This chapter explores what Algerianness, as a socio-cultural, religious and a political entity, 
has offered to Syrian displaced people, particularly during the first phase of migration from 
2011 to 2014. The next chapter (chapter 7) will focus on the second phase between 2015 until 
the present which has been dominated by a discourse of security and state sovereignty.  In the 
present chapter, I will discuss the norms of hospitality and humanitarian support in Algeria and 
the state’s strategy to manage the flow of Syrians since the start of the Syrian civil war in 2011. 
Even though Algeria is a signatory to the refugee convention of 1951 and agreed on its 1963 
and 1967 protocols in 1963, Algeria, to date, has not legislated for an official national 
mechanism of refugees and asylum seekers yet (UNHCR Global Appeal, 2010-2011, p. 08). 
Instead, Algeria’s approaches and strategies of managing the flow of refugees have been 
constantly changing depending on social circumstances, security threats, and mass migration. 
Data collected during fieldwork revealed that the state’s discourses, practices and approaches 
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in dealing with the flow of Syrian displaced people can be divided into two main phases. The 
first phase lasted between 2011 until December 2014; the second phase started in January 2015 
and lasted until the present. Ayman from the Syrian cohort explains the change in state’s 
approaches and legal procedures in managing the flow of displaced people to Algeria. He 
argued: 
 
‘… Before the Syrian civil war in 2011, for Syrians, coming to Algeria was a matter of just purchasing a flight 
ticket and having a valid Syrian passport. Once we, Syrians, arrive to Algeria, we used to receive a resident permit 
of 3 months. If, however, we want to stay more, we should contact the Algerian Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
apply for a long-residence permit that is valid for 2 years and is renewable … I myself used to come before the 
Syrian war to Algeria for business purposes … After the start of the Syrian civil war in 2011, Syrians needed to 
have a sponsor or a guarantor before entering Algeria. This sponsor / guarantor can be a Syrian resident in Algeria 
or an Algerian citizen … On 01/01/2015, it was a surprise, ( said in a sarcastic way), Algeria denied entry to non-
visa holders coming from Syria… [kabl el harb fi souriya, kan lkodoum ila jazaei’ir mayhtaj ay chi, bas nakhod 
ta’chira ticket tayara w njib passport salih lfa’aliya w w ndkhol houn la jazaei’ir bi doun mochkila … fi halat ma 
kan min lmohtamal ani abrok aktar mn 3 chohour, brouh la solotat lma’niya mitl wizarat dakhiliya w atlob ikama 
da’ima saliha modat ‘amayn… ana matalan kabl el harb bi souriya kount aji la jazai’ir bi gharad tijara fakat … 
ba’ed el harb asbah lazem alina nkadem bitakat iwae aw takafol min jazaei’ri aw souri mokim houn b jazaei’ir … 
fi 01/01/2015, kanet el mofaja’a, el jazaei’ir faradat el visa ala souriyin w ay wahed bi doun visa maykder ydkhol 
la jazaei’ir]’. 
 
The first phase was characterised by Algeria’s unconditional approach of hospitality and 
granting rights; the second phase, on the other hand, has been managed by the state with a 
discourse of security due to the constant threat of international terrorism to the country. The 
present chapter discusses the first phase, its characteristics, dominant state discourses, 
techniques and their rationalities. Hospitality was a dominant discourse from 2011 to December 
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2014 and remains a strategic narrative used by State officialdom to show how benevolent the 
response has been towards Syrian displaced people. This is an overtly moral narrative and it is 
used to also impose a duty on its subjects. Although hospitality seems ‘a gift relationship’ 
(Komter & Van Leer, 2012, p. 07) offered by the Algerian state to Syrians, this chapter explains 
how it is a strategy of subjectivation.  
 
The present chapter will elaborate the state’s strategy of granting unconditional rights in the 
name of hospitality. The latter is primarily linked to a moral duty of Algeria towards Syrian 
brothers and sisters. What Algeria considers as a moral duty and a generous offer is traced back 
to historical relations that started since 1855 between Algeria and Syria and between Algerians 
and Syrians since the exile of one of the iconic leaders of resistance during colonial Algeria to 
Damascus, Syria, El Amir Abdu El-Kader El Jazaei’ri. Asma, the state official at the level of 
the Foreigners’ Office, confirms that: 
 
‘ …Syrians and Algerians share the same history … when our leader, El Amir Abdu El-Kader went to Damascus, 
he lived there with his family and his grandchildren were born there and they are both Syrians by birth and 
Algerians by naturalisation… [nahna adna tarikh mochtarak ma’a souriya lama el ka’id El Amir Abdu El-Kader 
rah la dimachk kanet fih mossahara ma’a souriyin w ahfado nwaldo tama w homa souriyin w mojanassin bi el 
jinssiya el jazaei’riya]’. 
 
In a country where culture and social values are highly dependent on religion, Algeria’s 
approach to hospitality has been driven by Islamic values and principles of unconditionally 
honouring the guest for God’s sake. ‘Islamic hospitality represents the culture and ethics of 
giving and relates to many different domains ranging from private or family relations to public 
spheres and from social-mundane interactions to sacred or religious beliefs and rituals’, El-
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Aswad confirms (2015, p. 462). ‘A guest—Muslim or non-Muslim, stranger or relative, rich 
or poor—must be received and treated with kindness, dignity, and respect’ (El-Aswad, 2015, 
p. 462). In Algeria, the approach of hospitality involves commitment to Islamic principles 
through promising a high level of dignity at a societal level and a positive public opinion to the 
Syrian displaced community, and showing tolerance when it comes to legal procedures, 
responsibilities and commitments that Syrians are expected to follow such as the renewal of 
their legal documents and respecting the national law in Algeria such as road traffic codes, 
employment laws …etc. For instance, most short-residence permit holders from the Syrian 
cohort were able to use their Syrian driving licence in Algeria with no restrictions. The state 
does not offer the possibility for Syrians to apply for an Algerian driving licence because they 
do not have legal status.     
 
This discourse has produced Syrians as “worthy guests” that deserve care but still face 
restrictions and exclusion in terms of naturalisation and legal rights. The state production of 
Syrians as guests allows them to be equally treated as Algerians at the level of healthcare, 
education and housing. They are not recognised as refugees or asylum seekers at a societal or 
a legal level. As a strategy of governing the flow of migrants, the Algerian state does not 
prevent the interference of the UNHCR in registering and managing the Syrian displaced 
community. The “guest” status allows Syrians to register with the UNHCR in Algeria which 
will make them eligible for humanitarian assistance, financial support and allows them to apply 
for asylum in another country via the UNHCR if they wish. Although the “guest” status does 
not allow Syrians to travel outside Syrian, it protects them from illegal deportation and grants 
them freedom of movement inside the Algerian national territory where they can reside and 
work.  Although the “guest” status is a right-based approach and does not draw a negative 
public opinion towards the Syrian displaced community in Algeria, it is still a biopolitical 
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decision to protect the homogeneous Algerian national identity as a political order by 
preventing full integration and restricting the possibility of naturalisation and mixed marriage 
between Algerians and Syrians. Hospitality is, indeed, a biopolitical strategy to both maximise 
and preserve the Algerian community as a political entity and control its diversity by governing 
the Syrian displaced community and granting them limited and conditional rights. Full 
unconditional integration within the scheme of Algerian citizenship and its rights seems to be 
the limit of Algerian hospitality towards Syrian displaced people.   
 
6.1. Hospitality: A Gift Relationship or A Moral Duty? and the Production 
of “Guests” and “the Suffering Body” 
 
By the mid of April 2017, Algerian national newspapers (Abd el Razak. B, 2017) and the 
world’s newspapers (Human Rights Watch, 2017; Amnesty Press, 2017) announced that a 
group of Syrians were trapped in the desert between the Algerian and Moroccan land-borders. 
National and international news providers disputed the number of trapped Syrians from 41 to 
55 people (Abd el Razak. B, 2017; Human Rights Watch, 2017; AFP, 2017; Middle East 
Monitor, 2017; UNHCR, 2017). The group of vulnerable Syrians included men, women 
(pregnant and breast-feeding women), children and babies. Deeply concerned about the 
deteriorating conditions at the borders and the potential risks associated with them, the United 
Nation urged both countries, namely, Algeria and Morocco, to assume responsibility towards 
these vulnerable refugees (UNHCR, 2017). Puzzled by the Syrians’ story and their journey to 
reach the Algerian-Moroccan borders, the incident resulted in a diplomatic crisis between both 
countries. Both Algeria and Morocco rejected these vulnerable people in the name of security. 
Given the unstable diplomatic relations with the Kingdom of Morocco, the Algerian state 
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denounced Morocco’s reaction towards Syrian refugees as leverage during this unfortunate 
situation (AFP, 2017; Middle East Monitor (MEMO), 2017; Bouteldji, 2017).  
After Morocco refused to share responsibility and to comply with the international legislation 
of refugees, the tragic experience of trapped displaced Syrians that had lasted for two months 
(from April to June 2017) ended up with the Algerian state granting them access into its 
territory in the name of hospitality of brothers and sisters in faith, although the Algerian 
political and immigration scenes have been governed by the state discourses of security and 
borders’ control since 2015. Following the state’s decision, Sai’ida Ben Hbilass, the 
chairwoman of the Algerian Red Crescent, declared that the group of displaced Syrians were 
taken to the closest border province, Béchar, where they would be hosted in the state guest 
centres. Ben Hbilass further added that the Algerian Red Crescent was in charge of providing 
immediate healthcare and necessary health checks to Algeria’s guests, Syrians, especially to a 
pregnant woman that needed intensive care after spending two months in the desert (Bouteldji, 
2017).  
 
The group of Syrian displaced people, like all Syrians that sought refuge in Algeria have 
received free and unconditional access to social rights, including access to healthcare, 
education, and housing / accommodation. However, the Algerian act of hospitality towards this 
group of Syrians had limitations; it did not grant them legal status such as refugee status, 
resident permits or potential access to Algerian citizenship; constraints and conditions in terms 
of employment still remain. The declaration of the state official, Sai’ida Ben Hbilass, at the 
level of the Algerian Red Crescent labelled Syrians as “guests” and not as refugees or illegal 
migrants. As such, the relationship between Algeria / Algerians and Syria / Syrians is a host-
guest relationship. Although Algeria’s approach of accepting, managing and governing Syrians 
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has been strongly led by security and borders’ control since January 2015 in response to the 
country’s constant security threats (see chapter 07), the state considers saving lives of trapped 
Syrians as a moral duty and a generous offer towards brothers and sisters in faith following a 
discourse of hospitality discourse that dominated the Algerian political scene from 2011 until 
December 2014.  
 
If I am to briefly analyse this scene and discourses that were delivered within this situation 
from a perspective of governmentality, I could say that the dominant discourse is a discourse 
of hospitality that is explicitly driven by an emotional charge of brotherhood that seeks to unify 
Algerians and Syrians in Islam and Arabness. Since power works at the level of ‘micro-relation 
[s], capillaries and everyday practices’ (Clegg et al. 2006, 254; see also Foucault 1989 in Seeck, 
2011, p. 05), the state technologies through which the state’s discourse of hospitality and its 
political programmes function can be observed in the provision of accommodation in guest 
centres in the city of Béchar, in the provision of unconditional healthcare and education …etc. 
This discourse categorises the group of Syrians as Algeria’s guests and not as asylum seekers 
or refugees. The fact that the Algerian state took so long (from April to June 2017) to respond 
to this humanitarian crisis can tell a lot about how its governmentality functioned at the time. 
This incident coincided with a new strategy, approach and state discourse of security and border 
control that has been adopted since January 2015. These Syrians were associated with a 
“potential threat” to national security as they could have been exploited by terrorist groups or 
traffickers at the borders of Algeria with its unstable neighbouring countries until they proved 
the opposite. Since the state did not identify any potential threat to its national security after 
accepting the group, and after already gaining access to the Algerian territory, the exceptional 
Syrians were labelled as “guests and brothers”. From a biopolitical governmentality viewpoint, 
these Syrians were accepted based on their vulnerability and biological needs especially 
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because among the group there were children and a pregnant woman who had been trapped at 
the borders for 2 months and desperately in need of medical intervention. Having said this, this 
is a case of refugees gaining “bio-legitimacy” (Schindel, 2016, p.22), which means that their 
sick bodies became the most effective resource of gauging vulnerability according to Algerian 
biopolitical logic. The production of these Syrians as vulnerable subjects or typifying the 
suffering body is clear.  These refugee bodies were deemed legitimate for biopolitical reasons 
and their health conditions have turned their bodies into ‘social resources’ / ‘suffering body’ 
(Schindel, 2016, p. 22) that the Algerian state and its rationalities (security, biopolitics) 
recognise and legitimise. In their case, the matter is not about being useful for work because 
they are not often granted social rights to legal employment unless working with an Algerian 
citizen. Producing a ‘passive and a suffering figure’ belongs to a ‘humanitarian logic’, Schindel 
claims (2016, p. 22). The humanitarian logic produces refugees in terms of ‘bare life’; this 
means that these lives are exposed to danger and therefore need protection ‘for the sake of their 
biological survival’ (Schindel, 2016, p.22). The humanitarian practice can be perceived as form 
of modern biopolitics that separates between what is inside and outside the qualified life 
(Schindel, 2016, p.22). About the humanitarian government of refugees, Mavelli (2017) argues 
that the humanitarian government of refugees is a form of the state biopolitical governmentality 
which is designed to govern both the displaced community and the local population by 
including ‘valuable lives’ and excluding ‘unworthy lives’ according to their capacity to boost 
the emotional and biological well-being of the host population.   
 
In Algeria, the socio-political scene is where paradoxical state discourses of hospitality, 
security and humanitarianism meet. My research data shows that these practices have not been 
helpful for Syrians to create and stabilise their identities of being either asylum seekers, 
refugees, guests, brothers in faith and Arabness, illegal migrants, or economic migrants. As 
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such, there is a confusion between state policies and state practices when managing the flow 
of Syrian displaced people. 
 
6.1.1. The Production of “Guests”: Historical ties Vs Citizenship Rights   
 
In his essay The Subject and Power, Foucault argued that subjects and power cannot be 
separated because it is power that makes subjects or ‘the way by which human beings are made’ 
(Foucault, 2000e, 326-327 in Seeck, 2011, p. 05). ‘Both subject and subjectivity are historically 
produced through certain discourses and certain desires’ (Dreyfus 1999; Cooper & Burrell 
1988, Foucault 2000b in Seeck, 2011, p. 05). Given the arbitrary nature of host-guest 
relationship, a guest can remain for a limited period of time but cannot be included into the 
host community. Darling (2009, pp. 656, 657) argues that ‘for Derrida (1999), the ethical 'law 
of hospitality' must always be subsumed within conditional `laws of hospitality', which 
translate ethical demand into practical concerns and conditions: for to be hospitable is to never 
question the guest and to be surprised by his or her arrival’. In this regard, Rozakou (2012, p. 
565) also adds that ‘hospitality, seen in the form of a gift, includes the stranger in the social 
world of the host, though it is temporary and a conditional inclusion in which the host holds 
the monopoly on agency’. As previously mentioned, if hospitality is meant to be conditional 
and temporary, this chapter raises several questions from a perspective of power-knowledge 
relation including: For how long can Syrians be “guests”? Can Algeria’s guests, Syrians, 
receive long-term / permanent inclusion into the Algerian setting? Will “guests” be qualified 
for the status of “citizens” by granting them citizenship and political participation in the 
Algerian context? Why do Algerian state officials often use the word “guest” as opposed to 
“refugee” or “immigrants”? Does the “guest” status grant Syrians any rights within the 
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Algerian context and what might be the limitations associated with this status? What might be 
the state’s policy and ideology behind labelling Syrians as “guests”? In order to answer these 
questions, I will rely on data collected from both Algerian and Syrian respondents. Given the 
absence of an asylum / refugee mechanism in Algerian law and the ambiguity of the state 
policies regarding refugeehood, documenting life-experiences of my research informants in 
Algeria would reflect the strategies adopted by the state for managing the flow of Syrians since 
2011. I will do this by analysing how the discourse of hospitality is built through its 
technologies and state rationalities of citizenship and how Syrians are produced as “guests” 
based on power-knowledge relations.   
 
It is worth mentioning that the phenomena of migration (legal / illegal) and refugeehood 
(including asylum) are not common and Algeria’s experience in managing flows of refugees 
and immigrants (excluding economic migrants) is still in its infancy compared to the experience 
of the western world (Europe, UK, USA, Canada …). After the Syrian civil uprising that started 
in 2011 against Assad’s regime, Algeria received approximately fifty thousand displaced 
Syrians (asylum seekers, refugees and immigrants). The UN has urged the Algerian state to 
enact a national law, but Algeria has not set up a mechanism of asylum and refugeehood. As 
previously stated, the first wave of immigration of Syrians (2011 to December 2014) was 
governed by principles and ethics of hospitality that took into consideration historical ties 
between Algerians and Syrians since the French colonisation in Algeria and the aspects of 
common origins in terms of faith (Islam) and Arabité (Arabness / Pan-Arabism). However, 
state technologies of hospitality discourse embody a state rationality based on nationalism, 
colonial and post-colonial Algerian citizenship, biopolitics of the local community (Algerians).  
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As with most of my Syrian respondents, who seemed very knowledgeable about the shared 
history between Algeria and Syria, Kamal mentioned a strong feeling of kinship originating 
since El Amir Abdu El-Kader el Jazaei’ri lived in Syria in the 19th century. He emphasised how 
mixed marriages between Syrians and grandchildren of El Amir Abdu El-Kader el Jazaei’ri 
have bonded both peoples and granted them citizenship. Unfortunately for Kamal, since he 
failed to prove that the first ancestor of his father’s family is El Amir Abdu El-Kader el 
Jazaei’ri, he could not be naturalised in Algeria. However, he alluded to some of his friends’ 
successful stories of naturalisation because they were able to provide the necessary documents 
to receive Algerian citizenship by descent.    
 
Although, 53-years old Rabie stopped schooling at an early stage, his memory did not fail him 
to remember his old days at his primary school in Syria. He remembered when pupils were 
encouraged to recite both the Algerian and the Syrian anthem before class every morning. Still 
about his education and schooling in Syria, Rabie remembered that they were taught about El 
Amir Abdu El-Kader el Jazaei’ri and Abd El-Hamid Ibn Badiss. Both figures were introduced 
in Syrian schools as loyal men that fought for the independence of their country and promoted 
moderate Islamic values by rejecting religious extremism, Rabie stated. Additionally, on my 
first meeting with another Syrian informant, Riyadh; he recounted very interesting stories about 
the life of El Amir Abdu El-Kader El Jazaei’ri in his exile in Syria that his grandfather used to 
tell him about. One of the stories discussed the fact when El Amir Abdu el-Kader hosted and 
protected a Christian minority in his palace in Damascus when their lives were threatened. On 
the day of our interview, and as an answer to my question about what might have motivated 
Riyadh and his family to residency in Algeria, he replied: “Algerians gained a good reputation 
in terms of hospitality that they learned from their ancestors compared to other Arab nations in 
Syria’s neighbouring countries such as Lebanon, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia” [… tarikat 
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mo’aamalat el jazaei’ri la souri ahssan wa diyafa ahssan… ana sma’et tajarob asdikai’ li fi 
amakin mota’adida ; matlan asdika’i fi lobnan hakouli ano fi wad’e ma’ichi mou mnih w kaman 
fi el ordon b sabab katrat souriyin hounik w hata fi so’odiya…]. He referred to the three 
countries as unsuccessful when it comes to providing good living conditions for the Syrian 
displaced community.  
 
Amin, a shopkeeper, shared Riyadh’s sentiment of Algerian hospitality but he turned to the 
hadith traditions in contrast to the aristocratic ideal of familial descent from Abdu El-Kader 
which Rabie had learnt about in his Syrian school. For Amin, a more democratic spirit of 
fraternal kinship has to prevail: ‘None of you [truly] believes until he loves for his brother what 
he loves for himself’ (“An-Nawawi…”, 2012). True to his everyday experience working 
among Algerians, Amin cited an anecdote of ordinary generosity. Visibly moved, he recounted 
his story with a woman who offered her seat to him in a crowded bus. She welcomed him to 
Algeria as his ‘second country’ […marhba bik fi ljazaei’ir … inta fi baladak tani…]. This is 
interesting for a number of reasons. The structure of feeling, of patriotic sentiment for one’s 
country extends beyond territorial space; it is as if the concerns of state politicians -the 
discourse of territorial integrity- in the face of terrorist threats had never touched the lives of 
ordinary people. The pre-nationalist mode of moral governmentality, ‘the government of 
souls’, as Foucault puts it (Foucault, 1997, p.81), has no need for the state. This gift of 
hospitality is not only afforded to men by men, as the female passenger’s welcoming remark 
to Amin shows.     
 
Others from the Syrian cohort considered mutual and reciprocal hospitality as a moral duty that 
Algerians owe to Syrians. Wael, a deliveryman, believed that the historical moment in 1855 
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that marked the exile of El Amir Abdu El-Kader el Jazaei’ri in Damascus, Syria, was a favour 
done by Syrians to an Algerian fighter who was forced to leave his country by a colonial power 
but welcomed by Syrian society. In his comment about the aspects of hospitality within 
Algerian society towards non-Algerians, Wael criticised the new approach adopted by state 
authorities to manage the flow of Syrian refugees. He was disappointed because he did not 
expect that ‘as a Syrian, that was supposed to be treated as a brother to Algerians in Arabité 
and Islam, would need to go to the Foreigners’ Office (Maktab El Adjanib) every 45 days to 
renew his short-residence permit, where non- Arab foreigners like Americans, French and 
Chinese have to go to renew their residence-permits’ [… min nahiyat iltizamat el mafrouda 
alina min nahiyat dawla el jazai’iriya, lazem nmaded el khatem taba’e el ikama el mo’akata 
kol 45 youm fi maktab el ajanib. Nahna souriyin, nahna Arab w yeba’atouna ‘ala maktab el 
ajanib! nrouh ma’a kol el ajanib: el amriki, l fransi, sini … yekhtmo jawazat safarhom, nrouho 
nahna kaman nekhtom honik …]. Wael’s critique targets the state’s policy and its bureaucratic 
procedures in dealing with Syrians in terms of their legal status and administrative issues. For 
him, hospitality means a well-defined legal status and travel documentations (long-residence 
permit instead of a short-residence permit) which will give him unconditional access to 
employment, and the right to family reunification. Although the Algerian state guaranteed the 
freedom of movement within its territory, freedom of mobility outside Algeria is still restricted.  
 
Data from the Syrian cohort revealed that hospitality, to them, means inclusion into two main 
aspects. The first involves achieving social inclusion and unconditional welcoming; the second 
and most important aspect was legal integration via offering long-residence permit or Algerian 
citizenship, granting unconditional / unlimited access to social rights (healthcare, education, 
housing and employment) and the exercise of the freedom of movement outside Algeria. In 
order to gather more data and details regarding the state technologies that embody the political 
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and social programme of hospitality, I asked the state official at the level of the Foreigners’ 
Office (Maktab El Adjanib) in central Algiers, Asma. Asma, previously a lawyer with nearly 
twenty years’ experience in the Foreigners’ office, also referred to the shared history between 
both Algerians and Syrians. To her, Algeria’s approach to hospitality covers the following 
aspects: insuring social inclusion and integration of Syrians within the local society [… el 
indimaj fi el mojtama’e el jazaei’ri …], freedom of mobility within the Algerian territory [… 
horiyat tanakol fi el Jazaei’ir…] and granting rights (healthcare, education, housing, 
employment) in order to facilitate the life of Syrians in Algeria, tolerance and generosity [… 
takabol, tassmoh wa el karam wa hosn diyafa], non-discrimination and justice [… adam el 
tamyiz wa el adl …], no detention or deportation [… la ihtijaz wela ikaf,  la tarhil …], and 
guaranteeing safety and security within Algeria [… salama wa el amn ta’ahom fi el jazae’ir…]. 
Indeed, achieving social justice reflects the equalities in the use and implementation of power. 
Regarding the duties of Syrians, Asma argued that Syrians, in turn, are expected to show respect 
to the state’s internal law. However, these rights and main aspects stated by the state official, 
Asma, seem vital and legitimate rights for a refugee and should be highly respected by all 
signatory state members of the UN Refugee Convention when hosting and receiving refugees 
(UNHCR, 1967).  
 
The answer provided by the state official gave important clues about the state technologies of 
hospitality. These technologies including duties and rights, levels of justice, dignity, tolerance, 
and inclusion / integration (legal and social) had to be discussed with my Syrian participants. 
Due to a lack in state’s reports and official documents that may have helped in deciphering 
Algeria’s strategies to manage the flow of the Syrian population and guarantee the rights of 
these displaced people, these discussions aimed at bridging the gap between the state’s 
intentions and their implementations in daily lives of Syrians. Additionally, I had to talk to 
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Algerian social welfare providers, namely, healthcare providers, teachers, and employers to 
identify social rights that Syrian displaced people enjoy.  
 
6.2. State Technologies of Hospitality and Integration: Rights and 
Bureaucratic Challenges  
 
For displaced people – asylum seekers, refugees and forced migrants – the best destination is 
where successful and accessible integration policies along with effective and permanent 
protection systems are offered and guaranteed by the host government. Hopkins and United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees -Bureau for Europe- (2013) state that there is no 
common definition of a complex term like integration / inclusion. They further confirm that 
the term is often taken subjectively because the state may perceive it from an angle that is 
totally different from that of the displaced community and even from that of the host 
community. The German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, for instance, suggests 
that integration is a long-term process which aims at including everyone into society on 
condition that they learn German, abide with the law and its constitution, and accept the 
normative values of the German national community (Hopkins and United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees -Bureau for Europe-, 2013). In the UK, Ager and Strang sum up 
‘integration in the following indicators and the level of their accessibility; employment, 
housing, education, health equivalent to the receiving society, through social connections and 
connections with services of the state, and through acquiring linguistic and cultural competence 
and a sense of security and stability’ (Hopkins and United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees -Bureau for Europe-, 2013, p. 14). The Canadian migration policy, on the other hand, 
defines integration as a ‘two-way process which encourages a mutual accommodation and 
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adjustment by both newcomers and the larger society’ (Hopkins and United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees -Bureau for Europe-, 2013, p. 14). At a legal level, for instance, 
refugees should be entitled to freedom of movement, access to education and healthcare, to the 
labour market, to valid travel documentation and the ability to reunify with their families. At 
the final stage of legal inclusion, refugees should receive their permanent-residence permits. 
At an economic level, refugees should be given the opportunity to participate in the economic 
aspect of life. Cultural and society-related aspects are ideally reciprocal acts of interaction, 
accommodation and contribution between refugees and the host community that should be 
governed by principles of diversity, openness, equality and non-discrimination or exploitation 
despite differences (Hopkins & United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees -Bureau for 
Europe, 2013, p. 15).  
 
The UNHCR confirms that there is a fine line between integration and assimilation; the first is 
an interactive process where ‘adaptation’ and ‘welcome’ are guaranteed from both refugees 
and the host society at the legal, economic and socio-cultural levels, the latter, on the other 
hand, refers to a conditional inclusion that requires from the refugee to abandon their own 
beliefs and adopt the host community’s ideas and values  (Hopkins & United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees -Bureau for Europe , 2013, pp. 14, 15). The strategies of 
integration adopted by Germany, the UK and Canada are different, and they depend on 
migration policies and principles of each country based on their political and social hierarchies. 
According to their conceptual definitions of integration, I believe that the policies designed by 
the German and the British governments are assimilationist rather than about integrating 
refugees. An assimilationist view would consider the newcomer as an outsider who needs to 
prove their acquisition of the normative values, linguistic and cultural competences in order to 
be included and maybe naturalized. In contrast, the Canadian perspective puts both the benefits 
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of the newcomer and those of local society at the same equal level in order to achieve harmony 
between both groups. The conceptualisation offered by the Canadian government is based on 
mutual accommodation between both groups, host society and refugees regardless their 
religious, cultural or linguistic backgrounds. 
 
As previously mentioned, the state official at the level of the Foreigners’ Office in Algiers, 
Asma, argued that the state technologies of hospitality involve integration into social rights of 
citizenship. However, my research data from the Syrian cohort revealed that the Algerian 
approach in granting rights has been unconditional / unlimited and equal to Syrians as 
Algerians in terms of healthcare, education and housing. Access to employment, however, has 
been selective, conditional and dependent to legal status of Syrians and the legal 
documentations they have. In fact, ‘certain technologies come to serve different functions 
depending on the specific rationalities they articulate with’ (Valverde, 1996, p. 358 in Lippert, 
1999, p. 296). Granting conditional access to employment serves a state rationality of 
protecting Algerian citizenship. I believe from a perspective of biopolitical governmentality, 
since unconditional access would pave the way to a long-residence permit and therefore to 
possibly the acquisition of Algerian citizenship, the state is restricting its access to better 
control the Syrian community and care for the host community (Algerians). Due to the nature 
of Algerian citizenship which is highly governed by maintaining loyalty and belonging to 
Algeria as a state and its people, Syrians have been granted conditional access to employment 
in order to better manage the diversity of Algerianness. This idea will be elaborated in chapter 
6. This section and sub-sections will discuss the fact of granting rights to healthcare, education 
and housing as a technology of state’s approach of hospitality.  
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6.2.1 Healthcare and the Understanding of a “Suffering Body”  
 
From independence (1962) onward, the Algerian national security system adopted an 
egalitarian plan for healthcare provision where ‘hospitalization, and outpatient care is equal 
and free to all Algerians’ (Metz, 1994, p.118). Within a biopolitical logic that aims to enhance 
the well-being of Algerians, these top-down policies were based on the principles of ‘the 
welfare state as a form of government in which the state plays a critical role in the protection 
and promotion of the social and economic wellbeing of its citizens (Basok & Ilcan, 2013, p. 
67)’. The World Health Organization (2002, p. 04) documented that after the economic crisis 
in 1980s, the Algerian health insurance system moved from an economic to a social welfare 
model in order to ensure ‘collective security, social protection, social solidarity, and social 
citizenship’ (Basok & Ilcan, 2013, p. 68). Karshenas and Moghadam add that the Algerian 
social protection policy covers the following: ‘social security’, ‘social assistance’, ‘social net 
allowance and home living social assistance’, ‘family allowance’, ‘student allowance and low-
income housing assistance’, ‘social assistance to the elderly, the mentally ill, and to children’ 
(2006, p. 93). The Algerian health insurance system has extended to both employed and 
unwaged Algerians through two main schemes, ‘CNAS and CASNOS’ respectively (WHO, 
2002, p. 04). In terms of medical insurance, most Algerians receive different reimbursements 
from the supplementary Health Insurance Company within the scheme of CHIFA and through 
their CHIFA cards. Beneficiaries receive from 80% to 100% coverage of costs according to 
the type of illnesses they have, their status. Employed people still receive their allowance 
during sick leaves (WHO, 2002, pp. 05, 06). Generally, foreign workers and foreign students 
in Algeria are entitled to free healthcare treatment at public hospitals and are eligible for health 
insurance as well. Their eligibility to health insurance varies depending on the insurance 
provided by their employers or companies they belong to. By contrast, undocumented 
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immigrants and refugees, although entitled to free healthcare service, may face challenges in 
terms of health insurance and reimbursements of their medications, as they do not hold CHIFA 
cards. Even though there is no refugee national mechanism, all Syrians are entitled to equal 
and free healthcare treatment at public hospitals regardless their status (documented migrant, 
undocumented migrant, short-residence permit holders, long-residence holders, people 
registered with UNHCR).  
 
From a top-down perspective, Asma, the state representative from the Foreigners’ Office in 
Algiers on April 25th 2018, confirmed that ‘the Algerian social welfare policy offers an 
egalitarian support to all Syrians, without any exception, just as all Algerians in terms of 
welfare rights, including healthcare services’ […bi nisba ila ria’aya sihiya, kamel souriyin bi 
doun istitnae andhom el hak fiha w yrouho l mostachfayat el dawla mitlhom mitl el Jazaei’iriyin 
a kamel bla massarif … mitlhom mitl el Jazaei’ri nafs el hala …]. At practical level and in real 
life situations, Algerian healthcare providers in public hospitals confirmed that the application 
of the state instructions of providing healthcare to Syrians free and equal to Algerians, is a 
must. When I went to the main hospital in Algiers - Mustapha Pacha - I walked into the 
emergency department where I noticed a busy scene with patients and doctors. I was not able 
to distinguish Syrians and Algerians through the way they have been treated in the hospital. On 
November 25th, 2018 in Mustapha Pacha hospital, I met a general healthcare practitioner with 
nearly ten years of experience, Tarik (40), who confirmed that  
 
‘all Syrians have been enjoying free healthcare in the state public hospitals since their first arrival in 2011. 
However, not all of them have CHIFA cards that grant them health insurance. This means that they cannot receive 
reimbursements to their medications compared to those whose Algerian employers have offered them health 
insurance’ […Lakin machi kamel souriyin ‘andhom el daman el ijtimaei’i bi istithnae li ykhdmo fi charikat 
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jazaei’iriya li hya amnthom ijtimaeiyan w andhom hata bitakat CHIFA li tkhali dawla tsa’adhom min nahiyat el 
dawae wa tkadamlhom tae’widat bi had el khoussous…]. 
 
Interestingly, Tarik mentioned an exception for ‘most vulnerable people with chronic diseases 
such as diabetes, blood pressure and even pregnant women and claimed that they are entitled 
to free medications even if they do not have CHIFA cards’ […lakin  kayen kadalik li ‘andhom 
el amrad el mozmina mitl sokari, daght dam, nissae el hawamil … hadou ‘and ma yjiw l 
mostachfa na’atouhom dawae ta’ahom bi el majan…]. After our meeting, Tarik invited me to 
visit the delivery suite in Mustapha Pacha hospital to hear more about the experience of 
pregnant women and the challenges they may have faced. I met Hassiba (60), a midwife with 
more than 30 years of experience in the maternity department in Mustapha Pacha. Just like 
Tarik, Hassiba did not hesitate to take part in my research, however, she was not comfortable 
with voice recording. For her, the well-being of the patients and staff members in the 
department is very important and should be respected by everyone. She said this while pointing 
at a bilingual notice on the wall which says “no smoking, respect our patients, keep silent, 
please” in both Arabic and French [el rajae la li tadkhin, ihtarimo mardana, iltazimo samt; ne 
pas fumer, garder le silence, respecter nos patients SVP].  Hassiba confirmed that ‘the maternity 
department has been continuously receiving Syrian women since 2011’. She assured that ‘they 
are treated equally as Algerian women’. Bearing in mind what Dr Tarik informed me about the 
reimbursement of medication, Hassiba also affirmed that ‘all pregnant women are entitled to 
free medication along with their newborns because they are the most vulnerable’ [… souriyat 
andhom nafs el hokouk fi ria’aya sihiya fi had el masslaha kima el jazaei’iriyat w awladhom 




The Algerian healthcare system did not appear to treat Syrians equally and research data 
revealed nuances in care and in gauging vulnerability. I remembered on March 10th, 2018 in 
Bab Zouar, Algiers, when I met Rabie, whose story was very moving. Rabie was a very 
welcoming man of 53 years old and a father of three children. Rabie was an example of a father 
who has been working hard for his family and the future of his children. I asked him about the 
Algerian healthcare system, and I could tell that he was not very satisfied with the services he 
received although they are free. Having an autistic son, Rabie expressed his frustrations about 
his son’s spectrum disorder and about not being able to provide medications for his son and 
being unable to cover the fees of his son’s private cognitive behavioural therapist. In fact, it is 
not only the case of Syrians, but autistic children of Algerian nationality also still receive 
limited support and the state’s strategy of looking after this category of patients is widely 
critiqued by doctors, civil society, and Algerian associations. However, being self-employed 
with an expired Syrian passport that was not renewed by the Syrian consulate in Algiers, Rabie 
seemed very concerned because he was not eligible to receive a CHIFA card that may allow 
him to receive support and reimbursements for his son’s medications as most Algerians 
possibly do. Within the state’s conceptualisation of a suffering body, Rabie’s autistic son, 
unlike pregnant women and people with chronic illnesses, did not fit into the state’s 
understanding of vulnerability and therefore did not receive a CHIFA card to help him with his 
medications and consultations with his cognitive behavioural therapist.  
 
In addition to the challenges of health insurance and CHIFA cards that Rabie has mentioned, 
the most challenging aspect for Syrian women is when they had to face the state’s bureaucratic 
procedures, administrative errors, and paperwork. Hassiba shared a very frequent scenario that 
has been occurring with pregnant couples which is the case of Syrian couples that are unable 
to provide proofs of their identity or their marriage contracts in order to register their babies 
 209 
and issue them registration certificates from the hospital. These certificates of registration are 
necessary in registering the new-born at the Syrian consulate in Algiers and in applying for a 
Syrian passport. Hassiba added that 
 
‘the application of bureaucratic procedures, in such cases, are sometimes unfair because it is obvious that displaced 
people, that fled their countries due to wars, are more likely to lose everything including their identification 
documents. For their consulates in Algeria, the issue of new documents usually takes a long time than expected. 
So, both the Algerian state and the Syrian consulate are concerned and should collaborate to find solutions to these 
issues’. 
 
The scenario narrated by Hassiba is equally applied against Algerian couples. Algerian couples 
that fail to prove their legitimate marriage are more likely to face bureaucratic obstacles that 
would prevent them from registering their new-borns. What Hassiba narrated about the 
experience of Syrians can be perceived as a representation of the state’s governmentality where 
Syrian war refugees, who are most likely to have lost their personal documents during war, had 
to prove their marital status in order for their new-borns to be registered at the hospital. Prior 
to Hassiba, this issue was also raised by Fatima Zohra, a thirty-nine-year-old Algerian 
businesswoman that has committed to voluntarily providing financial, emotional and mental 
support for Syrians that fled to Algeria since 2011. Fatima Zohra also argued that the issue of 
lost papers had put Syrian couples and their babies into troubles with both the Algerian 
government and the Syrian consulate in Algiers.  
 
Fatima Zohra, whom I met on April 28th, 2018 in central Algiers, looked very independent and 
expressed her will to help Syrians in all aspects of life and whenever possible. She appreciated 
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how ‘both the Algerian state and local society have been extremely open and helpful when it 
comes to brothers and sisters coming from Syria’ [… el dawla el jazaei’iriya wa el cha’eb el 
jazaei’iri kano fi el mostawa wa istakblo w kamo b lwajib w aktar mn jihat ikhwatna mn 
Souriya …]. When talking about challenges that Syrians have faced, she mentioned the issue 
of missed documents and lost IDs and explained how this has created constraints for both 
Syrian couples and their new-borns in their daily lives. Fatima Zohra explained how hard she 
worked along with her team members in order to find solutions in such cases, especially for 
pregnant couples to prove the legitimacy of their marriage in order to register their babies. As 
a representative and an active member and a representative of three charity organisations: 
Jame’eyat Hiraae (organisation of Hiraae), Jame’eyat Akhawat el khayr (Organisation of 
Sisters’ Good Deeds) and Jame’eyat el Irchad wa el Islah (Organisation of Guidance and 
Reform), Fatima Zohra relied on lawyers in these three organisations to help Syrians solve their 
bureaucratic issues by at least requesting their marriage certificates from the Syrian consulate 
in Algiers and urge their consulate to issue them their papers. 
 
The reason why the state governmentality has offered conditional access to social welfare to 
unmarried couples is to save the moral values of the Algerian society. This is again a state 
rationality of biopolitically caring for the well-being of the local population through governing 
the Syrian community. In this regards, Fatima Zohra argued that:  
 
‘Within a conservative society like the Algerian society where peoples’ values, traditions and ethics are highly 
dependent on their faith: Islam, unmarried couples cannot have sexual relationships and babies outside marriage. 
Babies of unmarried couples or single mothers raise a cultural issue’, [… sadfna mochkil wahid w kbir, ano lama 
tkoun el maraa souriya hamil, fa hnaya bi hokm a’arafna wa ‘adatna w takalidna w mojtama’ana el mohafid, fa 
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netolbo mnha daftar el a’eili bch twlad w li ybayan ano had el tifl ja an tarik alakat zawaj chare’iya aw ghayr 
chare’iya aw tkoun hya om ‘aziba]. 
 
This state’s biopolitical governmentality, however, may result in statelessness among new 
generation of refugees whose parents were unsuccessful in providing papers to legitimate their 
marriages.  
Another facet of Algeria’s biopolitical governmentality covers its power to restrict interracial 
marriages between Algerians and Syrians. In Algeria, there are two major steps that are 
necessarily important in marriage namely: Islamic marriage and legal marriage. The first one 
can be achieved by the presence of an imam; legal marriage comes after the Islamic marriage 
is achieved and requires the presence of the couple, the girl’s father (wali el Amr) and two 
witnesses. Marriages between Syrians are allowed, and the married couple will receive a 
marriage certificate issued from the Algerian state which will help them register at the Syrian 
consulate in Algiers and request a family register (Daftar el ‘Ae’ili / Livret de Famille). 
However, mixed marriages between Syrians and Algerians are not always allowed. It is worth 
mentioning that by law, mixed marriages are not banned in Algeria. However, as a state’s 
technology to limit access to citizenship by marriage, the state has enacted exceptional informal 
restrictions against mixed couples (Algerian-Syrian couples). Leyth, a twenty-three-year-old 
Syrian man is no exception. His marriage to an Algerian female was declined because of her 
family. According to Leyth, his request was declined by the girl’s father who doubted that the 
Algerian state will legalise the marriage even if the Islamic marriage is approved. Leyth 
claimed that the state has informally stopped legalising mixed marriages between Algerians 
and Syrians especially because some Algerian women were divorced right after their Syrian 
spouse received their long-residence permits. The reason why the Algerian state restricts mixed 
marriages is again a state’s technology to discipline and administrate the life of Syrians as 
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governed subjects. These state technologies are also designed to care and preserve moral values 
and care for all aspects of life of the host population (Algerians). If the phenomenon of single 
mothers or unmarried couples having babies outside marriage is tolerated or encouraged, 
Islamic norms and values of Algerianness will be disturbed. Through these bureaucratic 
procedures, the state’s biopower has identified governing technologies and measures to 
regulate the conduct of both Algerian and non-Algerians including Syrians.  
These technologies and measures embody the state rationality of promoting Islamic ethics and 
laws that ban sexual relationships outside marriage, being pregnant outside marriage and even 
ban abortion inside or outside marriage. Although the Algerian government has not adopted 
Shari’a law as a source of its politics, the family code in Algeria is highly dependent on Islamic 
rules (see chapter 4). If mixed marriages between Syrians and Algerians were not restricted, 
the chances of Syrians claiming their rights to long-residence permits and naturalisation will 
be high. The state would face unexpected diversity in Algerian society. The act of exceptionally 
and informally banning or imposing restrictions over mixed marriages between Syrians and 
Algerians is itself a biopolitical act which aims at preserving the genetic stock and quality of 
Algerians by excluding Syrians. Leyth’s story of being unable to marry an Algerian girl 
because he is a Syrian and cannot legalise his marriage due to the state’s restrictions on mixed 
marriages is an example of this. The historical development of the Algerian national identity 
reveals that Algerianness as both a political and normative entity is exclusionary and does not 
fit into multiculturalism because it adopts one religion which is Islam as its official state 
religion. In addition to preserving values of nationalism and the nature of Algerian citizenship 
and Algerianness, the rationality behind banning mixed marriages between Syrians and 
Algerians can still be shaped thoroughly by the state discourse of security which categorises 
Syrians as “potential threats to national security”. The latter will be discussed in chapter 7. 
Within the context of how a biopolitical decision of the state can still control the diversity of 
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the governed population by granting access to those who deserve and denying access to those 
who do not (Mavelli, 2017), the state bureaucratic procedures in Algeria can still be viewed as 
biopolitical state decisions that have been adopted in order to foster and care for the Algerian 
society and preserve its Muslim identity, values of nationalism and security by controlling  the 
Syrian displaced community. 
 
6.2.2 Education as a Technology of Care and Social Integration within the 
Classroom  
 
As stated in previous chapters, in French Algeria, Arabic was considered inferior as a medium 
of education and was completely disregarded from the schools’ curriculum. After 
independence, the Algerian state adopted the policy of Arabisation as a part of Boumedienne’s 
ideology of linguistic decolonisation that would end the dominance of the French language. 
Education has played an important role in rebuilding the Algerian nation and fostering national 
pride after colonial predation and the French assimilationist attempt to eradicate all indigenous 
norms of Algerianness. The policy of Arabisation was only with the assistance of three main 
Arab countries namely, Syria, Egypt, and Iraq. These countries sent teachers of standard Arabic 
language to Algeria to boost Arabisation during Boumedienne’s presidency and re-connect 
Algerian society again to the Arab nation. Although all efforts to make the project of 
Arabisation succeeded, French still has an important status in the Algerian administrative and 
social contexts, and it is still used as a lingua franca in Algeria (European Union, 2018).  
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The Algerian constitution guarantees free education to all Algerians and is compulsory from 
the ages of 6 to 16 (UNICEF MENA Regional Office, 2015). In his reply to my email, Hocine, 
a staff member at the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research confirms that like 
home students, international students in Algeria receive free service from the state’s 
educational institutions. This covers their tuition fees, students’ allowance, healthcare and 
health insurance, accommodation and catering (Executive decrees No 10-137 related to the 
conditions of accepting foreign students / learners in Algeria and the coverage of their costs, 
2010, pp. 7-9; Hocine, February 03, 2019 personal e-mail communication). For this research, 
I did not interview school pupils or teenagers. This research included only parents whose 
children are of school age and are registered at Algerian schools, and Algerian teachers that are 
involved in teaching responsibilities towards Syrian pupils.  
 
While more than 3 million displaced Syrian children of school age do not have the opportunity 
to go to school (UNHCR, 2019), in Algeria and after talking to Asma, at the Foreigners’ Office 
in central Algiers, she confirmed that ‘all Syrians, without exception, have the right to receive 
free education in Algeria as Algerian nationals’ […bi ghad el nadar ‘ala ay chi, jami’e el atfal 
el souriyin ‘andhom el hak fi ta’elim wa da’em fi hada el majal majanan mitl el jazaei’ri …]. 
‘Although most Syrians do not have legal status in Algeria, their children still receive 
compulsory education between the ages of 6 and 16 as Algerians and receive free textbooks’, 
Asma added. Data from the Syrian cohort have shown that Syrians do not usually face problems 
or delays in accessing or resuming education in Algeria. Narratives from my Syrian 
respondents also confirmed that the Ministry of National Education facilitated the pathway of 
resuming primary and secondary education for their children in terms of registration, free 
learning materials and textbooks and free educational support such as health and wellbeing 
support mental and emotional health support services, and the like. I remember when I was at 
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Rabie’s bakery shop in Bab Zouar, his daughter, Hiba, walked in during lunch time. Hearing 
Hiba talking to her Algerian best friend, her accent did not reveal her identity as a Syrian until 
her father, Rabie, introduced her as his little daughter. Hiba and I shook hands and she was 
very fluent in Algerian Arabic that was previously very difficult for her and her family to 
understand when they first came to Algeria. Rabie’s daughter was one example of many Syrian 
pupils who have been registered at Bab Zouar middle school and were able to resume their 
studies in Algeria after they left Syria. Just like Hiba, ‘those arriving in Algeria with no proper 
identification documents and qualifications were not prevented from resuming their schooling. 
Syrian school children only needed their birth certificates from the Syrian consulate in Algiers 
in order to prove their identity and a declaration from their parents that should state their real 
level of education in Syria’, Rabie argued.  
 
One of the most critical aspects that may hinder the integration of Syrian children at schools in 
Algeria are mental health problems that they may have developed due to traumatic events they 
witnessed, persecution, displacement, and abuse. After we had lunch together, Hiba and her 
Algerian classmate left for school and her father shared her story with me. He seemed very 
thankful to the emotional and psychological support his thirteen-year-old daughter, Hiba, 
received. I was curious to know more about Hiba’s story and Rabie was very open and decided 
to share it. With tears in his eyes, he remembered when his daughter first joined school in 
Algiers, she recalled the scenario that happened to her while in Syria. Hiba witnessed the death 
of her classmates after missiles hit her school in Syria, consequently, she was suffering from a 
post-traumatic stress disorder and refused to resume her studies in Algeria. Rabie stated that 
his daughter received emotional and mental support from her school’s sociologists and 
psychologists that helped her overcome her fears and return to school in Algeria. When I saw 
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Hiba for the first time and without knowing what she went through, she was an example of 
somebody that loves life, school and enjoys every aspect of it including her classmates.  
 
While it was easier for school children to resume their studies in Algeria, ‘most Baccalaureate 
holders and university students faced challenges in pursuing their studies at Algerian 
universities because the Algerian university curriculum is based on French as a foreign 
language and the Syrian curriculum is based on English as a foreign language’ […lakin fi halat 
ma kano darssin fi el jami’aa fi Souriya, lazemlhom baccalaureat jazaei’iriya li tkhalihom 
ysajlo fi el jami’aa el jazaei’riya. Hada kamel la ano le système fi souriya wa jazaei’ir meshi 
kif kif; Matalan fi jazaei’ir le système ybaser ala el faranciya ama fi souriya ybaser ala el 
ingliziya ka lougha ajnabiya …] Asma, the state representative at the Foreigners’ office, 
argued. Very few were encouraged to apply for Baccalaureate exams and access universities 
in Algeria, and Fateh was one of them. Fateh (39), a shop owner, recounted his experience  
 
‘… as a Syrian citizen that passed the Algerian Baccalaureate exam after registering at Algiers University without 
paying tuition fees and received his student card with all the accompanying student rights and benefits, equal to 
those granted to Algerian university students. These included free catering, free university transportation, free 
healthcare and health insurance …’ [… kan andi tajroba ani darast fi el jamiaa el jazae’iriya … kadamt ala imtihan 
el baccalauréat w najat w sajalt fi el jamiaa el jazaeiriya houn b doun ay rossoum aw massarif … el iteam fi el 




6.2.2.1. The Integration of Syrian Pupils in the Classroom: The Case of 
Middle School Pupils 
 
Syrian informants in my fieldwork did not mention that they have faced major problems such 
as unwanted attention, harassment, discrimination, or any act of exclusion during the process 
of registering their children in public schools in Algeria. However, they reported linguistic 
difficulties that their children faced. Despite the official language in both Algeria and Syria is 
standard Arabic, Syrians showed linguistic difficulties in understanding Algerian dialectal 
Arabic. Coming from a different linguistic background, Syrian families shared a common 
linguistic problem when it comes to understanding vernacular Arabic in Algeria and French 
language. Kamal, for instance, shared the difficulty of his nephew (his brother’s son) in 
understanding Algerian dialect at school which was a linguistic barrier for social inclusion and 
integration. Kamal added: ‘the Algerian dialect was not easy for my nephew at school but later 
he mastered it’ […mn nahiyat ta’alim, ‘andna wild akhi yrouh l madrassa majanan w fi tashilat 
mn had nahiya hamdoullah, f awal fatra kanet logha s’iiba chway alih bas ma’a lwakt walaf 
…]. While some Syrian pupils, like Rabie’s daughter Hiba preferred to be exempt from French 
classes and attended only Arabic and English, other Syrian parents expressed their interest in 
multilingualism that the Algerian educational system offers. As such, they registered their 
children in private schools that offer French classes to help their children outside the classroom.  
 
Given the data provided by my Syrian informants and during my third research trip to Algeria 
on November 26th, 2018, I decided to pay a visit to a middle school or a secondary school 
where most Syrians in Bab Zouar sent their children. I visited a middle school in Algiers which 
was highly recommended by most Syrians living in Bab Zouar province. Once I arrived at the 
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school, I had to submit my authorisation letter that was issued by the Ministry of Higher 
Education and Scientific Research which proves my identity and what I was doing in terms of 
my research and studies. After my request had been approved by the school’s headmaster, I 
met Algerian teachers and invited them to take part in my research. Unfortunately, very few 
offered their assistance and the reason why most of them refused to participate into my research 
was because they had to finish the curriculum of the trimester before the mid of December and 
before the start of the exams and the new year break and holidays. Fares (34) was among those 
who offered their assistance and invited me to join him for a session on citizenship and 
nationality. Fares was a 3rd and 4th year-grade teacher of Civil Education, Geography and 
History.  
 
Fares introduced me as a teacher-to-be to his pupils. In the last row, I took a seat and observed 
how the session would go. In the beginning, I was not able to detect who was Algerian and 
who was Syrian because I did not notice any major differences in terms of teacher-pupil 
rapport, pupil-pupil rapport or even in terms of their linguistic performance. ‘The organisation 
of seats within the classroom was deliberately arranged by their principal teacher that made a 
Syrian pupil and an Algerian pupil sit together on the same table’, said Fares. I believe this was 
a good idea to ensure feeling of integrating and inclusion among Syrian pupils and rather than 
encouraging exclusion within the classroom. This will also provide an opportunity for Algerian 
pupils to know more about their Syrians classmates, their culture, and their linguistic 
backgrounds. My session with 3rd - year grade pupils was not fruitful and rich because of the 
subject of that session compared to that with 4th- grade pupils. After my session with his 3rd – 
year grade pupils, Fares, invited me to join him in his next session with final- year middle 
school pupils (4th grade) because the subject of this session was relevant to my research; it 
discussed subjects around the Algerian state and Algerian society and the ideal Algerian 
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citizen. Theoretically, the session covered the normative values of the Algerian society, legal 
values, the Algerian constitution and relations between state, administration and citizens. 
Before diving into the subject of the session, Fares asked his pupils to introduce themselves by 
full name and nationality so that I could recognise Syrians from Algerians. Interestingly, some 
Syrian pupils identified themselves as both Syrians and Algerians though they were not 
naturalised citizens or of naturalised parents. Just like me, I could see that Fares, their teacher, 
was astonished by their answers as well. He asked what made them identify themselves as both 
Syrians and Algerians. One of the girls expressed her love for both Syria and Algeria. Another 
girl said that she was born in Syria and she has been living in Algeria with her parents and that 
is why she feels she belongs to both countries. Interestingly, the classroom observation and 
through Syrian pupils’ answers, I concluded that Syrian pupils reflected an image of displaced 
children that were successful in integrating into the Algerian society without renouncing their 
Syrian identity and culture. This can be seen as a part of the state’s strategy of hospitality that 
aims at achieving integration rather than assimilation. The classroom atmosphere did not 
manifest any cultural or linguistic barriers, acts of social exclusion, racism or discrimination 
among peers. As a teacher of two different levels, Fares did not report any major problems or 
challenges that his Syrian pupils faced during their schooling apart from difficulties in 
understanding the Algerian dialect of Arabic at the beginning of their schooling.  
 
6.2.3 Housing and “Guest” Centres  
 
Immediately after independence, the housing sector was not defined as one of the state’s main 
priorities compared to the sectors of education and healthcare in Algeria. The reason was 
because the independent population was very limited, ‘around 12 million in 1966’ and most of 
 220 
them moved to vacant properties that were abandoned by their French / European owners 
(Metz, 1994 & Nait Saada, 2003, p. 01). Due to a significant baby boom and internal migration 
from rural to urban areas, Algeria started adopting a series of housing policies, strategies and 
reforms. Buildings in public sector reached ‘360.000 units per year between 1990 and August 
1993’ (Metz, 1994, pp. 122-123).  
 
From independence to 1990s, the housing policy changed significantly from a ‘social product 
to an economic product that became available for rental or sale purposes’ (Nait Saada, 2003, 
p. 03). The state started subsidising people with housing services according to their housing 
condition and their income. Nait Saada (2003, p. 07) confirms that the 21st century’s Algerian 
housing policy is in a dilemma that can be traced back to the 1990s during which Algeria 
witnessed an economic and political instability due to shortage in financial support. Another 
reason is because politicians and decision makers did not address the crisis and could not 
develop efficient policies to meet the expected objectives and higher demand due to a 
population growth of 1.9 per annum with 70% of the whole population living in cities (Africa 
Housing Finance yearbook, 2018, p. 62). ‘Although Algerians have the right to benefit from 
low-cost state rental properties, housing affordability in the private market remains an issue for 
60% of the population due to the increased rate of unemployment, slower GDP growth, and 
higher inflation’ (Africa Housing Finance yearbook, 2018, p. 62).    
 
Generally, foreigners are not eligible to the state’s social housing. Murphy and Vieten (2017, 
p. 25) believe that a good quality of housing is the most prominent aspect for a host country in 
order to achieve integration to displaced people and through which it enhances the access of 
forced migrants to education and employment. In the case of displaced people such as Syrians, 
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and due to the absence of a formal national refugee mechanism in Algeria that should define 
programmes of re-settlement and provide housing schemes to successfully integrate 
newcomers into the host community, the Algerian state hosted Syrians in “guest” centres. In 
Algiers, Sidi Feradj, previously a tourist complex, is now a place for hundreds of Syrian 
families that have not been able to afford private accommodation.  
 
6.2.3.1. ‘Guest Centres, Not refugee Camps’: Between Care and Control 
 
‘Guest centres, not refugee camps’ [… hado morakab diyafa mach mokhyamat laji’in …], this 
was strongly articulated by Asma, the state representative at the Foreigners’ Office (Maktab El 
Adjanib) when I asked her about the existence of refugee camps in Algeria like Sidi Feradj 
centre in the municipality of Staouali in Algiers. The rejection of calling “guest centres” 
refugee camps shows the dominant discourse adopted by the Algerian state in governing and 
managing Syrians which is that of hospitality. The latter is manifested in a host-guest 
relationship. Algerian society and the Algerian state represent the host and the Syrian 
community represents the guest. Syrians that reside in Sidi Feradj enjoy the same rights as 
Syrians who were able to rent private properties outside the state’s guest centres. They have 
full free access to healthcare, education, housing, and conditional access to employment unless 
they have long-residence permits. 
 
Although the present research does not intend to provide a contrastive analysis between two 
groups of Syrians: those that have chosen to rent private properties and others that chose to 
stay in guest centres like Sidi Feradj, hearing more about the conditions of Syrians in Sidi 
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Feradj guest centres was still relevant to my research in order to analyse how norms of 
hospitality may or may not have changed with both groups. Unfortunately, gaining access to 
the guest centre was not possible due to security measures. The security guards at Sidi Feradj 
guest centre were ordered by responsible staff managers not to grant anyone outside the centre 
access including researchers, journalists, and NGOs. ‘The reason behind this refusal was 
because Syrians inside the guest centre have previously been interviewed by journalists who 
claimed to be Algerians and conducted research with Syrians without taking into consideration 
their previous traumatic experiences in Syria, instead they added fuel on the fire’, argued the 
security guard. He also confirmed that some Syrians’ life experiences were politically and 
inhumanely exploited by a group of foreign researchers that claimed to be Syrians that wanted 
to visit their friends in Sidi Feradj centre. For these reasons and because the guest centre 
represented a very securitised space, only Syrians that reside in Sidi Feradj could either invite 
or reject the invitation of people outside the guest centre. The invitee will have to provide their 
ID and a proof of kinship so that they can access the centre. Because both the physical space 
and the lives of Syrian residents in Sidi Feradj guest centre are monitored by the Algerian state, 
as a second plan I have chosen to talk to Syrians that may have visited or previously resided in 
the guest centre of Sidi Feradj. Fateh was one of my Syrian participants that had a general idea 
about Sidi Feradj and previously paid visits to it. Fateh visited his friend in Sidi Feradj guest 
centre after his friend had a surgery in the hospital and was discharged after his condition was 
stable and safe to leave the hospital in Algiers. In our conversation, Fateh confirmed that 
‘Syrians who live in the guest centre and those that have chosen to rent private houses outside 
enjoy the same rights’. He also argued that ‘Sidi Feradj guest centre is only for those who could 
not afford accommodation in the private sector and not people that are excluded from the 
community’ […el ijraat el kanouniya mn nahiyat tanakol w kamel lhokouk mitl ri’aya sihiya 
wa ta’elim hiya nafsha. Ya’ani mitlna mitlhom. El morakab ta’ae Sidi Feradj howa makan lal 
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mabit fakat darato dawla el jazai’eriya la nas li ma’andha kodra anha takri bara...]. Fateh further 
added that ‘Syrian residents at Sidi Feradj guest centre are not deprived of their freedom; they 
can work for themselves, they have access to healthcare and education, and they can quit the 
centre at any time if they can afford private housing’.  
 
Having already visited his friend at Sidi Feradj guest centre, Fateh mentioned that the Algerian 
Red Crescent has been in charge of managing the guest centre and of satisfying residents’ daily 
needs such as catering, medical treatment [… el hilal el ahmar el jazaei’ri motkafilin b tawfir 
el akl w hata el mossa’adat sihiya ka modawat w atibae…]. He added:  
 
‘…because Middle Eastern cuisine is different from the Algerian cuisine, the Algerian Red Crescent provides 
groceries such as vegetables, fruits and pantry essentials for every family … Syrians have a shared kitchen where 
they can prepare their own food…[… homa yakhdo hissass ghidaeiya ghayr mohadara w fi matbakh w kol ae’ila 
takder thadar wajbatha el ghidaeiya b tarika li tnassbha…]’. 
 
When I met Anis, the representative at the Algerian Red Crescent, on November 26th, 2018, I 
asked about the responsibilities of the Algerian Red Crescent in terms of managing the guest 
centre of Sidi Feradj, providing food supplies and assistance to Syrian residents. He explained 
that the Algerian state has been providing accommodation to Syrians in guest centres such as 
Sidi Feradj in Algiers. Initially, three guest centres were equipped and ready to host Syrians 
since 2011, but most Syrians preferred to rent private houses with their own money. As such, 
two centres were closed, and only Sidi Feradj remains open and continues to host Syrians. He 
had the same attitude as Asma, the state official at the Foreigners’ Office in Algiers and argued 
that ‘Sidi Feradj is not a camp, it is a guest centre’. Anis confirmed what Fateh mentioned;  
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‘…The centre is an emergency accommodation that is equipped with multiple mobile caravans for more than 100 
refugee families compared to approximately fifty thousand Syrians that have chosen to reside outside the guest 
centre. Sidi Feradj centre also benefits from a massive kitchen where all families could prepare their own meals 
of the day. In terms of food provision, the Algerian Red Crescent is responsible of this and it also provides doctors; 
general health practitioners, psychologists and sociologists that are in charge of providing assistance in terms of 
mental and physical health of Syrians. The responsibilities of the Algerian Red Crescent involve providing social 
support including healthcare, accommodation. It is beyond our responsibilities to find jobs for Syrians or solve 
such issues for them [… hada machi mokhayam lajiein lakin markaz iwae w diyafa wafrato dawla el jazaei’iriya 
l aktar mn 100 a’eila souriya mohtaja … nahna ka hilal ahmar nwafroulhom el akl w homa ytaybou wahadhom fi 
el matbakh li kayen fi el markaz … andhom hata atibae wa mokhtassin nafssaniyin wa ijtimaeiyin bch ysaadouhom 




6.3. Concluding Remarks and Discussion 
 
Having had less experience in dealing with wide flows of displaced people compared to 
European countries, data gathered during three research trips to Algeria revealed that the 
Algerian state adopted hospitality as its main approach to welcome and manage the flow of 
Syrians between 2011 until December 2014. After January 2015, the state approach has 
changed and started to be driven mainly by discourses of security and border control (see 
chapter 7). The approach of hospitality adopted by the Algerian state, Algerian society and 
Algerian charity organisations was not a part of a state official scheme, project or network. It 
has not been structured or organised by religious communities in Algeria, either. Instead, 
research data revealed the strategy of hospitality towards Syrians is an act of kindness towards 
brothers and sisters in faith (Islam) and Arabité. Additionally, it is an act of maintaining and 
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strengthening relations between Syria and Algeria that are not new but started since the exile 
of Amir Abdu El-Kader El Jazaei’ri in Damascus in 1885 during the French occupation in 
Algeria.  
 
Within a non-official framework of hospitality, the Algerian state offers full and unconditional 
access to certain social rights that are not directly dependent on refugees’ legal status in Algeria 
such as the right to healthcare, education and housing. Full unconditional access to 
employment, however, is a privilege that needs a long-residence permit or a citizenship by 
naturalisation (see chapter 7). At a state and societal levels in Algeria, Syrians are labelled as 
“guests” rather than being labelled as “refugees” or “asylum seekers”. Although the “guest” 
status offers facilities and less obligations to Syrians, it can still be seen as a restrictive strategy 
to control and discipline the Syrian community.  
 
Literature review chapters in the present thesis mentioned how the nature of the post 1962 
Algerian citizenship was exclusive because after Algeria’s independence people were excluded 
based on their political and religious beliefs. Years later, Algerian citizenship law changed, and 
all discriminatory conditions were lifted but the law of naturalisation itself remained unclear 
and ambiguous. Having said this, it can be said that the biopolitical production of Syrians as 
“guest” comes as a camouflage to the gap that exists in the Algerian law of citizenship and 
immigration. The “guest” status is an indirect way of excluding Syrians that are unworthy from 
Algerian citizenship by naturalisation. It is not an exclusion from Algerian identity, it is rather 
an exclusion from the political order.  
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‘Within Algeria, charity organisations are not specifically founded to help displaced people 
such as foreign refugees and asylum seekers only, their main aim is to provide help to 
everybody in need; be it Algerian or foreigner, for the sake of God’, Fatima Zohra confirmed. 
This implies with the tradition of Islamic values and principles of hospitality that involves three 
main components: ‘the host, the guest and Allah’ (El-Aswad, 2015, p. 462). The strategy 
adopted by Algerian national charity organisations can be divided into two main tasks: the first 
was supporting Syrians that were willing to come to Algeria but were stuck either in Syria or 
in different places in the world in terms of securing accommodation prior to their arrival in 
Algeria. The second task was supporting Syrians after they arrive in Algeria. Fatima Zohra 
confirmed that she provided proofs of address while Syrians were in Syria, Sudan and Egypt 
and secured accommodation for them even after they came to Algeria. As an active member of 
local and national charity organisations, Fatima Zohra also explained 
 
‘ I helped more than 50 or 60 people even before they came to Algeria by providing proofs of accommodation 
and invitation letters with my personal details so that Syrians would be granted entry at police check points in the 
Airport of Algeria [… fa wafarna chahadat el iwae li el katir mn souriyin w b asmaena el khassa w anawin 
boyoutna el khassa majanan ‘ala assass ano nahna ntkaflo bihom ki yjiw la jazaei’ir…. fa matalan ana ‘amalt had 
chahadat l aktar mn 50 aw 60 chakhs souri b asmi ana w onwan manzili el khas…]’. 
 
Not only charity organisations were in charge of helping Syrians before they came to Algeria, 
Fatima Zohra mentioned an Algerian businessman who financially supported Syrians though 
he does not belong to any charity organisation. Fatima Zohra mentioned  
 
 227 
‘I called an Algerian businessman on the phone and asked for financial assistance as there was a Syrian family 
that was stuck in Egypt and could not afford the flight tickets to come to Algeria. Without any self-interest and 
without hesitation, the businessman paid for the family’s travel expenses, welcomed them once they arrived at 
Houari Boumedienne’s Airport in Algiers, secured accommodation in Douira in Algiers and paid its rent for one 
year in advance, and provided furniture for them [… tkhayli ana mara ‘ayat l wahed fa’el khir f telephone kotlo 
ano fi ‘aeila souriya fi masr malkatch kifch tji lahna la jazaei’ir, kifch tchri les billets ta’e tiyara tkhayli bi mojrad 
makotlo a’eila souriya kali a’atiini asmaehom w ana ntkafal b takalif naklhom abr taira mn masr la jazaei’ir. lama 
jaw stakbalhom howa w staejarlhom bit fi Douira w khalasslhom ijar ‘aam kamil w jablhom el atat … tkheyli 
hada insan wahed ‘amal had chi wahdo w b doun mokabil…]’. 
 
Fatima Zohra and ‘many Algerians outside the charity organisations believed that to help 
Syrians is a moral duty towards their brothers and sisters because they are Muslims and Arabs 
just like Algerians’: [… ka moslimin… hnaya majbourin ano nsa’adhom …], Fatima added. In 
Bab Zouar, Nabeel (54) an Algerian landlord, did not share the same view as Fatima Zohra. He 
stated that in order to rent out his properties to a Syrian or an Algerian tenant, they should agree 
to sign a 12-month tenancy agreement like an Algerian citizen and must pay one-year rent in 
advance. He believed that this could make both the landlord and the tenant safe. Unlike Fatima 
that cared about maintaining high levels of hospitality as a moral duty, Nabeel cared about the 
financial situation of Syrians and their ability to pay the rent during their tenancy agreement. 
 
Generally, Syrian participants: single people and families, did not express major problems such 
as insecurity, homelessness, exclusion, racism and discrimination, inequalities in service 
provision and anti-social behaviour in the neighbourhood, which may have discouraged them 
from renting with private sector providers. However, some of my Syrian respondents, such as 
Samer, stated the fact that they should not be noisy and disruptive after 23h at night because 
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Algerians tend to dine and go to bed early, before midnight, especially in winter, which is not 
the case among Syrians. This aspect was not described as a major problem that may have been 
a turning point in Syrians’ lives; it is rather a cultural difference which did not affect their social 
life.  
 
Refugees that fled wars and reached out to other countries for safety and security do not only 
need support in terms of their physical health, their mental and psychological health also 
requires intensive support and care. About the provision of emotional support to Syrians in 
Algeria, Fatima Zohra gave an example of a twenty-four-year-old Syrian female was a victim 
of sexual abuse while she was internally displaced in a refugee camp in Syria before she came 
to Algeria. It was during an event, that one of the charity organisations Fatima Zohra belongs 
to planned to gather both Algerians and Syrians in order to encourage social integration and 
inclusion, when Fatima Zohra noticed a Syrian female that was afraid of others and looked 
extremely introverted during the event. Fatima Zohra approached the girl’s mother who told 
her that her daughter was raped in a refugee camp in Syria. Fatima Zohra felt heart-broken after 
knowing her story and decided to shoulder responsibility towards her: she arranged free 
psychological therapy sessions with one of the psychologists in her organisation called Salima. 
Fatima Zohra felts very proud because the girl recovered, and she is now resuming her studies 
in Algeria.  
 
On the 30th of October 2020, Fatima Zohra, my gatekeeper, arranged a skype call with Salima 
to hear more about her experience with Syrians. Salima (37), a psychologist and a mental health 
counsellor in Algiers and a member of Sisters’ Good deeds organisation, mentioned that the 
most vulnerable people that were extremely in need for support did not choose Algeria as their 
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destination, but they went to neighbouring countries of Syria. Just like Fateh, from the Syrian 
cohort, Salima argued that, in a state of war, not all Syrians could afford flight tickets that are 
expensive. That is probably why Syrian war refugees did not live difficult life experiences in 
Algeria as their fellow countrymen did in Lebanon or Turkey. Salima and I talked about the 
Syrian girl that was violated in a refugee camp in Syria and she stated: ‘… Narjas, the girl that 
was violated in Syria was not the first or the last one we helped…’. She added: 
 
’…my responsibility is to provide mental health support with no medical interference / therapies. If, for instance, 
a Syrian needs further therapies that we cannot provide, we can either book them with private practice or refer 
them to the hospital where they can see social / medical assistants. Social / medical assistants will book them with 
doctors specialised with mental health disorders: psychiatrists … the latter will assist help them with overcoming 
their disorders with the help of medication … these services are provided by the state for free to all Algerians and 
Syrians as well … I remember we, my team and I, referred Syrian females to the state hospitals for further 
therapies…[… fi ljamei’iya nahna mohimtna anana nsa’ed kamel nas lmohtaja … Narjas, makantch awal wela 
akhir wahda sa’ednaha lama kanet andha mochikila … Matalan ana mohimti ani nwafar da’em nafssi fakat bla 
dwa… fa Matalan jatna hala w htajet tadakhol tibi … najmo hna ka jame’iya nkhalsoulha and tbib pive wela 
nb’atha l mostachfayat dawla kayen assistan sociale yakder y’awnha mn nahiyat ichtirae dwa w motaba’at l ilaj 
… hado des services li dawla twafarhom mach fakat la souriyin; la, l kamel l jazaeiriyin w souriyin ki jaw kadro 
ydemjouhom fi had les services bch y’awnouhom… ]’.  
 
Being aware of Rabie’s autistic son, I asked Salima if autistic patients might be eligible to 
receive these services. Salima added:  
 
‘unfortunately, these services are still limited, but autistic patients especially children less than 18 years can still 
receive support in terms of medication either from our organisation or from social assistants at the state 
hospitals…’. 
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I wondered about the services provided for autistic children and teenagers (less than 18 years 
old), Salima mentioned a centre in Ben Aknoun called ‘Club Espoir [El Amal]’ that provides 
a wide range of therapies for autistic children such as Equine-assisted therapy [l'équithérapie], 
which involves activities with horses to help children during their treatments. ‘Ben Aknoun’s 
centre receives children from all provinces of Algeria’, Salima stated. Not being sure if Syrian 
autistic patients might be eligible to register at the centre or not, Salima advised that:  
 
‘… in the case of Syrian autistic children, they may want to get in touch with the Ministry of National Solidarity, 
Family Affairs and the Status of Women. This ministry and its branches all over the country receive more than 
1000 children with disabilities every year and integrate them within a scheme of Psychopedagogists. They help 
them with special needs education and assist their families as well on how to manage their children’s skills… if 
these services are free to Algerian children, I assume they are free to Syrian children as well…’ 
 
Salima mentioned an interesting story of an Algerian ophthalmologist that has been providing 
free consultations to Syrian war refugees at his private eye clinic in Algiers. The story is that 
the Algerian doctor studied ophthalmology in Damascus, Syria, after Algeria’s independence 
and when Syrians moved to Algeria due to civil and political instability in their country, he 
committed to provide free consultations to all Syrians as an act to show gratitude for to his 
Syrian brothers among whom he lived and studied. In addition to some private doctors that 
have provided healthcare and medical assistance to Syrians, my interview with Salima revealed 
that both the Ministry of Health, Population and Hospital Reform and the Ministry of National 
Solidarity, Family Affairs and the Status of Women are responsible of providing healthcare 
and medical assistance for the suffering body of war refugees and of providing 
psychopedagogical assistance to school pupils with disabilities, respectively. Unfortunately, as 
Rabie’s autistic son does not fit into the state’s conceptualisation and its construction of the 
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suffering body of a war refugee that includes newborns, pregnant women and patients with 
chronic conditions, he might not be eligible for further assistance from healthcare providers. 
Although the Algerian strategies of hospitality and the provision of welfare help enhance the 
refugee population’s well-being, the construction of a suffering body falls into biopolitical 
racism when a group of patients with physical chronic conditions receive further medical 
assistance and health insurance by the state, while others with chronic cognitive disabilities 
may be deprived of this welfare right.  
 
To conclude, Algerian unconditional hospitality towards Syrians at a social level was driven 
by Islamic values and historical ties that implicated genuine acts of kindness and the will to 
always help those in need. Algerian hospitality also offered a full integration into the Algerian 
society as the majority of Syrian respondents expressed their satisfaction with the level of social 
inclusion felt among the Algerian local population. Although the Algerianness as a normative 
order believes that hospitality and offering help to Syrians is a moral duty between Muslims 
and between two countries that shared history in the past, its political order did not fully and 
unconditionally integrate Syrians into the legal order of Algerian citizenship. If hospitality is 
both a strategy of care, control and exclusion, it is still a form of a biopolitical governmentality 
that indirectly aims at enhancing the well-being of the local population (Algerian society) by 
preserving its social and political national identity through including worthy refugees into 
citizenship such as businessmen and excluding unworthy refugees and label them as “guests”. 
Next chapter (chapter 7) will investigate how the state’s strategies of hospitality and 
humanitarianism have been securitised in 2015 and how this has resulted in my Syrian 
participants themselves feeling as if their autonomy is being sacrificed to bureaucratic 









Research data revealed that the three elements of citizenship: legal recognition / legal status, 
employment and security are intimately related, and each element in this relationship affects 
the other. Practically in Algeria, when security measures have been tightened in 2015, this has 
led to governmental interventions into legal rights of citizenship and restriction were applied 
to exclude Syrian displaced people from enjoying legal recognition such as: long-residence 
permits or naturalisation. The latter is not only a matter of legalising status; it is also a practice 
of subjectivity (Olson, 2008). These legal restrictions constructed Syrian war refugees as 
“potential danger”. Because, Syrian subjects have been deemed potentially “dangerous”, this 
has resulted in their exclusion from legal labour market and rights of unconditional 
employment because they are explicitly legally excluded. This is another facet of new 
humanitarianism that offers conditional assistance to war refugees (Duffield, 2014) and will, 
in turn, affect the state decisions of inclusion and exclusion of refugees. This is a vicious cycle 
where my Syrian participants, such as Wael, feel lost in. He added:  
 
Chapter Seven: The Dispositif de Sécurité: Citizenship and 
Biopolitical Practices of Controlling Circulation and their 




‘we obviously need to work … we do not have the right to work at the state’s organisations because we do not 
have legal status. If I want to start my own businesses and register everything in my name, I need a long-residence 
permit , because we do not have a legal status, I cannot apply for a trade register … the state is no longer issuing 
long-residence permits for Syrians… […ida bidna nchtghol and dawla y’oloulak ma fik la anou ma adna ikamat 
… niji nftah machrou’e b ismna y’oloulak lazem sijil tijari, tkadmi ala sijil tijari ykolak wina el ikama … mafina 
na’emal ay chi ala ismna la anou mafi ikamat … tiji tkadmi ala ikama mafik la anou dawla wa’afet la souriyin…]’. 
 
The previous chapter demonstrated how the historical ties, that linked Syrians and Algerians 
since the day El Amir Abdu El-Kader el Jazaei’ri was exiled in Damascus in 1855 by the 
French, and how the aspects of faith and Pan-Arabism have governed the state discourse of 
hospitality. By questioning how Algeria’s social policy has promoted the well-being of the 
Syrian displaced community based on their rights and public responsibilities dictated by their 
legal situation in Algeria, chapter (6) demonstrated an understanding of Algeria’s hospitality 
as a biopolitical practice that produces certain Syrians as “worthy guests” that deserve 
unconditional inclusion within the sectors of Education, healthcare and housing and others as 
“unworthy” that do not necessarily deserve to belong.  
 
Having mentioned in the previous chapter that Syrians do not necessarily share similar life- 
experiences in terms of their integration into the social rights of citizenship and in terms of 
their legal status, the present chapter will explain the paradoxical discourses that contradict the 
discourse of hospitality, especially when it comes to employment and training. My research 
data revealed that the state’s underlying rationalities of security, Algerian citizenship, and 
biopolitics problematise the integration of Syrians within sectors of employment and training 
by including valuable, loyal, and worthy Syrians and excluding invaluable, suspicious / 
dangerous and unworthy lives of refugees. The state’s dynamics of inclusion and exclusion 
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reflect the normative nature of Algerian citizenship / Algerianness. This is another biopolitical 
practice of preserving biological existence, emotional well-being and even preserving the 
nationalist feature and the homogeneity of the Algerian national identity through the practices 
of security and control of borders. To sum up, ‘biopolitics is a dispositif de sécurité which 
secures - that is to say regulates, strategises and seeks to manipulate the circulation of species 
life - by instantiating a general economy of the contingent throughout all the processes of re-
productive circulation which impinge upon species existence as such’ (Dillon in Aradau and 
Blanke, 2010, p. 01, italics in original text).  
 
7.1. Threats at Algeria’s Borders: Encounters with International Terrorists 
and “Illegal Migrants” 
 
January of every year marks the anniversary of the Teguentourine attack that took place in the 
gas field of Teguentourine in Ain Amenas gas plant in south-eastern part of Algeria in 2013, 
the largest gas processing plant. The region of Ain Amenas is in the south-eastern part of 
Algeria close to the country’s borders with Libya and Mali, countries which have witnessed 
political upheaval and interventions of foreign military troops to combat terrorism. The gas 
development plant in Ain Amenas is a ‘joint venture’ between the Algerian state company, 
Sonatrach, and foreign companies including UK-based multinational British Petroleum (BP) 
and Norway's Statoil (“In Amenas…”, n.d). The gas field covers a large area in the Algerian 
Sahara of more than 2750 km2 (“In Amenas….”, n.d), where approximately 685 Algerian 
workers and 107 foreign national workers reside (Post Staff report, 2013). 
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Gas and oil productions are considered the backbone of the Algerian national economy. The 
fields of Hassi Rmal and Hassi Messoud in Laghouat and Ouargla provinces, respectively, are 
known worldwide and have been operating since the nationalisation of hydrocarbon industry 
in Sahara during Boumedienne’s presidency in 1971 (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 
2019; Layachi, 1998, p. 12). Although still in its infancy in 2013, Ain Aminas started to operate 
as one of the main gas processing plants in the country and it has covered four main gas fields 
in the country including Teguentourine, Hassi Farida, Hassi Ouan Taredert and Hassi Ouan 
Abecheu, where natural gas reserve is estimated to be 85 billion m3 (‘In Amenas Gas Project’, 
n.d). Foreign producers follow the Algerian law of investment that entitles the Algerian 
producer to 51% of the profits and 49% for the foreign company (Hamouchene, 2016, p.22). 
The contract of Ain Amenas gas plant project entitles Algeria’s national gas and oil company, 
Sonatrach, to 51% of interest and BP and Norway’s Statoil multinational energy company 
receives 49% of profits.  
 
The terrorist attack on the gas processing field in Algeria started on the early morning of 
January 16th, 2013 when a group of terrorists, claiming to be affiliated by El-Qaeda division 
in the Islamic Great Maghreb region led by Mokhtar Belmokhtar, stole into the country and 
began their attack (Stewart, 2013). The attackers are believed to have conducted attacks in both 
Syria and Banghazi in Libya (Gråtrud and Skretting, 2017, p. 43). The terrorist attack started 
when a group of 32 heavily armed terrorists of different nationalities (Tunisia, Libya, Yemen, 
Egypt, Syria, Canada and Netherlands) (Al Arabiya, Hodna, Zarou, 2013) invaded the base and 
kidnapped Algerian and foreign national workers as hostages. The Algerian army forces 
refused negotiations with the attackers and after a battle in the middle of the desert, the lives 
of 685 Algerian nationals and 107 foreign nationals, including hostages from different 
nationalities (USA, Japan, Philippine, Norway, UK and France), were saved (Euronews Arab, 
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2013; Post Staff Report, 2013). The number of people died is disputable: Algerian sources 
argued that 23 people died, foreign sources, on the other hand, claim that 37 lives were lost 
including Algerian national guard and foreign nationals. By the end of the incident, 29 attackers 
were killed and 3 of them were arrested by the Algerian national security forces (“Moktar 
Belmoktar…”, 2013). 
 
If terrorists took control over the gas fields in Ain Amenas gas plant, Algeria would lose its 
reputation as a safe country after struggling with a civil war for 10 years in the 1990’s and it 
would lose its foreign investors and tourists. Having said this, Algeria’s economy is heavily 
dependent on the processing and production of oil and gas, the attack on Ain Amenas’s plant 
would drastically impact the Algerian economy especially with the fluctuation of oil and gas 
prices since 2010. At the level of security, both the lives of national and foreign workers at the 
plant would be lost and the general safety of the local population would have been menaced. 
After significantly reducing the scale of the internal terrorist threat and violent religious 
extremism since the civil war, the threat started to grow at the borders and in the neighbouring 
countries due to the waves caused by the Arab Spring and as a result of the civil wars especially 
in Libya and Mali that resulted in a complete chaos and political unrest. Regional 
destabilisation, civil unrest and terrorism in Libya and Mali have led to the spread of criminal 
networks, drugs and weapons trafficking and terrorist groups that have permanently threatened 
Algerian national security at its borders (Harmon, 2014). Additionally, foreign interventions of 
military troops in Mali and Libya have destabilised the Sahel region which, in turn, has 
threatened Algeria’s national security. Refugees, asylum seekers and immigrants face a high 
risk of being either assassinated or kidnapped by terrorist groups, if not recruited in different 
terrorist affiliations such as ISIS and El-Qaeda. International terrorism is both a major cause of 
mass migration in the twenty-first century and a source of menace to the lives of displaced 
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people. In an attempt to solve the issue of illegal migration and refugeehood, the Algerian state 
suggested that these fragile nations, regimes and states should be supported in order to solve 
their internal socio-economic issues without foreign interventions of military forces from their 
former European colonisers (eg, the case of French troops in Mali). For instance, Algeria 
mediated between the conflicting parties in Mali. As a result of that, Mali has adopted the 
Algerian experience and Agreement of Peace and National Reconciliation which was 
advocated by the previous president Bouteflika in order to stop the bloodshed during the 
Algerian civil war in the 1990s. However, the restoration of peace in Mali through adopting 
the Algerian model of counter-terrorism and counter-extremism may or may not work 
depending on the context and on the conflicting parties. Boukhars (2012, p. 04) points out that 
‘a sustained, cooperative, and sincere engagement by Algeria is critical to the success of 
conflict management and resolution in Mali’. He further adds that the European countries’ 
efforts should work congruently with Algeria’s instead of just ‘competing with Algeria’s 
security and diplomatic initiatives’ (Boukhars, 2012, p. 04). By supporting peace in its 
neighbouring countries, Algeria will be able to protect and control its large borders more 
efficiently from unexpected terrorist attacks coming from terrorist groups at its borders with 
Mali and Libya. This could bring political stability and settlement to the Sahel region. Algeria 
has also suggested that the issue of illegal migration can be solved through the voice of young 
people and researchers under the projects of ‘l’enterprenariat des jeunes’ (youth 
entrepreneurship) agendas that aim at developing the socio-economic situation in Africa by 




7.1.1. Discourse and Technologies of Security: Algeria’s Biopolitical 
Response to Security Threats and Mass Migration 
 
The start of the Arab spring in the Arab region and along with civil and political destabilisation 
of the Sahel region forced Algeria to adopt a new imaginary of security by adopting new 
measures of monitoring circulation in order to protect both its national borders and its 
population. The latter became a ‘referent object of security’ (Aradau and Blanke, 2010, p. 01). 
‘The dispositif de sécurité refers to ‘the institutional and discursive formation that has been 
deployed in the government of societies since the 18th century’ (Aradau and Blanke, 2010, p. 
01). Therefore, security can be understood as a biopolitical practice of ‘organising circulation, 
eliminating its danger, making a division between good and bad circulation, and maximizing 
the good circulation by eliminating the bad’ (Foucault in Aradau and Blanke, 2010, p. 01). By 
the start of the world’s refugee crisis in 2015, the biopolitical governmentality of the Algerian 
state adopted certain technologies such as border control and closure to fully manage the flow 
of displaced people into the country, visa prior to arrival, difficulty of family re-unification and 
restrictions of travelling outside Algeria. Syrians are no exception. Before 2015, Syrians were 
able to enter Algeria without a visa. After adopting security as a state discourse / approach in 
January 2015, Syrian displaced people coming from Syria were obliged to submit visa 
applications prior to their arrival. This state decision comes from a project of ‘circulatory 
migration’, as Aradau and Blanke (2010, p. 02) would call it, which is a new procedure to 
control and secure the circulation of displaced people including Syrians. If in Syria, visa 
applications should be submitted at the level of the Algerian consulate in Damascus, Syria, 
otherwise the application should be submitted at the level of the Algerian consulate where the 
applicant resides. If the visa application is approved, the applicant will be granted entry to 
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Algeria. Once the applicant arrives in Algeria, they will receive a short-residence permit which 
is renewable every 45 days, but they cannot leave the country and go back to it whenever they 
wish. I remember when I went to Baba Hassan the 21st of March 2018, I met Fateh who 
mentioned that he is separated from his wife by borders. In my mind I thought that she had 
been deported but Fateh proved the opposite and confirmed:  
 
‘my wife first came with an entry Visa in 2015, she left Algeria because she needed to go back to Syria and finish 
her studies at university … it is true, we took risks and hoped that she would be able to re-enter Algeria but that 
was never the case … now she is stuck in Syria and I am in Algeria’ […zawjati dakhlet ba’ad ma hato el visa; 
yaani ba’ad 2015 w dakhlat b visa. L visa thasslet aliha b so’ouba w ijraat ktir mo’akada. W hiya mou ma’ei, 
ya’ani mou b jazai … kissatha anha nizlat la souriya la ano rahat tkamal dirassatha f souriya w halae ma andha 
forssa la tarjaa la Jazair la ano li ykhroj m jazair marah yakder yrjae…]. 
 
Out of Fateh’s story, I understood the frustration of Syrians and concluded that holding a short-
residence permit or no residency does not only prevent an asylum seeker, refugee or migrant 
from registering a property in their names, but this status does not give Syrians the right to 
apply for family re-unification, or to travel freely outside Algeria, though they are free to travel 
within the Algerian territory without restrictions by any means of transportation. The 
experience of Fateh’s wife says a lot about the knowledge produced around his wife. After she 
left Algeria and went back to Syria, which is still unstable, his wife’s reasons for leaving 
Algeria and going back to Syria to finish her university exams were a source of suspicion. 
Consequently, her visa application may take longer to be approved. It can be completely 
ignored if she failed to prove the reason for her trip to Syria.   
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It is important to mention that before January 2015 when Algeria’s policy of managing refugees 
was led primarily by a discourse of hospitality, Syrians were granted either naturalisation 
documents in case they prove that they have Algerian origins, or renewable long-residence 
permits of two years or renewable short-residence permits of 90 days. After January 2015, in 
order to control the circulation of all displaced people within the Algerian territory including 
Syrians, they were offered short-residence permits only which must be renewed every 45 days.  
The procedure of residence renewal is not complicated, but it is a part of the state bureaucratic 
procedures. Anas, a 39-year-old Syrian male recounted his experience with visa application 
procedures. Before residing in Algeria, Anas and his small family used to reside in UAE where 
they applied for a visa to Algeria. Without any obstacles or challenges, their first application 
was successful, and Anas and his small family were granted access to Algeria on June 2017. 
What encouraged Anas and his family to quit UAE and move to Algeria was the level of 
tolerance and openness his friends in Algeria experienced. Wafae’s experience was slightly 
different from Anas’s and somehow challenging. Wafae, a 27-year-old Syrian housewife and 
a mother of a baby girl that was born in Algeria, was a successful applicant that shared her long 
journey to gain entry visa to Algeria. Wafae was married when she left Syria and went to Sudan 
where she received a long-residence permit. At that time (in 2016) Wafae’s Syrian husband 
was living in Algeria but was not able to apply for a family reunification because his status in 
Algeria was not legal as he entered illegally to the country. He is a well-known self-employed 
maintenance man who is skilful in painting and building in the western part of Algeria in Saida 
which is 415km far from the capital, Algiers. Wafae’s husband stopped renewing his 
documentation since he entered Algeria. Although the Algerian police and the immigration 
office know about his situation in Algeria, Wafae confirmed that ‘her husband did not face any 
restrictions in terms of private housing or self- employment’.  
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Speaking about her experience with visa procedures, Wafae recounted 
 
‘… While in Sudan, I had to apply for an entry visa at the Algerian consulate in Sudan…after submitting all 
documentations for the first and second time, my application was denied because I needed an Algerian sponsor 
that would provide me with proofs of accommodation’ [… El visa talabtha fi soudan mou mn souriya. kadamt 
maratayn bas ma wafakouli w awadt kadamt chahadat iwae aw invitation mn and nas jaza’iriyin la hata wafakouli 
ala talab el visa. Lhaja li lkitha s’iba fi mawdoue el visa ani lama baatli jouzi visa makdert nji la ano makan ando 
ikama da’ima fa makablouli talab el visa] 
 
Pointing out to Fatima Zohra, a member of national charity organisations, Wafae stated: ‘thanks 
to Fatima I was able to reach out to an Algerian sponsor to provide me with the necessary 
documents that supported my visa application’ [ lakin f lmara talita anas jaza’iriyin mitl Fatima 
homa li ba’etouli el iwae w kafala la hata kdert ahssol ala visa …]. The reason why Wafae 
needed an Algerian sponsor was again for state’s security reasons in order to manage Syrians’ 
circulation into the country more efficiently especially because her husband’s status in Algeria 
was illegal. Identifying Syrians by their Algerian sponsors is a technology adopted by the state 
in order to govern the Syrian community through a disciplinary system of regulation and 
control. After Wafae lived in Algeria, Wafae gave birth to a baby girl who was not eligible for 
Algerian citizenship or long-resident permit, but received the same status as her mother, a 
short-residence permit.  
 
In my discussion with the state official at the Foreigners’ Office (Maktab El Adjanib) in central 
Algiers, Asma, I mentioned the obligation of visa prior to arrival that Syrians have faced after 
January 2015. Firstly, she highlighted the importance of Algeria’s national security and border 
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control policies in the age of migration and international terrorism. Asma also focussed on the 
geo-political position of Algeria and argued that most displaced people consider Algeria as a 
gateway and a transit point between Africa and Europe. Additionally, Asma praised Algeria’s 
efforts to fight terrorism and extremism since the civil war in 1990s. She argued ‘the visa 
procedure is an exceptional state decision in response to a constant threat to Algeria’s national 
security and to the safety of their national population’. She further justified: ‘not only does 
Algeria enact strict rules, the U.S, for instance, did that with Trump’s Muslim ban which is 
even a worse example’.  
 
Gibney (2011, p. 05), for instance, argues that the speech of Nicholas Sarkozy, the French 
president, in July 2010 after the civil riots in Grenoble focussed primarily on France’s Muslim 
citizens when he proposed that: ‘French nationality should be stripped from any person of 
foreign origin who voluntarily tries to take the life of a policeman, gendarme, or other figure 
of public authority’ (Bloomberg Media, 30 July 2010).  Sarkozy’s speech was later followed 
by his Interior Minister, Brice Hortefeux, who explained that the person of ‘foreign origin’ 
targets France’s Muslim community (Newsweek, 17 August 2010 cited in Gibney, 2011, p. 
05). Gibney (2011, p. 05) further confirms that France’s Muslim citizens were labelled as 
persons of ‘foreign origin’ in Sarkozy’s speech. On the contrary, Asma argued: ‘unlike 
Trump’s Muslim ban and many other countries, Algeria’s decision to close borders was not 
explicitly based on religion, ethnicity or race. It is rather for security reasons’.  
 
Similar to Asma’s viewpoint, during his interview with Dzair News in January 2019, Hassan 
Kassimi, the head of migration office at the Algerian Ministry of Internal Affairs, argued that 
not all Syrians who have tried to enter Algeria are refugees that need humanitarian support and 
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protection in Algeria. Some of them belong to terrorist groups that are active in Syria who try 
to enter Algeria with fake passports. He backed up his argument by wondering how could a 
refugee that needs humanitarian support and protection travel through several countries such 
as Turkey, Sudan, Mauritania, Northern Mali where they did not apply for asylum but choose 
to settle at the borders of Algeria and tried to enter the country illegally (Dzair TV, 2019). In 
another interview with El Arabiya, Hassan Kassimi argued that Algeria’s decision to close its 
borders was due to a constant threat that comes from unstable countries in the Sahel region and 
terrorist groups at Algeria’s south-eastern borders. He clarified that this decision is not applied 
against Syrians only but against all foreigners that try to enter Algeria illegally and are proved 
suspicious or belong to groups of extremists or terrorists. Refugees that need humanitarian 
support are, instead, very welcome in Algeria, he added (Algeria Alarabiya, 2019).  
 
Aradau and Blanke (2010, p. 02) emphasise that the securing of certain mobilities augments 
the immobility of others which makes them excluded.  From a biopolitical perspective, I argue 
that Algeria’s decision to secure and control circulation of displaced people namely Syrians, 
can be led by state rationalities that imply the protection and the preservation of the Algerian 
national identity. Although the state official, Asma, explained that the reason behind the visa 
procedure is a part of raison d’état, I still believe that the introduction of visa is a biopolitical 
strategy that cares about the well-being of the Algerian national population. Thus, this strategy 
came to change the state’s production of knowledge around Syrian displaced people that were 
labelled as “guests” between 2011 and December 2014 as the previous chapter shows. Turton 
(2003) argues that ‘the language, images, categories and metaphors that we use to describe 
forced migrants are not innocent but are part of how we interpret and therefore act towards 
those who are displaced’ (Turton, 2003 in Judge, 2010, p. 06). In power-knowledge relations, 
Judge (2010) adds that discourse built around displaced communities often serve particular 
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parties that hold the power of instruction over social realities and social interactions in the 
country and that play important roles in constructing and re-constructing identities. Asma, 
argued that the Algerian state cannot grant access to a person that may be potentially dangerous 
and sacrifice the lives of more than 40 million Algerians because anyone can be a suspect until 
they prove the opposite. In order to better understand the biopolitical practices of the Algerian 
state rationalities to protect the Algerian national identity, we should investigate the openness 
of Algerian citizenship towards non-citizens and what it has to offer for people who wish to 
belong. The earlier chapters critically investigated the nature of the Algerian citizenship and 
Algerianness as both normative political entities. They revealed that in colonial Algeria, French 
governmentality produced Algerian Muslims as “subjects without rights” according to code de 
l'indigénat (1881) compared to Algerian Jews who were deemed “citizens” according to the 
Crémieux decree (1870). As stated in chapter 4, after independence in 1962, Algeria’s law of 
citizenship on March 27th, 1963 came as a reaction to the France’s colonial governmentality 
and automatically granted Algerian citizenship to those whose father and grandfather had 
Muslim status and to those who participated in the Algerian war of liberation. Algeria’s 
colonial and post-colonial past still govern today’s state’s decisions regarding the naturalisation 
of non-citizens who wish to belong. The next section investigates the possibility of 
naturalisation for Syrians by critically analysing the norms of inclusion and exclusion of 






7.1.2. A Right or a Privilege: Governmental Rationalities of Algerian 
Citizenship and the Possibility of Naturalisation 
 
Different ethnic divisions make up Algerian society and the Algerian national identity, such as 
Arabness and Tamazight (including its sub-divisions such as kabyles, shaoui, and twareg) and 
different religious beliefs. These include Islam – the Maliki school of Sunni division - that is 
the religion of 99% of Algerians, Christianity and Judaism are adopted by 1% of Algerians 
(Algeria 2018 International Religious Freedom Report, 2018, p.02). Algeria is not a secular 
state and Islam remains the official religion. Algeria does not adopt multiculturalism neither as 
criterion in naturalisation nor as a natural part of Algerian citizenship. In this regard, Perrin 
(2014, p. 15) argues that the most important positions in the state, for instance, such as the 
president of the republic of Algeria or their wives must have only Algerian citizenship and 
must be Muslims. The fact of deciding who is worthy and who is not worthy of citizenship is 
a way of controlling the level of diversity in the Algerian national identity and its capacity to 
include non-citizens. Perrin (2014, p. 10) further claims that in countries of the Maghreb region, 
‘reluctance to grant citizenship is rather based on a mix of immaturity in nation-building, of a 
closed and ‘naturalist’ - if not ethno-religious - conception of the nation, of suspicion and fear 
toward difference and aliens’. This does not necessarily mean that the host community in 
Algeria is not open to foreigners, but it does mean that the integration process in Algeria is 
different from the Western world. In European countries, asylum seekers may be granted a 
legal status if their asylum application is approved. A European state may allow them to apply 
for citizenship after a certain period provided that they prove that the applicant for 
naturalisation has a source of income and can support themselves financially and prove their 
assimilation into the local society. If their naturalisation is approved, they become naturalised 
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citizens. However, this does not necessarily guarantee that the host community will include 
them as new naturalised citizens that are part of the national identity. In the UK, for example, 
speaking English language was intertwined with British values (Blackledge and Creese, 2010, 
p. 08). This means that ‘the use and visibility of minority languages other than English threatens 
this sense of national unity and common belonging (Blackledge and Cresse, 2010, p. 08)’. If 
Britishness is related to English language skills, mastering the language and passing the 
language test should allow immigrants to qualify for a British passport. Britishness is still 
measurable. The processes of integration and assimilation are often confused among different 
people. Algeria’s process of integration, for example, is based on developing a strong feeling 
of belonging to Algeria first and naturalisation comes next. I asked the state official, Asma, 
whether Syrians are eligible to Algerian citizenship. Her answer was that ‘they should 
understand the nature of citizenship which is strongly normative and nationalistic’. She added 
that ‘a naturalised citizen should demonstrate a strong feeling of belonging to Algerianness, to 
Algerian society and the Algerian state’.  
 
By law, foreigners are qualified to receive Algerian citizenship if they are married to an 
Algerian citizen for more than three years and have been continuously living in Algeria for at 
least two years. Foreigners may also receive Algerian citizenship by naturalisation provided 
they comply with the following conditions (Algerian nationality law, 2007, p. 03): 
 
Naturalisation 
Art. 10. A foreigner may be qualified to receive Algerian citizenship, provided they:  
1° Have resided in Algeria for at least 7 years from the day of their request. 
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2° Have resided in Algeria during the signature of the decree granting them the certificate of 
naturalisation.  
3° Are of age (reached adulthood). 
4° Are of good morality and never been subject to any condemnation.  
5° Justified that they have enough means of life. 
6° Are sound in body and mind. 
7° Proved their assimilation to the Algerian community / society. 
Exemptions / Exceptions 
Art. 11. (amended) In some exceptional cases, a non-Algerian citizen can be granted Algerian 
citizenship if they provide exceptional favour or service to Algeria or whose infirmity or illness was 
contracted in the service or in the interest of Algeria regardless the conditions of naturalisation stated 
in article 10.  
Foreigners may also be naturalised, regardless of the conditions provided for in article 10 above, if their 
naturalisation is of exceptional interest to Algeria. 
The spouse and children of the deceased foreigner, who in his lifetime could have entered the category 
provided for in the first paragraph above, may apply for naturalisation posthumously.   
 
The Algerian law of citizenship and naturalisation do not elaborate on the idea of doing a 
unique favour or a specific service to the country in details. Article 11 of the nationality code 
remains vague as it does not say what kind of favour should a foreigner offer to Algeria and in 
which context. It does not explain in detail what kind of obligations are expected from a 
foreigner. In this regard, Perrin (2014) adds that the process of naturalisation in the great 
Maghreb region (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya) is often uncertain and very 
complicated. ‘Although Palestinians are not necessarily naturalised in Maghreb countries, in 
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Algeria, for instance, among the majority of naturalised citizens since 1970 were Palestinians 
(Perrin, 2014, p. 09) that arrived in the country after the violent Palestinian-Israeli conflict. In 
this case, it is not only about being Arab and Muslim, but also probably because of the historical 
relationship that has grown since Boumedienne’s era between the state of Palestine and Algeria 
which has, to date, remained strong. This has again been confirmed by the Algerian president, 
Abdelmadjid Tebboun, in 2019, (Alghad TV, 2019). Algeria has always been a supportive and 
loyal ally to Palestine to the point that it does not have diplomatic relations with Israel and any 
Israeli passport holder will be banned from entering Algeria. Perrin (2014, p. 10) further 
confirms that citizenship in the Maghreb region is often ‘a political gesture, intimately linked 
to the interstate relations and the national balance’. Speaking about the possibility of acquiring 
Algerian citizenship because of unique favour or specific service offered for Algeria, Macey 
(2012, pp. 385 & 386) argues that Frantz Fanon, for instance, ‘could have been granted 
Algerian citizenship and an Algerian passport if he had lived after Algeria’s independence in 
1962 regardless of his religion or ethnicity, but in a sense that he would always have remained 
an honorary Algerian’ for his efforts and his strong anti-colonial attitude during the Algerian 
revolutionary war since its start in 1954 until his death in 1961.    
 
Regarding the eligibility of Syrians to Algerian citizenship, article 11 of the Algerian law of 
naturalisation was discussed during my meeting with the Algerian state official, Asma, at the 
Foreigners’ Office (Maktab El Adjanib). Asma gave an example about Algerian martyrs and 
war fighters (el Moudjahidin) that sacrificed their lives during local resistance and Algeria’s 
revolutionary war against the French occupation. A critical analysis of Asma’s discourse would 
confirm that the acquisition of Algerian citizenship is not designed as a right to foreigners but 
as a privilege granted to those that are ready to contribute to the reproduction of the biopolitical 
features of Algerian nationalism by proving the ability to sacrifice for Algeria’s security and 
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national unity in case the state faces potential threats, thus enhancing the life of the Algerian 
population. This is due to the complex history of colonial Algeria and its struggle to gain power 
and sovereignty over its territory and granting rights to citizens. This is not unique to Algeria 
only, similarly, for example ‘Hilary Clinton, the US State Secretary, mentioned that the US 
citizenship is a privilege. It not a right. People who are serving foreign powers … are clearly 
in violation … of the oath which they swore when they became citizens’ (Clinton cited in 
Gibney, 2011, p.05). 
The example offered by the Algerian state official reflects the state discourse that has remained 
highly nationalistic and patriotic. The state discourse is based on the national history of colonial 
Algeria and on paying tribute to the martyrs of the revolutionary war (1954-1962). Discourses 
of fear of the “unworthy” alien and security of national borders have always been powerful in 
Algeria’s conceptualisation of citizenship along with ethno-religious criteria (Islam and 
Arabité). Since the Algerian civil war and during the Arab spring, Algeria’s policy has 
approached aliens with suspicion either in terms of offering access to the Algerian territory or 
in terms of granting a legal status of citizenship. The state holds power to either naturalise non-
citizens if they prove loyalty and possibly denaturalise them if the opposite if proven. I believe, 
one of the constrains that most foreigners living in Algeria and wishing to belong would face 
is the non-measurable conditions of Algerian citizenship. Not only Islam and Arabité but 
loyalty to the state cannot be efficiently measured. Unlike the British system of citizenship 
which offers examples of life in the UK test and English language test, the Algerian law does 





7.1.3. Syrians’ Perceptions of Algerian Citizenship 
 
After discussing the state’s perception and understanding of Algerian citizenship that is based 
on developing feelings of belonging and loyalty to the state and the Algerian people, I discussed 
citizenship, including naturalisation, and a sense of belonging with my Syrian respondents to 
hear more about their perception and understanding of citizenship and its values in order to 
bridge the gap between the state policies and practices at the level of social life. Research data 
demonstrated that the majority of my Syrian respondents perceived citizenship as an 
opportunity to extend their rights in terms of gaining access to housing and employment 
without the presence of an Algerian guarantor or a Syrian that holds a long-residence permit. 
More importantly, for Syrians, the acquisition of citizenship in Algeria was not to overcome 
social exclusion, xenophobia, racism or discrimination but was seen as an opportunity for 
freedom of mobility outside Algeria. Bigo (2002, p. 64) confirms that ‘full integration of 
migrants and refugees will provide opportunities of freedom of travel around the world and a 
new understanding of citizenship in the age of cosmopolitanism’.  
 
Outside of his working hours, Wael, a deliveryman, offered me some delicious Syrian konafa 
(type of oriental sweets) and invited me to a public garden where we could talk at ease. Wael 
owned a delivery van which was registered in his friend’s name because his short-residence 
permit did not grant him the right to own a property or a car in Algeria. I asked what if he goes 
through a police checkpoint, he assured me that there would be no problem even if he was 
using his Syrian driving license and all his van papers are in the name of his friend. He claimed 
that the Algerian police knew about the legal situation of Syrians and are ordered by the state 
to be more understanding of Syrians’ situation in Algeria. Wael assured me that he and his 
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Syrian fellow countrymen had been living, travelling and working in Algeria without any 
problems. As a short-residence permit holder,  
 
‘[He] had the same social rights such as free healthcare, free education, access to housing as an Algerian citizen, 
but still believed that without legal status or citizenship, the place is similar to a big prison because he could not 
travel outside Algeria and visit Syria and his family there…’ [ … mitli mitl el jazaei’ri andi hak taalim, hak l ilaj 
w kolo majani. Ana andi el wathaeik homa aham haja, bi doun wathaeik ka anak b sijn kbir; sijn kbir. Ya’eni mata 
matlaeti mn el jazaeir, ma andek lhak terja’ei liha … bidi anzil ala souriya bas mankder la ano ma andna ikama 
da’eima aw jinssiya …]. 
 
Yasser, for instance, narrated his experience when the Algerian police stopped him at a check 
point because he violated Algerian law, just by mentioning he is a Syrian the ticket was 
dismissed, and the case was closed’. To him, ‘the fact of being a Syrian has offered him 
privileges at different levels: at the level of education and schooling’. For instance, Yasser 
appreciated how easy it was for him to register his children at schools and change them from 
Bordj Bou Arreridj, where he first resided before moved to Algiers for his business. He added: 
 
‘… Thanks God, I live in Algeria and there is no difference between an Algerian and a Syrian… we, Syrians have 
some privileges: for instance, it is easier for us to transfer school for our children than Algerians… for a Syrian, 
we just have to take our papers from one school to another but in the case of Algerians, they need to go through 
some bureaucratic procedures and they need a letter of acceptance from the recieving school…’[… hamdoullah 
ana a’aych houn f jazai’ir si’ri b si’er ay wahed jazai’iri. Ma fi ay tamyiiz bin wahed souri w wahed jazaei’iri 
niha’iyan, niha’iyan niha’iyan. Hata nahna adna chaghlat msahla ilna aktar mn jazai’iriyin mitl nakl tifl mn 
madrassa la madrassa okhra. Hna bark nhazo lkwaret mn madrassa w nedouha l madrassa deuxième ama ljazai’iri 
yelzamlo mowafaka mn lmadrassa lmostakbila w yjib bezaf awrak bch ynkol tifl ta’oo …]. 
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Once Yasser arrived in Algeria in 2013, he went to Bordj Bou Arreridj, first, before he moved 
to Algiers. I asked Yasser about his experience in a different city, Bordj Bou Arreridj, in the 
eastern part of Algeria. He mentioned that an Algerian man supported him even before arriving 
to Algeria with proofs of accommodation and sponsoring letters and continued to help him 
during his stay in Bordj Bou Arreridj with accommodation. Yasser confirmed that he did not 
know his Algerian friend until he arrived in Algeria, he was, rather, a friend of his Syrian friend. 
Unlike Wael who perceived life in Algeria as “a big prison” because he did not have a long-
residence permit or Algerian citizenship that would allow him to visit his home-country, Yasser 
appreciated when Algerians said to him: ‘you left Syria and Algeria is, now, your first country, 
and Syria comes next’.   
 
Similar to Wael, Samer, who has, now, moved to Canada where he has been granted asylum 
by the end of 2019, was one of my Syrian respondents that preferred holding a passport as 
proof of social inclusion and belonging. He considered Algerian citizenship as one of his 
legitimate rights and an honour for his small family to have. In his own words, Samer argued: 
  
‘…from my opinion, my pleasure to have the Algerian nationality because we spent many years here, we know 
the people here, I learnt the language: darija (Algerian Arabic) and I think yes, … yes, I deserve it. Because we 
are trying to make and add value in our business, and we have more deep connections to Algeria… my daughters 
were born here.… but actually, for my case, the most important part of the story is the documents. So, yes if I 
have the chance to get documents outside of Algeria, I will go … but I may come back only for my project…’ 
 
Although Samer was working in an Algerian company of pharmaceutical products in Algiers 
which was previously in Syria, he did not have a long-residence permit. ‘The reason is because 
 253 
Samer did not apply for a work-permit prior to his arrival’, Samer’s Algerian employer, 
Marwan (55), added. Samer confirmed this and argued that in order to apply for a work permit 
and a work visa, he had to be outside Algeria and apply for it, but because he received a call to 
join the Syrian military forces in 2013, he had to leave his country by any means. While Wael 
and Samer theorised successful integration in Algeria as legal recognition / documentations 
and citizenship, Ayman’s viewpoint was very different. His theorisation of successful 
integration is rather based on social inclusion and openness.  
 
Ayman is another example of a Syrian father of three children that fled Syria and went to 
Algeria to search for safety, security and a new life for his small family. He had chosen to go 
to Algeria because he used to visit it even before 2011 for business reasons. After the Syrian 
civil war in 2011, Ayman chose to reside in Algeria although he did not have Algerian 
citizenship or long-residence permit in Algeria. During our discussion about citizenship, 
Ayman stated: 
  
‘…Even though I do not have an Algerian citizenship, I still prefer to stay in Algeria rather than going to a 
European country where I need to give up on my identity, ethno-religious values (Islam and Arabité), and social 
values. I prioritised social inclusion over legal inclusion. I can openly share the experience of my cousin that 
sought refuge in Europe after the civil war in Syria. Despite all the privileges my cousin enjoys such as: European 
citizenship / passport and financial support from the government, he could not cope with life in Europe and social 
differences. That is because of social exclusion and the level of racism he faced. As a Muslim living in Europe, 
my cousin did not feel he belongs to the German society or any European society unless he assimilates and accepts 
their social values. I personally had an opportunity to travel to Belgium where my two sisters have been residing 
and have Belgian passports, but I preferred to stay in Algeria where I share similarities with the Algerian 
population in terms of religion, ethnicity, history and social values… [… ana makhamamt arouh la europa la ano 
fiha massawie. Ma’a kol mahassin europa fiha massawie. Matalan hounik tarbiya el ijtima’eiya sayi’a. ya’eni kad 
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matkoun mondabit inta fi tagharat khossoussan ma’a el atfal w lama yakbro yssir lmawdoue sa’eb. Taniyan, ana 
ibn bi’aa isslamiya w arabiya fa ofadil el aych ma’aa ibn bi’eti kay la ach’or b tamyiz. Halae ibn khali hakali an 
el ijabiyat mitl el passport, ljinssiya, drahm … bas howa hakali ala silbiyat el ijtimaeiya ano hounik fi tafakok 
ossari ala mostawa ktir kbir. Mawdoue salat, el imaniyat hada mawdoue chibh mon’adim … kad mahawalti 
tehorssi alih matkdri … kadalik el mojtamae yendroulk nadrat tamyiz; matalan anta mada taf ‘al houna, fi 
lmostakbal lama andamij momkin, bas fi lbidaya andhom tamyiz ano hada baladna w inta jit la andna w ta’khod 
mn amwal el hokouma. W ba’edhom andhom nadrat ighathat el malhouf … ana andi 2 ikhwati, kano houn w raho 
la baljika lakin ana mahabit arouh la ano ana ibn bi’aa islamiya w ibn biaa arabiya fa fadalt ani n’ich houn ma’aa 
ibn bi’eti…]. 
 
Schuster (2004, p.02) claims that undocumented migrants usually face extreme practices of 
exclusion. However, it was not the case for Malik (21) and his wife Nora (19) that proved the 
opposite in Algeria. The Syrian couple have stopped renewing their short-residence permits 
before we met in 2018, but did not report any problems such as injustice, exclusion, 
discrimination or racism. Malik argued: ‘…I always continue to work although I do not have 
legal documentations apart from my Syrian passport…’ […ana bchtghol … ma andi wala 
awrak andi bas jawazi el souri…]. The pregnant wife Nora and her Husband, like most my 
Syrian respondents, expressed their satisfaction regarding the treatment of Syrians in Algeria 
that was equal to Algerian citizens if not better, even if Syrians did not have legal documents. 
When I visited Nora and Malik at their house, they shared with me the video of their wedding 
in Algiers, where Nora dressed up in both Algerian and Syrian traditional dresses, although she 
is Syrian. Nora justified her choice by saying:  
 
‘… I love both countries and cultures: Algeria and Syria and that is why I wanted to wear both traditional dresses 
in my wedding ceremony… both my Syrian and Algerian friends joined my wedding’ [ana bhab jazaei’ir wa 
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souriya michan hik lbast labs taklidi tabae el baladayn w takafatayn bi orssi … azamt ahbabi souriyin wa 
jazaei’riyin la orssi…]. 
 
In sum, research data have shown that my Syrian participants did not face major obstacles or 
problems at a societal level and did not experience any acts of racism or xenophobia. Next 
sections of the present chapter will show how legal status of these Syrian participants have 
affected their full integration into the Marshallian rights of citizenship in the Algerian context 
and played a major role of exclusion in terms of employment and difficulties in family 
reunifications. Conscious and unconscious exclusion from the state to Syrians at a legal level 
serves the state’s rationalities of both securitisation and nationalism. Securitisation of 
citizenship rights limits the rights of Syrians in freedom of mobility and naturalisation. The 
majority of my Syrian respondents, although appreciating the level of integration at a societal 
level, typified full integration in the host state as legal recognition and a full / unconditional 
access of social rights of citizenship.    
 
7.2. Security and Biopolitical Practices of Managing the Diversity of 
Algerianness by Limiting Syrians’ Access to Employment 
 
With a rapidly growing population of more than 41 million in 2019 (Mourad & Avery, 2019, 
p. 01), Algeria’s provision of work opportunities is very challenging especially for youth and 
for graduates. A civil war in the 1990’s and the reliance of the Algerian state on hydrocarbon 
revenues has resulted in no change or update in economic policies. In turn this resulted in a 
high rate of youth unemployment over the past 20 years and in social discontent which ignited 
 256 
continuous social movements in Algeria particularly since February 22nd, 2019. Despite several 
state interventions and change in labour policies for better flexibility and development, 
employment is still falling. The National Statistical Office (Office National des Statistiques –
ONS-) declares that one in four Algerians aged from 16 to 24 is unemployed, the highest rate 
that reached 26.4% compared to adult unemployment at 8.6% (Berrah, 2018, pp. 03, 14, 21, 
22).  In an attempt to save the situation, ‘Algeria designed a five-year government plan (from 
2014 to the end of 2018) of privatising and diversifying industry and economy, promoting a 
more market-based economy, and fighting corruption (European Training Foundation –ETF-, 
2017) (ETF, 2017, p. 08)’. ‘As a part of its employment policy and state’s financial support 
policy, the Algerian government has adopted the following five schemes for better engagement 
to increase employability among young people, in particular (ETF, 2017, p. 08). However, it 
is worth mentioning that the state’s schemes mentioned below under the Ministry of 
Employment and the Ministry of National Solidarity are available only to Algerian citizenship 
holders 
 
a- Under the Ministry of Employment, Labour and Social Security 
 
ANEM (National Employment Agency): DAIP (‘Dispositif d’Aide à l’Insertion Professionnelle’) 
temporary work contracts and internships for youth. 
ANSEJ (National Agency for Supporting Youth Employment): creation and expansion of 
microenterprises by young people aged 19–35. 
CNAC (National Unemployment Insurance Fund): unemployment benefits and support for the creation 
of micro-enterprises for unemployed individuals aged 30–50. 
 
b- Under the Ministry of National Solidarity 
 
ADS (Social Development Agency): public works programmes for the poor. 
ANGEM (National Agency for Management of Microcredit): micro-credits to the poor’. 
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The state’s ability to provide work permits and create job opportunities is crucial in a successful 
programme of resettlement and integration of displaced people including asylum seekers, 
refugees, and immigrants. The integration of displaced people into the world of employment 
will have a positive impact on their experience of living in a new country (Murphy & Vieten, 
2017, p. 88). Murphy & Vieten (2017, p. 88) state that in the UK, for example, asylum seekers 
will not have the right to work until they are granted a refugee status. In the interim, asylum 
seekers experienced delays in having their applications processed and decisions made. 
Consequently, this would have a negative impact on their lives and would make them 
susceptible to exploitation. In Algeria, the scene is totally different. Generally, non- Algerians 
can work in Algeria if they are investors or members of investing companies in Algeria. They 
will receive work permits and long-residence permits of two years subject to renewal. 
Unfortunately, due to the absence of a refugee national mechanism, asylum seekers, refugees 
and non-economic migrants do not have the right to work either at the state’s sector or receive 
unemployment benefits from the state or apply for state credits. Additionally, they do not 
expect any final decision to be made regarding their legal status due to a gap in the Algerian 
law. Syrians are no exception. By law, short-residence permit holders from the Syrian cohort 
and those that do not hold work permits do not have the right to work in Algeria. However, law 
is not religiously respected when it comes to the state dealing with Syrians in Algeria and some 
legal restrictions have been removed to ease life and work for Syrians. Practically, all my 
Syrian participants confirmed that they could work at their own business, shops or co-work 
with Algerian citizens despite not having legal status or work permits. Rabie and his son, Leyth, 
worked at their shop although they did not hold residence permits and work permits. ‘All we 
have are our expired Syrian passports’, Rabie and Leyth confirmed.   
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The analysis of research data revealed that Syrians fall into three main categories; long-
residence permit holders (valid for 2 years and renewable), short- residence permit holders 
(valid for 45 days and renewable) and Syrians who are registered with the UNHCR and hold 
certificates of registration and humanitarian protection which should be renewed every 6 
months. By law, long-residence permit holders are legally eligible to receive work permits 
which allow them to submit job application and work within their areas of specialisation and 
expertise if they wish to and can apply for CHIFA cards for National Insurance. This status is 
offered to foreign businessmen and investors in the country including Syrians. Because the 
Algerian state has not yet adopted a national refugee law that specifies rights and obligations 
of displaced people, Syrian short-residence permit holders are registered as visitors and their 
residence permits are subject to unlimited renewals every 45 days, but they cannot legally apply 
for work permits or receive national insurance in Algeria. Syrians differ from visitors of other 
nationalities in being protected from illegal deportation because their lives are threatened if 
they go back to their country.  
 
Access to employment is not a straightforward process and is not automatically granted to 
Syrians in Algeria. Most Syrians, mainly businessmen and company owners, who have work 
permits were those who entered Algeria between 2011 and December 2014 when Algeria 
adopted a hospitality approach and granted more rights to Syrians compared to those who 
entered after 2015. Syrians that arrived in Algeria after the world’s refugee crisis in 2015 did 
not necessarily enjoy free unconditional access to employment and did not receive work 
permits to allow them to work legally in Algeria. In order to hear more about life experiences 
of Syrians with employment in Algeria, my research gatekeepers suggested that I pay a visit to 
Baba Hassan in North-western part of Algiers which is known as Baba Aleppo among Syrians. 
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Baba Hassan is a busy, commercial district where most Syrian businessmen who came from 
Aleppo reside and work. In Baba Hassan, I met Hatem, an energetic and very welcoming Syrian 
businessman and investor in Baba Hassan district in Algiers. Proudly, Hatem expressed how 
he and his fellow countrymen helped in transforming Baba Hassan from a forgotten place to 
the most crowded and vibrant district in Algiers known for Syrian textile production, handmade 
oriental decorations, and Middle Eastern sweets and pastries stores. On March 18th, 2018 and 
away from his crowded fabric shop, Hatem and I went to a calm café in Baba Hassan where I 
asked him about his experience with employment as a Syrian investor and businessman in 
Algeria. He confidently replied: 
 
‘I own a textile company in Algeria, and one of the benefits of investing in Algeria is having health insurance and 
a CHIFA card issued by the Algerian government… I pay taxation every year and my family and I receive free 
health services and health insurance’ [… ana stasmart houn bi jazaei’ir fi majal lkmach … eh, andna ri’aaya sihiya 
hamdoullah w adna hata daman ijtimai’i w andna bitakat CHIFA. Hamdoullah … mn chorout fath charika houn, 
fi el ichtirak b daman el ijtimai’i w tkhalssi mablagh kol am. Fa chtarakt w hatit kamel ai’ilati ma’ei b had lbitaka. 
w ana btlaka ri’aaya sihiya b had l bitaka majaniya …]. 
 
As a long-residence permit holder, Hatem confirmed:’ I did not face any problems when it 
came to employment and work permits’. Hatem considered working with Algerians crucial 
especially when he first came in 2011 as he was not familiar with the Algerian context in terms 
of law and Algerian dialect. He added: ‘I have an Algerian private driver, an Algerian female 
dressmaker, and an Algerian female law solicitor / counsellor that I have always trusted’ 
[…andi chauffeur jazai’iri andi ma’ah takriban 10 snin w khayata jazai’iriya w andi mohassba 
kanouniya jazai’iriya. Ma fina nchteghol lahalna b doun jazai’iriyin la ano byfidouna b achyae 
momkin ma na’arfouha w hata homa ashab thika…]. He further added that ‘working with 
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Algerians had never made me feel inferior or raised any issues of racism or discrimination’ 
[…ma fi machakil tamyiz aw hogra…la mawsslna la hadik nokta abadan ma’a el 
jazaei’iriyin…]. Unlike Hatem that had a long-residence permit, short-residence permit holders 
did not enjoy work permits. 
 
About a drive of half an hour away from Baba Hassan, I arrived in Sidi Yahia, a small district 
and a place famed of luxury and extravagance in Algiers, where I met Mohamed, a 32-year-
old man at his workplace. He had been working for four years in a luxurious restaurant as a 
chef specialising in both Syrian and Algerian cuisine. At my first visit, Mohamed did not 
hesitate to take part in my research and agreed to share his experience of seeking refuge in 
Algeria. Without my asking and as if Mohamed was reading my mind, he mentioned the 
situation at work and described the atmosphere with his Algerian and Syrian co-workers:  
 
‘… I have been working with Algerians for 4 years and in our workplace, we are equal, there is no difference 
between us…’ [… fi houn souriyin am bchteghel maahom w maana jazai’iriyin. Nahna mou mokayadin nchteghel 
bas ma’aa souriyin. La ana andi tnin jazai’iriyin ychtghlo ma’ii houn sarlhoun 4 snin w kolayatna kif kif mafi 
fark…]. 
 
Having Syrians and Algerians working in the same restaurant, Mohamed appreciated this 
brought success, openness and good reputation among clients. To him, Pan-Arabism and Islam 
are the strongest bonds between them. The most recurring reasons behind Syrians’ decision to 
choose Algeria as their first destination, were the availability of job opportunities, the state’s 
facilities upon arrival, openness and support of the Algerian local community to Syrians as 
opposed to other countries such as the Gulf states, Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey and European 
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countries. Mohamed went first to Egypt where he lived for nearly two years before he decided 
to live in Algeria. I was curious to know why he left Egypt, even though it is still an Arab and 
a Muslim country. To him, ‘job opportunities in Algeria are more available than in Egypt’ [… 
Lkhdma, lkhdma b jazai’ir khir mn masr…]. Practically, in this case, Mohamed confirmed the 
availability of job opportunities made him decide to move with his wife and two children, to 
Algeria.  
 
The legal situation of Mohamed is different from Hatem’s. Mohamed held a short-residence 
permit and a registration certificate issued by the UNHCR in Algiers. By law, Mohamed’s 
residence permit does not grant him a work permit in Algeria and the UNHCR registration is 
only an assurance against illegal deportation and grants him humanitarian support. Despite the 
fact that law does not grant short-permit holders the right to work legally, Mohamed did not 
face obstacles in terms of his work. He confirmed ‘…the state is fully aware of Syrians who 
are working without legal status or even without documents, but the state is not imposing any 
fines against us or against our employers...’ […el dawla taaref anou ma adna ikamata aw awrak 
la nchtghol bas ma y’akbouna aw yfrdou alina okoubat …]. For him, having or not having a 
work permit is not an issue in Algeria. Mohamed’s life experience was different from another 
short-residence permit holder that found having no work permit and having a short- residence 
permit difficult in terms of starting a small family project.  
 
My fieldwork revealed that in real and daily-life situations, the absence of a refugee / asylum 
official mechanism, creates a gap between top-down and bottom-up applications of theories 
and their actual practices, between intentions and their implementation, and between ideal and 
reality. Leyth and his father own a shop of Syrian pastries and bakeries in Bab Zouar, Algiers. 
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Having heard from other participants that holding a short-residence permit does not allow a 
Syrian to own a property, be it a house, a shop or even a car, I asked Leyth about the sweet 
shop his father owned. He claimed that, in reality, it is their shop but in terms of papers and 
contracts and by law the shop belongs to his uncle. I found this contradictory until he explained: 
‘since my uncle has long-residence permit and he can own a property and apply for a trade 
register. He helped us to open this shop and start our family business …’ […bi nisba la lmahal, 
fatahna b asm ami bima ano mokim daim Kader ydir sijil tijari b asmo w yftah mahal b 
asmo…]. Leyth is a 23-year-old male, who came to Algeria in 2012 when he was just sixteen. 
I asked him how he managed to come to Algeria as a teenager. He expressed his gratitude to 
his uncle, from his father’s side that helped him. I wondered about his uncles’s status; Leyth 
smiled and said ‘he is a long-residence permit holder because he has been married to an 
Algerian woman since 2003’ […ami mokim da’im la ano motzawij wahda jazaei’riya min 
2003…]. Leyth mentioned that without his uncle’s status, he could not have applied for family 
re-unification for his parents and siblings to join him in Algeria. Since their arrival in Algeria, 
Leyth and his family were granted short-residence permits and could not apply for a long-
residence permit because their passports were expired and refused to be renewed by the Syrian 
consulate in Algiers. By law, Syrians who do not hold legal ID or valid documents are illegal 
and may be subject to deportation. However, just like Mohamed, Leyth confirmed that ‘even 
though I do not have legal documents or work permits, I will not face any issues with the 
state…’ [… ana jawaz safari montahi w ma andi ikama w ma andi awrak w makanch li 
yhassebni. Matalan ywakafni barrage aw markaz amni mabyahko maei...]. However, Leyth 
mentioned the obstacles he had been facing due to his undefined legal status; ‘the problem of 
confidence’, he stated. He wondered what if his uncle decides to take over their small business 
because, in law, he is the owner not Leyth and his father. All papers and trade register are in 
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his uncle’s name though money is theirs. The latter is a problem that short-residence holders 
from my Syrian cohort raised.  
 
The European commission (n.d) reported that migrants and non-EU migrants, including 
refugees and asylum seekers, often face challenging obstacles of integration into the labour 
market. The challenges can be due to linguistic incompetence, cultural barriers, lack of legal 
status and papers, lack of required skills, and even due to discrimination. The scene was 
different in Algeria. The major challenge to successful integration into the labour market is 
legal status and legal recognition by the state. The gap in the Algerian immigration law, which 
is the lack of a national law of asylum, hinders successful integration of Syrians although they 
can still work without work permits or legal documents without facing legal procedures against 
them. The only advantage in addition to Syrians’ access to social services (healthcare, 
education, housing and a conditional access to employment) is that they do not face deportation 
as the state’s official at the foreigner’s office, Asma, confirmed that ‘Syrians, generally, do not 
face deportation, but they have to respect the internal law of the state’.  
 
Murphy & Vieten (2017) argue that if asylum seekers can work while waiting for their asylum 
applications to be processed, their living conditions will be improved at all levels and not only 
their financial situation. For asylum seekers, it is all about guaranteeing dignity, pride and 
independence (Murphy & Vieten, 2017, p. 89). Similarly, Syrian interviewees ensured that they 
do not accept any humanitarian aid either from the Algerian state or UNHCR, but they prefer 
to work and earn money to support themselves and their families. For instance, Kamal, a 35-
year-old male participant that owned a shop of oriental decorations in Kouba district in south-
eastern part of Algiers, confirmed that he registered with the UNHCR, but assured me that he 
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did not accept any humanitarian or financial support because he was skilful enough to work, 
unlike some other Syrian refugees. The only reason why Kamal registered with the UNHCR is 
to make sure that he would not be deported illegally by the state.    
 
After investigating the access of Syrians into employment and labour market, the question that 
arises here is: how can conditional and unconditional rights to employment be perceived as 
technologies of the state’s biogovernmental strategy of securitisation and how does these state 
practices implicitly govern the host population (Algerians) and control their diversity? As 
stated earlier, there is a close relationship between the legal status of Syrian displaced people, 
employment and security. From a biogovernmental rationality, by excluding Syrians from legal 
recognition and legal employment, the state is protecting national security, and preserving the 
homogeneity of Algerianness. This became a vital interest for the biopolitics of the Algerian 
state in response to 21st century’s events including the Arab spring waves, civil and political 
unrest in neighbouring countries, the spread of terrorist groups in the Sahel region, and to the 
world’s refugee crisis (2015). As previously mentioned, the Algerian approach to accept Syrian 
displaced people and grant them access to the country went through two main phases (from 
2011 to Dec 2014 and from 2015 to the present time) and adopted two different state discourses 
(hospitality and securitisation) and technologies to manage them and control their circulation. 
Mavelli argues that the ‘dynamics of inclusion and exclusion of refugees have been informed 
by the state’s biopolitical racism that redraws the boundary between ‘valuable’ (to be included) 
and ‘not valuable’ (to be excluded) lives according to the refugees’ capacity to enhance the 
biological and emotional well-being of host populations’. In this respect, late comers during 
this phase enjoyed slightly limited rights compared to the early comers. They either have 
renewable short-residence permits (renewable every 90 days) or hold no documents at all due 
to the expiration of their Syrian passports that were not renewed by the Syrian consulate in 
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Algiers. This group have received free education, free healthcare, access to housing with a 
conditional access to employment. As illustrated in chapter 6, this phase was governed by a 
state discourse of hospitality that labelled them as “guests”. However, Syrians that entered 
during the second phase (starting from January 2015) faced strict borders control policies and 
security measures due to potential threat to Algeria’s national security. They were obliged to 
submit visa applications to the Algerian consulate prior to their arrival to Algeria. The visa file 
should include an invitation and a sponsoring letter from an Algerian citizen or a Syrian that 
holds a long-residence permit. Syrians who were granted entry to Algeria during this phase, 
received short-residence permits which are renewable every 45 days. This type of residence 
permit issued during the 2nd phase have allowed Syrian holders to enjoy free education, free 
healthcare, access to housing but conditional access to employment. A conditional access to 
employment means that Syrians can either work illegally at stores despite the awareness of the 
Algerian state or open their own businesses such as shops, restaurants but with Algerian co-
owners that will help them receive their trade register from the Algerian government. This does 
will not grant them CHIFA cards and grant them access to the state’s national insurance. If 
short-residence permit holders could not find Algerian co-owners, a Syrian long-residence 
permit holder is still eligible.  
 
Most Syrians during the second phase belong to lower middle class or working-class families 
that are still skilful and not very dependent on the state or on the assistance of the UNHCR. 
However, this can still make them vulnerable to exploitation and domestic slavery at work 
especially if they do not have legal documentation. Conditional access to employment also 
means that the Syrian displaced community is effectively governed and managed by the state 
rationalities of security and values of nationalism that protects the Algerian identity and 
controls its legal capacity to include non-citizens. If a short-residence permit holder receives 
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unconditional access to employment, they will be able to start their small business without a 
co-owner. As such, they will have a long-residence permit which is renewable every two years 
and will enjoy the right to free mobility outside Algeria. In terms of Algeria’s discourse of 
security, travelling outside Algeria for Syrians could be considered ‘bad circulation’ (Foucault 
in Aradau and Blanke, 2010, p. 01) that still menaces the national security of the state. By law, 
after 7 years of continuous residence, foreigners can apply for Algerian citizenship. If their 
applications are successful, they will be naturalised and, therefore, they will be Algerian 
citizens. However, since this does not guarantee that they have strong feelings of belonging 
and loyalty to Algeria including its people and the state, as strongly articulated in the argument 
of the Algerian state official, Asma, the state has to limit their access to citizenship by limiting 
their access to employment and to residence permits. 
 
7.3. Discussion  
 
This chapter has discussed how Algeria’s biopolitical decisions aimed at both governing the 
Syrian community and at governing the local population, at the same time through security 
measures. As such, the state decides who is deemed “worthy” and who is ‘‘unworthy / suspect 
/ dangerous’’ of inclusion into the Algerian community. ‘If Foucault’s biopolitics aims at 
caring and maximising the well-being and life of the population as a whole, the humanitarian 
government is the politics of individual life’ (Mavelli, 2017, p. 815 italics as in original text). 
However, Algeria’s state strategies of governing and managing the flow of Syrians have led to 
a state of discrimination and vulnerabilities among the Syrian community itself despite the 
majority of Syrians did not report that they faced acts of racism, harassment, or abuse against 
them by the Algerian society.  
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7.3.1. At the Edges of Discrimination and Vulnerability  
 
Syrian displaced people do not share the same life-experience in Algeria. Generally, Syrian 
businessmen and Syrians who are married to Algerian spouses hold long-residence permits that 
allow them to enjoy full unconditional access to employment and training and freedom of 
mobility outside Algeria. Among the Syrian cohort, Wissal, a 40-year-old Syrian, has been 
married to an Algerian citizen since they were in Syria. Her children were born in Syria and 
received their Algerian citizenship because their father is Algerian. When they entered Algerian 
in 2012, Wissal received a long-residence permit and confirmed that she enjoyed equal rights 
as her husband and children. Although not guaranteed, long-residence permits still grants 
Syrian holders the chance to apply and probably receive Algerian citizenship after 7 years of 
continuous residence in Algeria. However, short-residence permit holders enjoy conditional / 
limited access to employment. This status does not grant its holders the right to travel outside 
Algeria freely or to have the right to apply for Algerian citizenship after 7 years of continuous 
residence in Algeria. The state’s practices resulted in painful inequalities among the Syrian 
community: between long and short-residence permit holders, in terms of their rights (access 
to employment and freedom of mobility outside Algeria) and access to citizenship. For the 
purpose of preserving the national identity, Algerianness, ‘these limitations reflect the frontiers 
and power hierarchies that continue to shape the relationship between citizens / non-citizens 
(Van Woensel Kooy, 2016, p. 09).  
 
Conditional / limited access to employment may make some Syrians vulnerable to modern 
slavery such as fraudulence and exploitation at work.  For instance, short-residence permit 
holder, Samer, was not able to register his car in his name but his Algerian friend and employer, 
 268 
Marwan, registered the car in his name and Samer paid for it. According to law, Samer’s car is 
not his, but his friend’s. Fortunately, Samer and his Algerian friend, Marwan, share mutual 
trust and Samer did not doubt his Algerian friend. The story was totally different with Iyad (40) 
from Ouargla province in the Sahara Desert in southern Algeria where he works as a welder. I 
met Iyad during his stay in Algiers for the registration of his new-born in the Syrian consulate 
in Algiers. During our conversation, Iyad expressed his satisfaction about his life among 
Algerians in Ouargla. He stated that even if in Ouargla there is a very small community of 
Syrians compared to that in Algiers, he did not feel socially excluded. He appreciated how 
people in the Sahara region preserve their cultural customs and traditions compared to the north 
where people are more westernised, as Kamal claimed as well. After three days of our meeting 
on April 14th, 2018, I called him in order to hear more about his experience during his stay in 
Algiers. I was surprised to hear that his legal status made him vulnerable to a fraud.  
Holding a short-residence permit, just as Samer, Iyad was not able to register his personal car 
in his name. He used his Syrian fellow countryman’s long-residence permit to buy a car and 
apply for a vehicle registration (La carte grise). After 1 year of having the vehicle, Iyad was 
surprised to be called by the police because his Syrian friend claimed that he lent his car to 
Iyad, who refused to give it back to him. Legally, the car is not registered in Iyad’s name 
because he could not, but it was he who paid for it. This act created a frustration to Iyad and 
his family but ended up on Iyad having to re-register the car on the name of his Algerian friend. 
Although there was some relief, nothing guaranteed to Iyad that the same scenario would not 
repeat itself with his Algerian friend. This justified why my Syrian participants were concerned 
about their legal status and why Leyth and his father Rabie, for instance, were extremely 
concerned because their family business and contracts were on the name of Leyth’s uncle. 
What made Leyth’s uncle able to apply for a trade register and register it on his name to help 
Rabie start his family business was because he held a long-residence permit. If, for instance, 
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Rabie or Leyth’s status were legalised in Algeria, they could have been able to register their 
family business on their names rather than being susceptible for unexpected fraud from Leyth’s 
uncle.  
 
7.3.2. Knowledge Production: Good and Failed Citizens within the Syrian 
Community 
 
The act of begging is illegal in Algeria, and the Algerian law punishes beggars (Criminal and 
Punishment Law, 2015, pp. 81-82). For some people who have received short-term resident 
permits remained vulnerable to exploitation from illegitimate organisations and scam agencies 
of street begging. Having different status and enjoying different rights, Syrians developed a 
sense of discrimination among them. Ayman was one of the Syrians who commented on the 
growing phenomenon of Syrian beggars in the streets of Algiers. In a very strong attitude of 
denationalisation, he called them ‘El Arbat’ and claimed that ‘they are not (true) Syrians by 
descent by they are naturalised Syrians that have been granted Syrian passports when they 
immigrated to Syria’. Fateh is another respondent who shared the same view as Ayman. He 
argued that they are called ‘El Ghajar’ that are naturalised Syrians, but not true Syrians 
[…okhrin yada‘oun anhom souriyin li homa el motassawilin El Ghajar li jaw b ism el souriyin 
lal jazai’ir…]. When talking to both Ayman and Fateh and trying to analyse their discourse 
from an angle of knowledge production, I noticed that Syrians established exclusionary criteria 
within their own community. They excluded people that need financial support and do not work 
from being Syrian and classified them as previously Bedoon (stateless people) that are not true 
Syrians, but they are naturalised citizens. Fateh and Ayman’s discourse of denationalising 
 270 
other Syrians, that are in need for financial support, from Syrian citizenship was an attempt to 
change a negative sociological image drawn around Syrian war refugees in the world. ‘Syrians 
are hard workers and they prefer to work rather than wait for financial supports’ [… souriyin 
hirafiyin w chtghlo mayntadro wahed ysa’edhom b ay chi … w hado li am ytssawlo may’aksso 
sourat souri el hakiki…], Ayman stated. Anderson (2015) argues that the community of value 
distinguishes migrants from citizens. Yet not all citizens are good citizens; norms of inclusion 
/ exclusion should determine that. In her exploration of this idea, Anderson argues that ‘the 
community of value is defined from the outsider by the non-citizen (exclusion), but also from 
the insider by the failed citizen (failure) (Anderson, 2013, p. 4)’. A non-citizen is excluded 
from the local community / nation because they do not have a normative status in addition to 
the absence of a legal status. In contrast, failed citizens (despite legal citizens in law) such as 
criminals can also face exclusion because they are not worthy of membership of the community 
of value (i.e.), they are not hard workers; they do not contribute to the development of the 
nation, they are criminals. Similarly, within the small community of Syrians in Algeria, Syrians 
set up boundaries and norms of inclusion and exclusion of good and failed citizens. Syrian 
workers in Algeria defended themselves by claiming that Syrian beggars are failed citizens, as 
Anderson (2015) would call them, because a good citizen should work and earn money by 
themselves rather than begging. It can be concluded that Syrian beggars and poor people were 
considered as a threat to the social order of the Syrian community itself and not only to the 
Algerian society, as the Algerian law would consider them.  
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7.4. Conclusion  
 
Migration and refugeehood have always intertwined with concerns of the state’s national 
security. They also challenge the homogeneity of national identities especially in societies and 
states that do not adopt multiculturalism as their political and sociological ideologies. Within 
the age of globalisation, migration and refugeehood have left negative effects and consequently 
displaced people have been associated with illegalities that increase the level of crimes, human 
and drug trafficking, local and international networks of terrorists and espionage between 
countries. Not only does illegal displacement of migrants and refugees create risks at the level 
of national security but it challenges the welfare state and its capacity to provide social welfare 
through granting social rights (Bigo, 2002) to both local population and the displaced 
community of refugees and migrants.  
 
Algeria’s strategy of securitisation came as a reaction to civil and political instabilities in 
neighbouring countries namely: Libya and Mali. This, in turn, led to human trafficking, drug 
trafficking, and the spread of networks of terrorists and extremists on the Algerian borders. 
Reviewing the national historiography of Algeria in chapters 3 and 4 reveals how securing 
national territory and protecting national sovereignty have always been very sensitive subjects 
to colonial and post-colonial Algeria (1832- 1962 and 1962- present). On November 4th, 1848 
Algerians were deprived of their sovereignty over their national territory when metropolitan 
France annexed Algeria to its French territory in its mission to expend its power in Africa 
(French Constitution, November 4th, 1848). After discovering natural resources in the Algerian 
Sahara, France started spreading its exploitation of oil and gas until officially nationalised after 
independence during Boumedienne’s era. Additionally, Algeria’s vast Sahara was used for 
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France’s atomic and nuclear tests in February 1960 (Panchasi, 2019). Algeria’s challenge after 
independence has always been the protection of a vast territory especially during the age of 
migration and international terrorism. Unlike some of the ‘European countries that adopted 
deportation, detention and dispersal as their mechanisms of exclusion (Schuster, 2004, p. 01)’, 
this scenario did not take place in Algeria. Research data revealed that even without legal 
documentations or renewal of their residence permits, Syrian asylum seekers, refugees and 
immigrants did not face deportation or detention, as in European states. 
 
Before 2015, Syrians were able to enter Algeria without a visa prior to arrival. However, in 
2015 Algeria’s new strategy obliged Syrians to submit a visa application prior to arrival in 
response to attempts of terrorist groups to enter the Algerian territory in the name of 
refugeehood. The latter was clearly reflected in the viewpoint of the state official at the 
Foreigners’ Office, Asma, that argued: ‘we cannot grant entry to one person and sacrifice the 
lives of 40 million Algerians’. Additionally, as previously mentioned, the state’s biopolitical 
perception was also demonstrated in the speech of the head of migration office at the Algerian 
Ministry of Internal Affairs, Hassan Kassimi, after Algeria’s rejection to grant entry to a group 
of Syrians who claimed to be war refugees but were, in fact, Jihadists that flew from Syria to 
Turkey to Sudan until they reached Algeria’s borders.  
 
‘Biopolitics deals with the population as a political problem that is at once scientific and 
political, as a biological problem and as power’s problem’ (Foucault in Williams, 2015, p. 36). 
The state’s decision to control its borders and the requirement for displaced Syrians to submit 
a visa prior to arrival and limit their access to legal status and legal employment should not be 
understood from a security perspective only. These state’s technologies can also be understood 
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as a biopolitical decision to both care for the well-being of the local population in Algeria. 
Worthy Syrian refugees that were granted access before 2015, have proven their ability to 
enhance the economic situation in Algeria and contribute to the well-being of the local 
population through their businesses and economic activities. Visa requirements, conditional 
access of employment and the limitation of short-residence permits for Syrians who arrived 
after 2015 demonstrate the legal capacity and openness of Algerian citizenship which is still 
exclusive and conditional despite the level of hospitality among the Algerian local society and 
the state’s strategy of hospitality between 2011 and Dec 2014. This, in turn, reflects the state’s 
efforts to limit and manage diversity through the preservation of the homogeneity of the 
national identity: Algerianness. Citizenship in Algeria is not only a dynamic cultural and social 
process or a reflection of identity and a sense of belonging, but also a manifestation of loyalty 
to the state and the local population. Indeed, Hepworth (2015) concludes that threats of the 














8.1. Overview of Thesis  
 
The rationale of this study was to investigate how Algeria’s colonial past and post-colonial 
present still influence the present state’s decisions on Algerian citizenship when it comes to 
meeting the challenges of Syrian displaced people in Algeria. From a Foucauldian perspective 
of biopolitical governmentality, this empirical study finds that the state technologies manifest 
themselves in what Algeria has offered to Syrians in terms of legal, social and civil rights of 
citizenship such as healthcare, education, housing, employment, mixed marriages, and freedom 
of movement. Additionally, closed borders, bureaucratic procedures, visas prior to arrival and 
guest centres are also embedded state technologies through which the state rationalities 
function. The nuances of conditionalities of state’s technologies differ depending on the state’s 
discourses of hospitality, security and humanitarian support, but they serve the same 
rationalities of nationalism, national security, and the biopolitics of Algerian citizenship and 
Algerianness.   
 
In order to achieve this task, chapter 3 and 4 of this thesis started by critically reviewing the 
history of colonial and post-colonial Algeria and how the imagination and conceptualisation of 
Algerianness and Algerian citizenship have been continuously re-invented based on different 
events that take place in Algeria’s history such as: movements of local resistance to the French 
colonial power (nationality laws and rights), war of liberation, Algeria’s independence, 
Chapter Eight: Conclusion 
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Algerianisation of the nation (Algerian citizenship and rights, Islam and Arabness, Algeria’s 
civil war in the 90s, Arab spring waves and contemporary threats from international terrorism 
to national security). Reviewing Algeria’s history is important in understanding the present 
state’s practices of naturalisation, granting citizenship rights, and border control adopted by the 
state when managing the flow of displaced people. Colonial power or forms of power were 
supported and facilitated by political technologies directed towards the target population 
(Matereke, 2011, p. 07). Chapter 3 of this thesis critically analysed the practices of France’s 
colonial will to improve / civilising mission of obliterating the main principles of Algerianness 
namely Arabness and Islam through technologies of nationality laws, education and Algeria’s 
annexation to France. The French colonial disciplinary power started with Code de l’indigénat 
in 1881 that turned Algerians into subjects and exercised power through colonial courts and 
tribunals and administrations. The French colonial power deprived the Algerian population of 
rights and executed a policy of erasure when it comes to identity and land. The discourse of 
colonisation started by declaring Algeria as a part of the French territory in the 19th century and 
its people were deemed French citizens. However, the process of offering French nationality 
was discriminative and was based on ethnicity, origins and religion. Europeans in Algeria and 
Algerian Jews were declared citizens and received French citizenship; Algerian Muslims, on 
the other hand, were declared colonial subjects and deprived of rights. Algerian Muslims had 
to wait until France enacted Loi de Jonnart in 1919 which offered the possibility for Algerian 
Muslim elites to receive legal status and rights only if they renounce their religion. Education 
was another means through which the French colonial power controlled the Algerian nation to 
re-shape its national identity in the imperial Republican mould. The project of westernising 
Algerian pupils at schools aimed at obliterating faith (Islam) and language (Arabic). The 
French Minister of Education, Jules Ferry, stated that through the French educational 
curriculum adopted in colonial Algeria aimed at teaching Algerian pupils French and only 
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French because the primary aim was not to teach them about their history or geography, but 
the main aim was to detach them from their mother tongue and culture (Cited in Laaredj-
Campbell, 2016, p. 96).  
  
In colonial Algeria, these colonial practices had to face local Algerian resistance and cultural, 
political, and armed movements that preserved the nature of Algerianness as a collective 
national identity. Chapter 3 stated three main figures of Algerian movements of nationalism 
namely El Amir Abdu El-Kader el Jazaeir’ri, Abd El-Hamid Ibn Badiss, and Messali Hadj. The 
reason why I limited myself to these Algerian leaders is because of their significant 
contributions into shaping Algerianness and fostering Algerian national pride. Abdu El-Kader 
contributed in preserving religious and cultural attributes of Algerianness during the 19th 
century which established the social power of modern nationalism which was led by Ibn Badiss 
and Messali Hadj in the 20th century.  
 
Chapter 3 provided an overview of colonial power in colonial Algeria. Chapter 4 illustrated the 
state’s governmentality of Algerianising the independent nation of Algeria through 
technologies and discourses of citizenship, nationalism, and Arabisation. These discourses and 
technologies aimed at serving a state’s rationality of re-inventing and re-designing 
Algerianness as a normative and a political entity in order to foster national pride. From a 
perspective of power-knowledge relation, chapter 4 analysed how state discourses of post-
colonial Algeria have produced the “ideal Algerian citizen”. The Algerian constitution reflects 
the collective imagination and the role to be played by the ideal citizen.  
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The Algerian constitution starts with the turmoil and suffering of the Algerian nation and its 
will to achieve liberty. It then glorifies the Algerian revolutionary war against the French 
regime and its attempts to eradicate the principles and values of the Algerian nation namely: 
Islam, Arabism and Tamazight. The opening of the constitution also mentioned the efforts of 
the Algerian state to foster nationalism and social equality and protect national sovereignty and 
security. Section two of the Algerian constitution discussed what Algerian citizens are strictly 
banned from doing such as humiliating Islam and the principles of Algerian revolutionary war 
including the war veterans and martyrs. The most recent version of the Algerian constitution 
(2020) defines Algerian society in the preamble and sections as follows: 
 
‘… Knowing that the Algerian people went through foreign invasions throughout time and fought against colonial 
rule, Algerian people are free and remain always free and Algeria has always been the land of freedom, dignity 
and pride. 
November 1st, 1954 was a turning point in the history of Algeria and the Algerian people during which they 
resisted all attempts that would have obliterated their national identity, which is Islam, Arabism and Tamazight. 
Algerian society fought and will always fight when it comes to its freedom, national democracy, national 
sovereignty, national independence, and nationalism and always do its best to achieve them within a democratic 
republic that ensures social equality and justice… 
Chapter One 
Section One: Principles and Basics which govern Algerian Society 
Rule One: Algeria is a people’s democratic republican state and will never divide. 
Rule Two: Islam is the religion of the state. 
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Rule Three: The Arabic language represents the national official language of Algeria and it always remains so. 
All possible efforts have to be done by the supreme council to make Arabic language used in all scientific fields 
and translation; it should be encouraged. 
Rule Four: Tamazight is also a national official language in Algeria. 
The Algerian state has done its best to develop its linguistic variations used all over Algeria. 
Rule Five: Algiers is the capital city of Algeria. 
Rule Six: the national flag and the national anthem are the symbols of the Algerian revolution and they are not 
subject to change. They represent the symbols of the republic; … 
Section Two: The People 
Rule 10: it is totally prohibited for associations to do the followings: 
1- Acts of feudalism, regionalism, and nepotism. 
2- Acts of human slavery and dependency. 
3- All acts that contradict and do not represent moral ethics of Islam and the principles of the Algerian 
revolution.’ 
 
(The Algerian constitution, 2020. My translation from Arabic to English). 
 
A quick look at the text extracted from the Algerian constitution that was revised in 2020 in 
response to the Algerian Hirak of 22nd of February 2019, shows us the main points around 
which collective identity is to be formed: the principles of nationalism and Algeria’s war of 
liberation against the French coloniser, Islam, Arabism and Tamazight. The imagined “ideal 
citizen” in post-colonial Algeria has been structured in reaction to what the French colonisation 
intended to obliterate. After Algeria’s independence, only those whose father or grandfather 
held Muslim personal status automatically received Algerian citizenship. As such, around 
‘91.000 Harkis’ (Algerians that served France against Algeria) (Roberts & Tucker, 2008, p. 
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81) Jews and Christians that used to live in Algeria, known as “pieds noirs”, found themselves 
excluded after Algeria’s independence and immigrated to France. The “ideal Algerian citizen” 
is not only a Muslim, but the free nation needed to re-connect with the rest of the Arab world 
and mainly brothers-in-arms namely the republics of Syria, Egypt and Iraq. In order to achieve 
this, president Boumedienne adopted a cultural and political policy of Arabisation; the latter 
aimed at boosting Arabic as a language in a new independent nation where only French was 
allowed in educational settings. Algeria started exchange programmes of teachers with Arab 
countries namely Syria, Iraq and Egypt. Prior to this and before the Algerian independence in 
1962, the FLN (Front de Libération National), which was the armed force of Algerian 
nationalism, was backed up by Egypt where the provisional Algerian government was set up 
in 1958. After independence, Algeria’s ideology of Arabisation also involved supporting the 
Arab nation against foreign invasion under the principles of pan-Arabism. 
 
In the case of the Arab Israeli conflict in 1967 and 1973, Algeria’s military support remains 
undeniable: ‘on November 15, 1988, a formal declaration of a Palestinian state was made by 
the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) chairman Yasser Arafat in Algiers, Algeria during 
a meeting of the Palestinian National Council (PNC)’ (Roberts & Tuckers, 2008, p. 83). To 
date as a symbol of loyalty to principles of pan-Arabism and support to Palestine, Algeria has 
not had any official diplomatic relations with Israel.  
 
From a biopolitical perspective, social welfare offered an egalitarian form of statecraft to 
distribute the state’s wealth among the population. In order to enhance the well-being of the 
population, post-colonial Algeria offered free, full and unconditional access to healthcare, 
education, public housing and employment. Additionally, economically, during 
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Boumedienne’s era Algeria nationalised its hydrocarbon industry in its Sahara and gained 
control over its territory and its resources like oil and gas. 
The last section of chapter 4 critically questioned how discourses of Algerianness can be 
inclusive or exclusive to “the other” in the age of mass migration. In order to answer this 
question, this section offered an insight on how Algerianness / Algerian citizenship can be 
understood as a practice of biopolitical governmentality of the Algerian state. My claim was 
that since post-1962 Algerianness and Algerian citizenship were highly nationalistic and 
adopted technologies of exclusion, they would still be exclusive to a group of people in the age 
of globalisation and mass migration. However, the same technologies of exclusion might act 
as technologies of inclusion and offer rights for Syrians as they are Arabs and maybe Muslims, 
and they share the same history with Algeria since the exile of the Algerian leader of local anti-
colonial resistance in the 19th century ‘El Amir Abdu El-Kader el Jazaei’ri’ to Damascus and 
the participation of Algeria in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Yet, the fact of being Arabs and maybe 
Muslims does not guarantee that a foreigner holds nationalistic sentiments towards Algeria. 
Therefore, naturalisation for non-citizens in Algeria may not be a straightforward process 
especially due to the contemporary threats to Algeria’s national unity and security. In order to 
analyse these claims, I used biopolitical governmentality to approach research data from an 
angle that focusses on the art of governing a population including state’s discourses, 
rationalities and technologies of governmentality. The next step examined how these state 
governmentalities serve a biopolitical thinking of the state. In order to understand the power 
game in Algeria and to understand how the state manages the flow of Syrian displaced people 
into the country, I adopted three levels of analysis namely: identifying technologies of 
governing that show the embodiment of the state’s political programmes; identifying state 
discourses and power-knowledge relations of producing Syrian displaced people as either 
“guests”, “potential threats” or “suffering bodies”; the third level of analysis focusses on 
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welfare state rationalities and how they are designed to be biopolitical strategies of governing 
both the Algerian population and the Syrian displaced community. In the absence of an official 
asylum / refugee mechanism in Algeria, the analysis of data offered an explanation for why 
nationalistic Algerian citizenship is highly exclusive to most foreigners and what alternatives 
the state has to offer to Syrians instead of naturalisation and legal recognition. 
 
After providing research context and theoretical foundation, a review of the relevant literature 
in the field and a discussion of the methodology, chapters 6 and 7 presented data analysis and 
discussed research findings. The research findings revealed that within a state rationality of 
nationalism, Syrians may face exclusion because they did not fit into the box of “an ideal citizen 
that is loyal to Algeria” as imagined by the state. As Arabs and Muslims, Syrians were offered 
a higher level of tolerance and ease at a legal level and social rights of citizenship such as 
healthcare, education, accommodation / housing, and employment. However, access to 
citizenship rights has been controversial among Syrians. These controversies have created 
categorisation, feeling of marginality and identity crisis among the Syrian displaced 
community. In fact, I have divided the Syrian displaced community into two main groups: the 
first involved Syrians that entered without a visa or any restrictions from 2011 until December 
2014; the second group arrived after Algeria obliged to submit a visa application prior to arrival 
in January 2015. Although during both phases, Algeria committed itself to the provide 
humanitarian support to Syrian displaced people, they are governed by different 
governmentalities with different state discourses: hospitality and securitisation, technologies, 
and produced different paradoxical knowledge about Syrian displaced people: “worthy guests” 
and “potential threats”. However, they served the same state rationalities that aim at protecting 
the nature of Algerian citizenship.  
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From 2011 to December 2014, Algeria’s discourse that governed displaced people including 
Syrians was based on principles of Arabic and an Islamic ethic of hospitality which allowed 
unconditional generosity and solidarity. Because of a shared history that started between 
Algeria and Syria since the exile of Algeria’s leader of Anti-colonial resistance, El Amir Abdu 
El-Kader, hospitality and unconditional welcoming were considered as an ethical duty that 
Algeria owes to Syria.  Syrians were produced as “worthy guests”. Despite this openness and 
the guarantee of unconditional rights for Syrians in terms of healthcare, health insurance, 
education, accommodation, employment, legal status and freedom of mobility, they could not 
apply for naturalisation. The state’s rationality behind precluding Syrians from Algerian 
citizenship is due to its nationalistic nature of Algerian citizenship and the complex history of 
its development. The second phase from January 2015 to the present contradicts with the state 
discourse of hospitality. The dominant discourse of the second phase was based on security 
manifested in technologies of border control, limiting access to citizenship rights such as legal 
employment, restricting mobility and even restricting mixed marriages between Algerians and 
Syrians. This discourse produced Syrians as “potential threats” which again precluded them 
from naturalisation and Algerian citizenship. The latter remains the state’s rationality. 
Exceptionally, during this phase, Algeria’s obligation to provide humanitarian support is based 
on its conceptualisation of “the suffering body” whose suffering is legitimate and needs 
attention. This attention means access to Algeria and enjoyment of rights but not Algerian 
citizenship. Chapters 6 and 7 explained how these state governmentalities differ in technologies 
and discourses but relate to each other’s by serving the same state rationalities of preserving 
the nature of Algerianness by precluding displaced people from Algerian citizenship.   
 
To sum up, I would allow myself to end up by repeating Taher Djaout’s quote: ‘it is a tough 
job being Algerian’ (Tahar Djaout * (quoted in Šukys, 2007: 14) in Benrabah, 2013, p. vi). The 
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reason why I would like to re-mention the quote at this stage of my thesis is to summarise the 
experience of Syrian displaced people in Algeria. Despite all historical ties, Arabness / pan-
Arabism and Islam, research data revealed that the nature of Algerian citizenship remains 
normative and nationalistic during the age of mass migration and international terrorism in the 
21st century which makes it even harder to Syrians to be naturalised in Algeria.    
 
8.2. Summary of Key Findings  
 
8.2.1. The Politics of Alienation: Encounters with Refugeehood and 
Nationalistic Norms of Algerian Citizenship 
 
Due to the absence of an official national refugee law in Algeria which may have explained the 
state’s strategies of managing the flow of Syrian displaced people and may have legalised their 
status in Algeria, I offered an explanation of the state’s practices through the lens of biopolitical 
government. The latter explained Algeria’s strategies / discourses of hospitality, security and 
humanitarian support. The term also referred to the biopolitical force of Algerianness and the 
political order of Algerian citizenship which have governed the level of openness of the state 
and society towards non-citizens. Having said that, I have argued that the state’s inclusion and 
exclusion criteria are consciously and unconsciously informed by both historical and 
contemporary circumstances. My research data revealed that the state has used, alternatively, 
three main strategies namely: hospitality, security and humanitarian support that often conflict 
within the Algerian scene as they are driven by contradictory state rationalities and motives. 
For instance, from a hospitality viewpoint, the state welcomes Syrians as they are a part of the 
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community of faith (Islam) and Pan-Arabism. The discourse of security, however, denies 
access and precludes Syrians from enjoying full unconditional rights and classifies them as a 
potential source of threat to the national security of the country and its society. These state 
discourses promote different representations and productions of people of the Syrian 
community: “guests”, “brothers and sisters” or “potential threat” to the state security. Both 
Syrian groups are entitled to humanitarian support and war refugee rights such as registration 
with UNHCR, no illegal deportation and no detention.  
 
In Addition to its commitment to provide humanitarian support for displaced people, the 
Algerian state also adopted hospitality as its welcoming state’s strategy. The latter have been 
governed by principles of Islam, Pan-Arabism and in the name of strong historical ties between 
Algerians and Syrians. Security, on the other hand, was governed by the state’s concerns for 
the safety of its national territory and population. Implicitly, these norms of securitisation of 
strategies of hospitality and humanitarianism are also governed by unconscious rules derived 
from the nature of Algerian citizenship. The latter was invented as a reaction to the French 
citizenship in colonial Algeria that granted rights to valuable groups, namely Jews and 
Europeans in Algeria, as opposed to those who chose not to renounce their Muslim personal 
status. Algerians whose fathers and grandfathers held Muslim personal status were deemed 
French subjects according to code de l'indigénat (1881) and did not enjoy fundamental rights.  
Both French citizenship in colonial Algeria and post-colonial Algerian citizenship are based on 
exclusionary norms but serve different biopolitical state rationalities. If the Crémieux decree 
(1870) granted full French citizenship to Jews and allowed them to enjoy privileges and full 
social, legal and civil rights as opposed to Algerians of Muslim personal status who were 
excluded and deemed subjects, today’s Algeria’s decision, on the other hand, to grant access 
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only to “worthy” and “non-dangerous” people from the Syrian community still aims at boosting 
the well-being of the Algerian local population. Algeria’s exclusionary norms at a legal level 
resemble the exclusion of Muslims in colonial Algeria, but today’s exclusionary norms are not 
based on race, religion or ethnicity, they are rather based on biopolitical reasons of 
securitisation. Precluding a group of Syrians from Algerian citizenship is a manifestation of 
their exclusion at a legal level. However, biogovernmental norms of hospitality have granted 
conditional social rights to Syrians.  
Adopting a Foucauldian thinking, I argued that the state strategies of hospitality and security 
are designed as biopolitical governmentalities that care for the Algerian population and control 
the Syrian community. State strategies of hospitality and security also provided a social 
representation, conceptualisation and production of both displaced people and national citizens. 
This could be observed through the state technologies of exceptionally restricting and almost 
banning the legalisation of mixed marriages between Syrians and Algerian in Algerian civil 
law, offering conditional access to employment which can only be possible with the presence 
of an Algerian guarantor in the contract, and restricting access to health insurance. Besides, the 
legal status of Syrians did not grant them access to the right of naturalisation after residing in 
Algeria for 7 years. By restricting access to economy, healthcare, and mixed marriages between 
Algerians and Syrians, Syrian displaced people are legally marginalised and Algerian 
citizenship have treated them as “unworthy” and “invaluable” migrants whose lives do not 
matter. These state practices could tell a lot about the nature of Algerian citizenship and who 
counts as a citizen in Algeria. The discourse of nationalism remains dominant in Algeria’s post-
colonial state in terms of what Benedict Anderson has referred to as ‘official nationalism’, that 
is, ‘something emanating from the state, and serving the interests of the state first and foremost’ 
(Benedict Anderson, 1983, p. 145 in Hedman, 2008, p. 360). Having said that, at a state level 
the Algerian citizenship was often perceived as a privilege rather than a right.   
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My research date revealed that while the state’s conceptualisation of Algerian citizenship is 
highly normative, nationalistic and patriotic, the majority of my Syrian respondents did not 
express these sentiments. They perceived Algerian citizenship or the Algerian passport as a 
document or a piece of paper that is important for the development of their economic activities. 
Wael mentioned that ‘… if, for instance, Syrians have Algerian citizenship or at least long-
residence permits, they could have brought their businesses from Syria to Algeria and register 
them on their own names rather than having an Algerian co-owner …’ [souriyin andhom san’a, 
law faradan fi awrak kouna tawarna houn choghlna …]. Hatem, Businessman in Baba Hassan 
mentioned that ‘…we are importing Syrian textiles from Egypt, while we could have produced 
it here in Algeria if we had citizenship … even producers could have moved their businesses 
to Algeria because the Algerian market needs these businesses’ [am njib lkomach souri min 
masr … Matalan law dawla wafarat ikamat aw jinssiya kouna Matalan nkder nsan’o houn aw 
hadou sanay’iya ynoklo choghlhoun houn la anou b jazaei’ir fi khdma bi lmokarana maa masr 
w boldan okhra…]. Additionally, Algerian citizenship and the Algerian passport were seen by 
others from the Syrian cohort as a piece of paper that would facilitate their free mobility outside 
the Algerian territory. Lara whose mother was in Algeria but went back to Syria argued: ‘… if 
I have legal documents such as long-residence permit or citizenship, I can go to Syria and go 
back to Algeria … [Matalan law andi awrak fini rouh la souriya and ahli w arjae houn].   
 
While the majority of my Syrian respondents seem interested in legalising their status by 
naturalisation or through a long-residence permit, others such as Yasser did not seem very 
concerned about this. Yasser (45) is a Syrian restaurant owner in a northern suburb of Algiers, 
Bab Zouar, that left Syria and headed to Algeria in 2013. I met him in 2018 and although he 
did not receive a long-residence permit after five years of continuous residency in Algeria, he 
mentioned: 
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‘…I discontinued to renew my short-residence permit a year and a half ago and the only reason why I would think 
of legalising my status in Algeria is to be able to visit my family and friends that are still in my home-country, 
Syria. Although I recently applied for a long-residence permit but did not hear a decision yet, without a legal 
status for more than five years I did not face major obstacles in terms of healthcare, education, housing or 
employment. There is a high level of tolerance at both the state and societal levels for Syrians in Algeria … for 
instance at police checkpoints … I will always continue my life in Algeria even if Syria goes back to normal’ [… 
Sah kayen hadak lkhatem li howa tajdid kol chahrayn bas ana sarli aktar mn am w nosf madertha w ay barrage 
yhabassni mayhawssouch ‘aliya … kolchi ‘adi maydirouli ay mochkila. hatit mo’akharan talab and wizarat 
dakhiliya ani atlob ikama da’ima michan nkder nrouh ‘ala souriya w n’awed narjae w mazalni nstana. Lakin dorka 
ma’andi walou bas ma fi ay machakil hamdoullh rab el alamin. El ikama tlabtha michan akder arouh ala Souriya 
achouf ahli w akriba’i w arjae ala jazaei’eir la ani fateh choghli houn w am faker hata law khlsat el machakil fi 
souriya marah atrok el jazaei’ir. Ana mfaker 99% okim b jazaeir, li bado anhom ya’etouni el ikama la inzal ala 
Souriya zyara w arja’e ala jazaei’ir. Ama fi jazaei’ir el an, b el ikama aw bidounha rana aychin mitlna mitl ay 
mowatin jazaei’iri…]. 
 
Understandings and conceptualisations of citizenship were perceived by Syrian respondents 
differently. For Yasser, social inclusion was more important rather than just holding a passport 
or a legal residence permit in Algeria. He mentioned the example of his friend who had been 
living in Europe and narrated his experience:  
 
‘In Sweden, my friend was not satisfied with the level of inclusion at a societal level despite receiving financial 
support and free housing from the government… my friend has to face secularism, lost control over his children, 
and was not able to preserve his child’s Muslim identity in the Swedish society and even at schools and educational 
settings’  […w bedi kolak ano lhaja li khalatni ma etla’e ala europa hiya ano fakart b wladi awal chi, bas tala’ehom 
ala europa yetghayar kolchi; tarbiya, din, lkraya .. kolchi .. hata f lkraya ydakhloulhom afkar ano yeb’aad an dino 
w akiidto w an omo w abouh … ana kount ahki ma’aa rfiki fi Europa howa ‘aych w kali ano ibno talab la abouh 
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chorta. alo ana ida ma khalitni Matalan arouh ‘ala lmantika l folaniya rah ajiblak chorta w mabtahssen tssawi li 
bedak yah ma’ii…]. 
 
I asked Yasser if he had any Syrian friends who sought refuge in different places in the world 
other than Europe, he mentioned three countries that have hosted high numbers of Syrian 
refugees, namely: Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey. Yasser told me about the life experiences of 
his fellow countrymen who, he says, lost their dignity, faced discrimination at all levels, found 
themselves marginalised, and socially excluded. Yasser was disappointed by the way the 
Lebanese treated Syrians and said: ‘we, Syrians, opened our houses to Lebanese during the 
civil conflict in Lebanon in 2006 but they are treating Syrians with discourtesy’ 
[…Hamdoullah. Mn nahiyat karamti, houn b jazai’ir karamtna ka souriyin marfou’aa la sma 
kima ykolo hamdoullah w el jazai’iri yahdaflna karamtna mou mitl ba’ed el boldan el okhra li 
aychin fiha souriyin mitl lobnan, torkiya, el ordon … hounik el souri mahyouna karamto. 
Kayen ashabi Matalan fi lobnan, andhom haka tajarob w kalouli anou lma’icha fi lobnan mch 
mliha la souriyin w saro yemsaho b karamthom el ard ma’aa ano b harb 2006 fi lobnan nahna 
b souriya stakbalna lobnaniyin w fatahnalhom byoutna bessah homa daro el ‘aks lama jatna el 
azma fi souriya…]. By the end of our discussion, Yasser expressed his willingness to continue 
living in Algeria even if the political situation in Syria stabilises in the future. When he first 
arrived in Algeria, he considered Algeria as a transit point to reach Europe, but it was the level 
of social inclusion, openness and tolerance that encouraged him to stay in Algeria compared to 
what he heard about social exclusion of Syrian Muslim refugees in Europe, where they have 
faced ‘practices of deportation, detention and [where] dispersal [has] become ‘normalised’ 
rather than ‘exceptional’ instruments (Schuster, 2004, p. 01)’. Yasser perceived citizenship as 
a sense of social belonging because, to him, social inclusion is more important than just holding 
an Algerian passport and still being socially excluded. 
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8.2.2. The Visibility of Power in Algeria’s Response to the Flow of Syrian 
Displaced People 
 
Foucauldian view on power differentiates between repressive, normalising and regulating types 
of power. As stated in chapter 2 of the present thesis, power is not always negative and 
physically exercised, it can also be positive and psychologically implemented within a specific 
context. Additionally, power can either be visibly or invisibly practiced. In terms of Foucault’s 
conceptualisation of power, within the Algerian context and through analysing the 
government’s response to the flow of Syrian displaced people to the country, this research 
revealed how sovereign power was barely noticeable in daily lives of Syrians, but the state’s 
response still alternates between normalising power and regulating powers. The notion of 
biopower is more visible in the state’s response to the flow of Syrian displaced population. For 
instance, exceptional restrictions over mixed marriages between Syrians and Algerians and 
difficulties to register new-borns to unmarried couples. This reflects a lack of congruency 
between laws and their implementations and real practices at a societal level because the 
Algerian law permits mixed marriages, but this option was exceptionally frozen due to the 
state’s strategy of securitisation and the production of new knowledge around Syrian displaced 
people after 2015. In this regard, chapter 7 explained how the state produced the Syrian 
displaced community as a potential threat to the national security of the state and its local 
population. Difficulties to register new-borns of unmarried couples, on the other hand, is not 
only applied against Syrians, but it is equally applied against Algerian citizens. Though having 
different reasons, and belonging to different socio-cultural contexts, this act reminds me of 
Foucault’s ‘repressive hypothesis’ (Foucault, 1990a, p. 10 emphasis added). Difficulties to 
register babies to unmarried Syrian or Algerian couples can be seen as what Foucault called a 
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‘repressive hypothesis’ that supressed any discussions about sex in the 17th century among 
people of the bourgeois society (Foucault, 1990a). Although invisible, there is still an 
implication of power here because this repressive power and ‘censorship’ (Foucault, 1990a, p. 
17 emphasis added) supressed discourse around non-marital sexual relationships, single 
mothers within the Algerian society that is governed by Islamic ethics, values and thoughts. 
The latter can be referred to as ‘episteme’ ((Foucault, 1972, p. 192, emphasis added) which 
unconsciously governed the thoughts of Fatima. This censorship is conducted by both the 
Algerian society, and the state through its institutions namely: hospitals. It can be observed 
through what Fatima, from the Algerian cohort, argued: ‘…we are Muslims …  the Algerian 
society is a conservative society, and we should not encourage the phenomenon of single 
mothers …’. In addition to Fatima’s argument, Hassiba (60), a midwife at Mustapha Pacha 
hospital in Algiers confirmed that for new-borns to be registered at the hospital, the Syrian or 
Algerian couple need to prove their legitimate marriage. Additionally, the state’s exceptional 
response to high demands of mixed marriages between Syrians and Algerians with restriction 
and ban remains a highly biopolitical feature of state power. This aimed at enhancing the well-
being of the local population by preserving the nature of the Algerian citizenship / 
Algerianness, but still includes Syrians in a disciplinary system of control through, for instance, 
document checks and renewal of their residence permits. Institutions are a part of this 
disciplinary system such as hospitals, schools, the Foreigners’ Office (Maktab El Adjanib). The 
obligation for Syrians to renew their short-residence permits every 45 days is a way of 
controlling the mobility of Syrians inside and outside Algeria. Bachir (25), an owner of a small 
family business in Algiers, stated that:  
 
‘…I have an obligation to renew my short-residence permits every 45 days… I have to go to the Foreigners’ 
Office that will check our records… we do not have to pay money to do it…’[fi iltizamat Matalan tajdid awrak fi 
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maktab el Adjanib kol 45 youm lazem nrouh nkhtom … ychoufo awrakna w yjadoulna bi doun ma nkhelass 
drahem…]. 
 
Another manifestation of control can be observed through the obligation of Syrians to either 
submit proofs of accommodation or find Algerian sponsors or long-residence permit holders 
of Syrian origins prior to arrival to Algeria. Identifying Syrians by their Algerian sponsors that 
are citizens or documented Syrians that should be long-residence permit holders in the country 
is a state’s implicit technology of control that was implemented as a part of the state’s strategy 
and rationalities of securitisation. As stated in previous chapters (chapter 7), Wafae’s visa 
applications were denied until she secured an Algerian sponsor, Fatima Zohra, that was able to 
sponsor her and provide her with proofs of sponsorship and accommodation. This means, until 
the state identified a way to control and monitor Wafae’s circulation in the country, she was 
then granted an entry visa to Algeria in 2016. Although not a guarantee, the state would expect 
Wafae’s conduct less likely to deviate from the disciplinary system because she is already a 
part of it, and she is still identifiable and recognized. 
 
8.2.3. Modes of Subjectivation: Who is Biopolitically Legitimate?  
 
In the absence of a refugee law that would have identified who might be granted a refugee 
status and who might be rejected, the Algerian state has to adopt specific biopolitical 
technologies to identify the suffering body that deserves care and inclusion. Within a 
biopolitical logic, in order to determine who is a genuine refugee, the refugee body is perceived 
as an object of politics that can be perceived either as a ‘suffering body’ or a ‘dangerous body’ 
(Judge, 2010, p. 15). The ‘suffering body’ assesses the vulnerability of a war refugee and does 
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not fit in the case of political refugees (Schindel, 2016, p. 22; emphasis added). The treatment 
of a “suffering body” in Algeria works in parallel to norms of hospitality and solidarity in 
Algeria and the values of the host community. Unlike businessmen and long-residence permit 
holders, short-residence permit holders do not usually access the state’s scheme of health 
insurance. This category enjoys free access to healthcare but not health insurance which made 
them eligible to receive free medications. However, biopolitical governmentality that governs 
displaced people identifies Syrian pregnant women, new-borns and people with chronic 
conditions as “suffering bodies” that will receive medical support and health insurance in 
addition to their legitimate right to free healthcare. ‘Within the sector of education, pupils with 
mental disabilities can also be integrated into the scheme of psychopedagogy offered by the 
Ministry of National Solidarity, Family Affairs and the Status of Women’, Salima confirmed. 
Salima (37), a psychologist and a mental health therapist in Algiers and a member of charity 
organisations in Algiers confirmed: 
 
‘…I am aware that certain groups of people can receive help in terms of medication … they should get in touch 
with social assistants in the state’s hospitals…’ […kayen des groups li t’awenhom dawla min nahiyat dawe … 
lazem ychoufo maa el mosa’idin el ijtimae’iyin fi mostachfayat dawla…]. 
 
However, this does not end the ordeal of Syrian displaced people as it does not qualify them to 
long-term residency and, thereafter, to naturalisation. Within the Algerian state discourse, these 
Syrians are not labelled as “suffering bodies” or “refugees”, the kinship between Syrians and 
Algerians, moral values of solidarity, Arabness and Islam qualified them as “guests”. The 
“guest” status is not legal, but socio-political and does not grant Syrians a legitimate right to 
naturalisation. For instance, analysis chapter (chapter 6 and chapter 7) illustrated how the 
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state’s understanding of a suffering body have been constantly changing in response to certain 
circumstances. The socio-political scene of a group of Syrians that were trapped between the 
Algerian-Moroccan borders reflected a paradoxical scene of conflicting conceptualisations of 
the “suffering body” at a state level. One would question how the same group of people were 
considered as “potential danger” when they were outside the borders, as soon as they were 
granted entry to Algeria, they became “suffering bodies” that deserved care and were later 
labelled as “guests”. The identification of a suffering body remains, to some extent, vague and 
ambiguous and subject to constant change. According to biogovernmental thinking, the 
analysis chapters (6 and 7) have shown that these practices certainly reflect conflicts of power 
and strategies in the Algerian context namely: hospitality, securitisation, and humanitarianism. 
 
Since 2015 until the present (2021), the state production of knowledge around refugees has 
changed and the “suffering body” has become a “dangerous body”. All Syrian displaced people 
are now associated with illegality and potential terrorism unless they are able to prove the 
opposite in their visa files. Providing humanitarian support is another governing strategy 
adopted by the Algerian state which offers equal social rights as the previously stated 
approaches. Syrians who are eligible for humanitarian support should register with the UNHCR 
office in Algiers. However, Nirmin was one of my Syrian respondents who registered with the 
UNHCR in Algiers. ‘…This registration is my guarantee against illegal deportation’ [ana 
msajla fi lmofawadiya michan mayrahlouni kassran kharej el balad], stated Nirmin. What 
makes the three state strategies similar in rationale is that they refuse the right to Algerian 
citizenship as the majority of Syrians do not have long-residence permits issued by the Algerian 
state, except for a minority of businessmen and those who were able to prove relation by blood 
or marriage to the Algerian leader, Amir Abdu El Kader el Jazaei’ri, that lived in Damascus in 
the 19th century until his death. In terms of biopolitical governmentality, strategies and 
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discourses of hospitality, security and humanitarian support are designed to govern the 
Algerian local population by limiting its diversity. The Syrian displaced community are not 
denied entry to the national territory of Algeria but are precluded from legalising their status 
which may make them eligible to naturalisation after spending seven years of continuous 
residence in Algeria. This is again due to the colonial past and post-colonial present that still 
governs the openness of Algerian citizenship and the 21st security challenges Algeria is facing 
in the age of international terrorism.   
     
8.3. Final Reflections, Contribution to Knowledge and Limitations  
 
The present thesis provides a significant interdisciplinary knowledge by contributing into 
different fields of research in the Algerian context. First and foremost, this research sheds light 
on a neglected and unresearched sociological phenomenon within the Algerian context which 
is human displacement. Although Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh and Mohamed Saïb Musette 
significantly contributed into the field by reporting the situation of mass migration in Algeria, 
I believe a deep understanding into how political and social actors are shaping the lives of 
displaced people is also of a paramount importance. In order to achieve this, the present thesis 
has adopted a Foucauldian approach to look at how the lives of Syrian displaced people are 
shaped by state’s power and how Syrians reflect to it. This thesis analysed the power games 
and deduced that due to the lack of an official refugee mechanism in Algeria, the state has 
adopted different strategies namely hospitality, security and humanitarianism to regulate and 
govern the Syrian displaced people.  
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Secondly, the present thesis contributed in understanding the nature of Algerian citizenship and 
introduced a new perspective into looking at factors of inclusion / exclusion set by the state in 
the age of mass migration and international terrorism in the 21st century. It revealed that 
Algerian citizenship and Algerianness depend on the level of loyalty that a potential citizen 
should show to the nation. However, what is controversial about this point is that loyalty cannot 
be measured, and nothing guarantees that all Algerian citizens are truly loyal to the nation. As 
such and because these Syrians could not receive Algerian citizenship or legal status after 
spending more than 7 years of continuous residency in the country, they have been differently 
labelled either as ‘guests’, brothers / sisters in faith and Arabité’, or as ‘potential danger’. These 
labels developed an identity crisis among the Syrian community and placed it ‘at the edges of 
citizenship’ where Syrians neither feel as ‘insiders’ nor as ‘outsiders’ (Hepworth, 2015, p.09). 
Finally, using a Foucauldian understanding of power, this thesis introduced a new perspective 
of investigating power games in the Algerian context that is always portrayed as a symbol of 
authoritarianism in the West. Indeed, the present thesis shows how power within the Algerian 
context is also positive in the way it protects and boosts the well-being of the local and 
displaced population in Algeria.  
 
As any academic research, the present thesis has limitations in terms of generalisability when 
viewing the findings. This means that the results presented in this research cannot be 
generalised to all displaced minorities in Algeria or even within the Syrian community itself. 
Having lived in two different cities in Algeria: Algiers and Ouargla, my Syrian respondent: 
Riyadh, described the mentality of people in Algiers and mentality of people in Ouargla as 
different if not, sometimes, contradictory. What Riyadh argued provides an interesting starting 
point for another research which may compare and contrast the experience of Syrian displaced 
people in different regions in Algeria.  
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Additionally, What Foucault’s governmentality and the conceptualisation of power failed to 
cover is that within non-secular states and societies, where religion (Islam) plays an important 
role in the social and political life, such as the case of Algeria, there was an encounter with 
divine power and state power. The present research reported that within the Algerian context, 
there was no place for liberalism or neo-liberalism when it comes to the state meeting the 
challenges of human displacement, instead, in Algeria there was a constant struggle between 
divine power and state’s power within the state’s decisions of including and excluding Syrians. 
This was referred to as levels or nuances of inclusion. One of the examples is while in the name 
of Islam, Syrians should belong because they are a part of the Islamic Ummah; in the name of 
security, on the other hand, they were completely excluded because they have been perceived 
as potential threat to the nation.    
 
8.4. Gaps for Future Research 
 
Within a Foucauldian perspective of biopolitical governmentality, the present thesis focussed 
on power games behind the state discourses that have governed displaced people, but the field 
of migration and refugeeness in Algeria still remains underexplored and neglected by 
researchers. As with any empirical research, the present thesis could not cover every aspect of 
refugeeness in the Algerian context due to time and financial constraints and methodological 
limitations. Further research may adopt the same theoretical foundation of the present thesis 
but could shed light on other displaced communities in Algeria such as Sahrawis or Africans. 
However, working with the same people: i.e., Syrians, future research can investigate the 
experience of Syrian women in Algeria that would enrich social research related to migration 
and refugeeness in Algeria.  
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The present thesis revealed that Syrian women are not always encouraged to work or integrate 
into the Algerian society because most Syrian women required their male siblings to take 
decisions on their behalf in case they wanted to study, work or even participate in researches. 
The reason for Syrian males’ control over Syrian females was because they believed that the 
Algerian society and Algerian women, in particular, are influenced by the West in terms their 
lifestyle and culture. This research can document the voice of Syrian women and shed light on 
how Syrians see the Algerian society from their perspective with a special focus on how Syrian 
women perceive Algerian women. It can answer questions like: do Syrian women believe they 
had the same rights when they were in Syria compared to women in Algiers? What do Syrian 
women think about the lifestyle of Algerian women, their ability to work, their involvement 
into the socio-political aspect of life? This research may go beyond Algiers and provide a 
comparative analysis between the experience of Syrian women in Algiers and the experience 
of other Syrian women living outside Algiers. I remember the attitude of one of my Syrian 
participants, Iyad, who was in a visit to Algiers on the day of our meeting but was living in 
Ouargla in the South. He believed that unlike people in Algiers who he felt were westernised, 
people in Ouargla were very conservative and they still follow an Arab and traditional lifestyle. 
As such, a comparative study between different cities in Algeria such as: Algiers and Ouargla, 
for instance, would give more information about how the Syrian community perceives the 
Algerian society.  
 
Research can also focus on the employment of Syrian women in Algiers. For instance, during 
my fieldwork, I met only one working female, Lara, in Baba Hassan that used to work at her 
brother’s small fabric factory. Syrian females seemed very dependent on their husbands or their 
male siblings. The men decide if women work or if they stay at home. Lara’s small family 
business was opened and started to operate because her brother was married to an Algerian 
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citizen and held a long-residence permit which allowed him to own properties in his name. 
When it comes to employment and training, Syrian women, who are dependent on their male 
siblings, are the most marginalised group. Similarly, in Canada, for instance, within the 
framework of the state’s neoliberal immigration policy, males are given the opportunity to be 
employed (Basok & Ilcan, 2013, p. 78). In Britain, immigrant women and asylum seekers do 
not receive enough state support and their chances of becoming citizens are low (Basok & 
Ilcan, 2013: 78). Within the Algerian context, the research data revealed that a minority if not 
very few Syrian females worked in the fields of sewing and embroidery as assistants to their 
brothers, husbands or their fathers. Lara, for instance, argued that her main responsibility is to 
deal with female employees and female customers only. Her brother’s tasks are to deal with 
male customers and deliver parcels to different parts in Algeria. I believe that the absence of 
Syrian females in the labour-market in Algeria can be traced back to a cultural barrier among 
the Syrian community and to the perception of female workers within the Syrian community. 
The gap I suggested may cover cultural issues that may hinder Syrian women from full 
integration into the Algerian society or obstacles that limit their access to employment in 
Algeria. In addition to employment, as previously mentioned, Amar was not happy with his 
sister’s integration into the Algerian society. He criticised her of being algerianised since the 
time she started going to the university in Algiers. By algerianised, Amar meant that his sister 
started following Algerian culture and lifestyle and abandoned her Syrian culture.  
 
Research that sheds light on the experience of Syrian women in Algeria may also shed light on 
Syrian female students and the challenges, perceptions or even prejudgments that they faced 
within their own community. Additionally, this research may also cover Syrian women that 
have chosen begging instead of working in order to financially support themselves and their 
families. Ayman, for instance, denounced Syrian people including women that have chosen 
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begging as a source of their income and described them as Bedoons that were not “true” Syrians 
but were naturalised by Assad’s government to win presidential elections. In his words, Ayman 
called them: ‘Nawar and Ghajar’, by which they are known in Syria. “Nawar”, “Ghajar” or 
“Arbat” mean gypsies or nomads that do not have a specific place to settle at, but they move 
from one place to another, Ayman explained. By focussing on this point, this research may 
provide more details about psychological and social construction of an ideal Syrian citizen and 
the discrimination and racism against these women within the Syrian community. In sum, most 
researchers within the field of migration and human displacement investigated the 
discrimination or racism that the refugee community would face from the host population, 
however, my fieldwork revealed that there is discrimination among refugees themselves. The 
gap I have suggested would give an insight about the possible challenges and acts of 
discrimination that takes place within the refugee community. Focussing on the experience of 
Syrian women in Algeria, is a rich gap which allows social researchers to understand more 
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Interview with the Syrian displaced community in Algiers (Probing 
questions may appear during the interview) 
 
❖ Social networks and social cohesion 
 
• Would you tell me why did you choose to come to Algeria rather than other countries? 
• Do you have relatives in Algeria? Where did you stay when you first came? 
• What is it like to live in Algeria? Do you feel you are isolated or marginalized? 
• Are you married to an Algerian? If yes, do you have children? Do they have their papers 
(birth certificates, nationality)?  
• What are peoples’ attitudes towards you as non-Algerians? (hospitality Vs hostility) 
• Do you think Syrians and Algerians are different? If yes, in terms of what (values, 
religion, moral principles…)? Are Algerians tolerant and open to you as a different 
group of people? Could you give me some examples from your own experience?  
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• What would you say about levels of tolerance, freedom (of thought, speech, 
movement…), equality, justice, solidarity, security, dignity, discrimination, denial, 
hatred, rejection, xenophobia, and harassment practiced towards you by the Algerian 
community/ Algerian authorities? Did you experience any of this since you came to 
Algeria? If yes, what were the cause(s) and the result(s)? Could you give me some 
examples of your experience? 
• Are there any imposed obligations on you, as Syrian, by the Algerian local community/ 
Algerian authorities? What impact (positive or negative) this may have on your daily 
lives? 
• Apart from the political rights, do you think that you have the same rights as Algerians? 
What kind of rights you enjoy?  
• Do you think that the Algerian national community and the Algerian state have 
succeeded or failed in assisting and socially caring for Syrian refugees/ immigrants?  
 
❖ Legal procedures 
 
• When did you arrive? What were the checking procedures you went through once you 
arrived? 
• Did you enter with a Visa? If yes, how many times did you apply for it? What kind of 
requirements that you think are strict? 
• Who welcomed you upon your arrival? 
• What kind of legal procedures you went through after you arrived? 
• Do you have any legal papers or ID cards issued by the Algerian state? Do they tell 
about your status in Algeria? Have you been granted a status? What is it? Do you need 
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to renew your papers, or do you need to do a regular checking? What are the authorities 
responsible to do the usual checking?  
• Do you have a right for family reunification?  
• Are you free to move within Algeria? Are there any procedures you need to do before 
you travel from one city to another? 
 
❖ Belonging and National Identity 
 
• According to you, what and who is a citizen? What makes a good citizen?  
• As a Syrian, do feel yourself a stranger to and within the Algerian society? Why? Why 
not? 
• Can you openly and freely reveal your identity, race, religious beliefs, nationality and 
your ethnic division in Algeria? Why? Why not? 
• After you came to Algeria, what do you feel in terms of belonging? Do you still miss 
Syria? Do you want to go back, or you prefer to stay in Algeria? 
• Since the time you came to Algeria, do you think that the social circumstances helped 
you to be and maintain who you are in terms of your religious beliefs and national 
cultural identity? Yes/no and why? 
 




• What do you do for living? Do you have an income? Did you find any job? With whom 
do you work? Who helped you to get this job 
• Did you change your job when you came to Algeria? Do you have a qualification? 
• What do you want to do, in terms of work, in Algeria? 
• Are there any restrictions on work such as the bureaucratic procedures? 
• Do you receive any financial help? If yes, who is in charge of that and what do you do 
instead? 
• Where do you live? Is it public or private housing? Are you renting? How do you come 
to pay? 
• Do you have children, if yes, do they do to schools? How did you register them? What 
are the procedures? 
• Do you receive healthcare? Private or public? Is it free?  

















 Interview schedule for the state official at the Foreigners’ Office in central 
Algiers   
 
• What are the state’s facilities of reception (social welfare systems, public education, 
public health and housing facilities) and inclusion of Syrian refugees and Syrian 
immigrants or asylum into Algeria?  
• Why do Syrian refugees need visa to enter Algeria? Why was this introduced? Are they 
more likely to receive it or not? Why and why not?  
• Knowing that the Algerian authority has not yet adopted a national refugee law, how 
does it manage the flow of Syrian refugees and Syrian immigrants? 
• Does the Algerian state determine their status? If yes, what is it? What rights and 
responsibilities do they have under this status? 
• What are the criteria of and procedures for determining their status? 
• Can they apply for the Algerian citizenship? Why and why not? What are likely to be 
the conditions? 
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• If a Syrian immigrant or refugee’s application to Algerian citizenship is rejected, do 
they still have the right to remain in Algeria? Why and why not? 
• Do Syrian immigrants or refugees have the right for family reunification? Do they have 
the right to leave the Algerian territory and enter freely? 
• How does the Algerian state manage the flow of refugees along with the UNHCR? 
• Are Syrian refugees / Syrian immigrants at risks of deportation? If yes, when are they 
are forced to leave the Algerian territory? 
• What is the state’s policy to accommodate refugees and provide financial assistance, 
jobs, provide healthcare and to provide education to children?  
• Would you tell me more about the state’s legal reception and integration policies? 
Which ministry/ authority is in charge of that?  
• Does policy exclude those in need of international protection from reaching safety? 
• Who is liable to deportation or detention? Why? In case they refuse, what would the 
Algeria state do?   













Interview schedule for the state representative at the level of the Algerian 
Red Crescent 
 
• Do you usually welcome refugees upon their arrival?  
• Who is meant to receive humanitarian aid? 
• Do you receive assistance from donors? Who are these donors? National charity 
organisations, NGOs or or the state? 
• What sort of humanitarian aid do you provide to Syrian refugees? Emotional, financial 
…? 
• How did you manage to cover the humanitarian crisis especially after the large flow of 
refugees? 
• Does the absence of a national formal mechanism of granting refugee/ asylum status in 
Algeria affect your procedures of supporting people in need?  
• Do you think that you managed to cover the Syrians’ humanitarian needs? 
• Do you work with the UNHCR? If yes, how would you collaborate and share 
responsibility to cover Syrians’ needs? 
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• What do you think of the resources you are providing? Do they have a great impact in 
changing refugees’ situation to the better? If no, why? How can you develop them? 
• Do you ensure dignified treatment to refugees in need of humanitarian support? How 
would you do that? 
 
Appendix 3 
Interviews with providers of social welfare assistance / social rights  
 
A- Interview with healthcare providers 
 
• Do you usually receive Syrian patients in the state hospitals? 
• If yes? Do they receive the same services / benefits as Algerians? Do they receive free 
healthcare regardless their status?  
• What are the limitations / restrictions / challenges that Syrian patients usually face at 
the state hospitals? 
• Who receives what in terms of their legal status? do they have health insurance?  
 
B- Interview with teacher 
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• What kind of challenges your Syrian pupils may have experienced ?; eg. linguistic 
challenges, integration into the educational setting, problems with their Algerian peers 
… and the like. 
 
C- Interview with property owners (private accommodation) 
 
• Do you usually rent your property to Syrians? 
• What are the legal procedures of signing the tenancy agreement? 
• What if a Syrian does not have a legal status, do you rent to them?  
 
D- Interview with employer 
 
• Can Syrians submit job applications at your company? 
• On what basis do you accept Syrian employees?  
• What about their legal status and qualifications? 
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